Beliefs about informal payments in Albania

Informal payments for health care are a growing concern in Albania and other transitional economy countries. Recent international studies have shown that informal payments can have negative effects on health care access, equity and health status by causing people to forgo or delay seeking care, or sell assets to pay for care. Many countries are putting in place reforms meant to reduce informal payments. In order to be successful, such policies need to consider people's attitudes and beliefs about the practice. This study collected data from 222 citizens in Albania regarding intentions, past behaviours, attitudes and beliefs about informal payments. Comparing people who intend to make informal payments with people who do not intend to make payments, the study found differences in attitudes as well as beliefs about the consequences of making informal payments, in perceptions about what others think and in control beliefs, but no difference in moral beliefs or demographic characteristics. People who intend to make informal payments the next time they seek care are more likely to believe they will get faster and better quality care than non-intenders, but also think they must pay to receive any care at all. People who do not intend to make informal payments are more likely to report that they have connections with medical personnel, which may be substituting for informal payments. The study has implications for educational campaigns accompanying policy reforms. Campaigns which focus on anti-corruption messages are unlikely to be effective, as moral beliefs do not appear to influence intention.     

Informal payments in public hospitals in Greece

Informal payments are an ingrained social institution in Greece. In some cases, they are also part of corruption in the health area, which includes a variety of other forms. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this paper is to measure and analyze the size and nature of informal payments in the Greek public hospitals, concentrating on payments made to health personnel to facilitate access to services and preferred providers. METHODS: We used a randomized countrywide sample of 1616 households, amounting to 4738 individuals. The survey methodology was telephone interviews with a questionnaire supported by the software of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing. RESULTS: Out of the total number of those reporting treatment in public hospitals (N=336), 36% reported at least one informal payment to a doctor. Of these, 42% reported it was given because of the fear of receiving sub-standard care (if they did not pay) and another 20% claimed that the doctor demanded such a payment. None of the socio-economic characteristics of the family were related to the size of extra (informal) payments. The probability of extra payments is 72% higher for patients aiming to "jump the queue", compared to those admitted through normal procedures. Also, surgical cases had a 137% higher probability for extra payments compared to non-surgical patients. CONCLUSIONS: A very high percentage of informal payments are made in order to gain access to public hospitals and to receive a higher quality of services. Despite near universal coverage of the population by public health insurance, informal payments are widespread and a major source of inequity and inefficiency in the Greek health care system.     

The link between past informal payments and willingness of the Hungarian population to pay formal fees for health care services: results from a contingent valuation study

We examine the willingness of health care consumers to pay formal fees for health care use and how this willingness to pay is associated with past informal payments. We use data from a survey carried out in Hungary in 2010 among a representative sample of 1,037 respondents. The contingent valuation method is used to elicit the willingness to pay official charges for health care services covered by the social health insurance if certain quality attributes (regarding the health care facility, access to the services and health care personnel) are guaranteed. A bivariate probit model is applied to examine the relationship between willingness to pay and past informal payments. We find that 66 % of the respondents are willing to pay formal fees for specialist examinations and 56 % are willing to pay for planned hospitalizations if these services are provided with certain quality and access attributes. The act of making past informal payments for health care services is positively associated with the willingness to pay formal charges. The probability that a respondent is willing to pay official charges for health care services is 22 % points higher for specialist examinations and 45 % points higher for hospitalization if the respondent paid informally during the last 12 months. The introduction of formal fees should be accompanied by adequate service provision to assure acceptance of the fees. Furthermore, our results suggest that the problem of informal patient payments may remain even after the implementation of user fees.     

Understanding informal payments in health care: motivation of health workers in Tanzania

Background  

There is growing evidence that informal payments for health care are fairly common in many low- and middle-income countries. Informal payments are reported to have a negative consequence on equity and quality of care; it has been suggested, however, that they may contribute to health worker motivation and retention. Given the significance of motivation and retention issues in human resources for health, a better understanding of the relationships between the two phenomena is needed. This study attempts to assess whether and in what ways informal payments occur in Kibaha, Tanzania. Moreover, it aims to assess how informal earnings might help boost health worker motivation and retention.     

“If the Big Fish are Doing It Then Why Not Me Down Here?”: Informal Fee Payments and Reproductive Health Care Provider Motivation in Kenya

Informal fees are payments made by patients to their health care provider that are over and above the official cost of services. Payments may be motivated by a combination of factors such as low supervision, weak sanctions, and inadequate provider salaries. The practice of soliciting informal fees from patients may result in restricted access to medical care and reduced care-seeking behavior among vulnerable populations. The objective of this study is to examine nuanced health care provider perspectives on informal fee payments solicited from reproductive health patients in Kenya. We conducted in-depth semistructured interviews in 2015–2016 among a sample of 20 public and private-sector Kenyan health care workers. Interviews were coded and analyzed using an iterative thematic approach. More than half of participants reported that solicitation of informal fees is common practice in health care facilities. Providers reported low public-sector wages were a primary driver of informal fee solicitation coupled with collusion among senior staff. Additionally, patients may be unaware that they are being asked to pay more than the official cost of services. Strategies for reducing this behavior include more adequate and timely remuneration within the public sector, educating patient populations of free or low-cost services, and evidence-based methods to increase provider motivation.     

Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: Evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India

This paper tests the effectiveness of performance pay and bonuses among government childcare workers in India. In a controlled study of 160 ICDS centers serving over 4000 children, we randomly assign workers to either fixed bonuses or payments based on the nutritional status of children in their care, and also collect data from a control group receiving only standard salaries. In all three study arms mothers receive nutrition information. We find that performance pay reduces underweight prevalence by about 5 percentage points over 3 months, and height improves by about one centimeter. Impacts on weight continue when incentives are renewed and return to parallel trends thereafter. Fixed bonuses are less expensive but lead to smaller and less precisely estimated effects than performance pay, especially for children near malnutrition thresholds. Both treatments improve worker effort and communication with mothers, who in turn feed a more calorific diet to children at home.     

Paying informally in the Albanian health care sector: a two-tiered stochastic frontier model

Informal payments are deeply ingrained in the health care sector of most Central, Eastern and Southern European countries. Evidence suggests that the price paid informally to medical staff is negotiated either directly or indirectly between patients and medical staff. The aim of this paper is to measure the imperfect information that exists on the amount that has to be paid informally to medical staff. We measure the extent to which patients pay more than the amount medical staff expect informally and the extent to which medical staff request less than patients are willing to pay informally. A two-tiered stochastic frontier model is developed to estimate indicators of patients’ and medical staff’s imperfect information on informal payments and the effects on the amount the other party is minimally expecting or maximally willing to pay informally. The estimates are based on informal payments to medical staff in the inpatient health care sector in Albania. We use data from the Albania Living Standards Measurement Survey 2002 and 2005. The pooled samples include 707 individuals who have visited inpatient health care services in these 2?years. Our results show that medical staff has less information on the patients’ maximum willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical staff’s minimum expected amount. These estimates do not depend on categories of illnesses but on certain socio-demographic characteristics.     

Health worker remuneration in WHO Member States

Objective

To present the available data on the money spent by Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) on remunerating health workers in the public and private sectors.

Methods

Data on government and total expenditure on health worker remuneration were obtained through a review of official documents in WHO’s Global Health Expenditure Database and directly from country officials and country official web sites. Such data are presented in this paper, by World Bank country income groups, in millions of national currency units per calendar year for salaried and non-salaried health workers. They are presented as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), total health expenditure and general government health expenditure. The average yearly change in remuneration (i.e. compound annual growth rate) between 2000 and 2012 as a function of these parameters was also assessed.

Findings

On average, payments to health workers of all types accounted for more than one third of total health expenditure across countries. Such payments have grown faster than countries’ GDPs but less rapidly than total health expenditure and general government health expenditure. Remuneration of health workers, on the other hand, has grown faster than that of other types of workers.

Conclusion

As they seek to attain universal health coverage (UHC), countries will need to devote an increasing proportion of their GDPs to health and health worker remuneration. However, the fraction of total health expenditure devoted to paying health workers seems to be declining, partly because the pursuit of UHC calls for strengthening the health system as a whole.     

Out-of-pocket payments for health care in Serbia

BackgroundThis study focuses on out-of-pocket payments for health care in Serbia. In contrast to previous studies, we distinguish three types of out-of-pocket patient payments: official co-payments, informal (under-the-table) payments and payments for “bought and brought goods” (i.e. payments for health care goods brought by the patient to the health care facility).MethodsWe analyse the probability and intensity of three different types of out-of-pocket patient payments in the public health care sector in Serbia and their distribution among different population groups. We use data from the Serbian Living Standard Measures Study carried out in 2007. Out-of-pocket patients payments for both outpatient and inpatient health care are included. The data are analysed using regression analysis.ResultsThe majority of health care users report official co-payments (84.7%) and payments for “bought and brought goods” (61.1%), whereas only 5.7% health care users declare that they have paid informally. Regarding the regression results, users with an income below the poverty line, those from rural areas and who are not married are more likely to report payments for “bought and brought goods, while young and more educated users are more likely to report informal patient payments.ConclusionOverall, the three types of out-of-pocket payments are not correlated. Payments for “bought and brought goods” take the highest share of the total annual household budget. Serbian policymakers need to consider different strategies to deal with informal payments and to eliminate the practice of “bought and brought goods”.     

An alternative way of understanding exit,voice and loyalty: the case of informal payments for health care in Israel

This study examines Hirschman's model of exit, voice and loyalty with regard to informal payments in the Israeli healthcare system. Based on a national survey, we investigate the extent of “black” payments, its characteristics and its correlated factors. We find that informal payments do exist in Israel—although it seems that there has been a decline in the phenomenon. Contrary to the literature, we find no relationship between the option of voice or dissatisfaction with healthcare services and informal payments. However, we do find a negative correlation between trust and the use of such payments. This finding is consistent with Hirschman's insight that a lack of loyalty may lead people to strategies of exit. We suggest that given the fact that health care in Israel is a public service, the exit option may actually be a quasi‐exit behavior. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informal payment for health care: evidence from Hungary

While there is a growing body of evidence that informal payments for health care are widespread and enduring in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, evidence on the scale of the phenomenon is not only limited, but what is available is often conflicting. Hungary exemplifies this controversy, as the available literature provides conflicting figures, differing by an order of magnitude among various surveys, with a similarly large difference between survey findings and expert estimates. This study advances understanding of the methodological issues involved in researching informal payments by providing a systematic analysis of the methodology of available empirical research and official statistics on the scale of informal payments in Hungary. The paper explores the potential sources of differences, to assess the scope to reduce the differences between various estimates and to define the upper and lower boundaries within which the true magnitude of informal payments can be expected to lie. Our analysis suggests that in 2001 the overall magnitude of informal payments lay between 16.2 and 50.9 billion HUF (euro 64.8- euro 203.6 million, US dollars 77.1-242.4 million), which amounted to 1.5-4.6% of total health expenditures in Hungary. Looked at this way, informal payments do not seem to be an important source of health care financing. However, as informal payments are unequally distributed among health workers, with the bulk of the money going to physicians, with some not taking any informal payments, family doctors and some specialists may have earned between 60 and 236% of their net official income from this source in 2001. This suggests that it is not the overall amount of informal payment that makes it a policy concern, but the consequences of its unequal distribution among health workers. What is remarkable about informal payments in Hungary is that a relatively small amount of money can keep the system running, which gives rise to the hypothesis that, in certain cases, it is the hope of substantial informal payments in the future that motivates physicians to remain in the system. This is a difficult challenge for policy-makers as it would require a much larger amount of money to achieve equilibrium under any formal alternative.     

Willingness to pay for social health insurance among informal sector workers in Wuhan, China: a contingent valuation study

Background

Most of the about 140 million informal sector workers in urban China do not have health insurance. A 1998 central government policy leaves it to the discretion of municipal governments to offer informal sector workers in cities voluntary participation in a social health insurance for formal sector workers, the so-called 'basic health insurance'(BHI)

Methods

We used the contingent valuation method to assess the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for BHI among informal sector workers, including unregistered rural-to-urban migrants, in Wuhan City, China. We selected respondents in a two-stage self-weighted cluster sampling scheme

Results

On average, informal sector workers were willing to pay substantial amounts for BHI (30 Renminbi (RMB), 95% confidence interval (CI) 27-33) as well as substantial proportions of their incomes (4.6%, 95% CI 4.1-5.1%). Average WTP increased significantly when any one of the copayments of the BHI was removed in the valuation: to 51 RMB (95% CI 46-56) without reimbursement ceiling; to 43 RMB (95% CI 37-49) without deductible; and to 47 RMB (95% CI 40-54) without coinsurance. WTP was higher than estimates of the cost of BHI based on past health expenditure or on premium contributions of formal sector workers. Predicted coverage with BHI declined steeply with the premium contribution at low contribution levels When we applied equity weighting in the aggregation of individual WTP values in order to adjust for inequity in the distribution of income, mean WTP for BHI increased with inequality aversion over a plausible range of the aversion parameter. Holding other factors constant in multiple regression analysis, for a 1% increase in income WTP for BHI with different copayments increased by 0.434-0.499% (all p < 0.0001), and for a 1% increase in past health care expenditure WTP increased by 0.076-0.148% (all p < 0.0004). Being male, a migrant, or without permanent employment significantly decreased WTP for BHI. Education was not a significant determinant of WTP for BHI

Conclusion

Our results suggest that Chinese municipal governments should allow informal sector workers to participate in the BHI. From a normative perspective, BHI for informal sector workers is likely to increase social welfare because average WTP for BHI is significantly higher than estimates of the average cost of BHI. We further find that informal sector workers do not value the BHI as a mechanism to recover the relatively frequent but small financial losses associated with common illnesses, but because it protects against the rare but large financial losses associated with catastrophic care. From a behavioural perspective, our results predict that at a price equal to the average premium contribution of formal sector workers 35% of informal sector workers will enrol in the BHI. Subsidies and changes in insurance attributes (e.g. including catastrophic care and portability) should be effective in increasing BHI coverage. In addition, coverage should expand with rising incomes among informal sector workers in China. Finally, adverse selection will be unlikely to be a large problem, if the BHI is offered to informal sector workers.     

Health sector reform and public sector health worker motivation: a conceptual framework

Motivation in the work context can be defined as an individual's degree of willingness to exert and maintain an effort towards organizational goals. Health sector performance is critically dependent on worker motivation, with service quality, efficiency, and equity, all directly mediated by workers' willingness to apply themselves to their tasks. Resource availability and worker competence are essential but not sufficient to ensure desired worker performance. While financial incentives may be important determinants of worker motivation, they alone cannot and have not resolved all worker motivation problems. Worker motivation is a complex process and crosses many disciplinary boundaries, including economics, psychology, organizational development, human resource management, and sociology. This paper discusses the many layers of influences upon health worker motivation: the internal individual-level determinants, determinants that operate at organizational (work context) level, and determinants stemming from interactions with the broader societal culture. Worker motivation will be affected by health sector reforms which potentially affect organizational culture, reporting structures, human resource management, channels of accountability, types of interactions with clients and communities, etc. The conceptual model described in this paper clarifies ways in which worker motivation is influenced and how health sector reform can positively affect worker motivation. Among others, health sector policy makers can better facilitate goal congruence (between workers and the organizations they work for) and improved worker motivation by considering the following in their design and implementation of health sector reforms: addressing multiple channels for worker motivation, recognizing the importance of communication and leadership for reforms, identifying organizational and cultural values that might facilitate or impede implementation of reforms, and understanding that reforms may have differential impacts on various cadres of health workers.     

Informal payments in government health facilities in Albania: results of a qualitative study

As governments seek to expand access to quality health care services, policy makers in many countries are confronting the problem of informal payments to medical personnel. The aim of this study was to help health planners in Albania understand informal payments occurring in government health facilities. Researchers used in-depth interviews and focus groups with 131 general public and provider informants in three districts. The results suggest that factors promoting informal payments in Albania include perceived low salaries of health staff; a belief that good health is worth any price; the desire to get better service; the fear of being denied treatment; and the tradition of giving a gift to express gratitude. Members of the general public also believe informal payments create uncertainties and anxiety during the care-seeking process, while providers perceive that informal payments harm their professional reputation, induce unnecessary medical interventions, and create discontinuity of care. The study showed that focusing on the most harmful effects and targeting the most vulnerable populations may be one way to gain consensus for policy reform. Understanding citizens' and caregivers' viewpoints is an important step in designing regulatory and bureaucratic interventions.     

Informal payments in transitional economies: implications for health sector reform

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union increasing evidence is emerging of informal payments by patients for health care services that are officially free. There is little information, however, on the characteristics of these payments and the effect that they have on health care reform initiatives. This paper examines these issues and concludes that the endemic and complex nature of such payments suggests that a range of policy tools are necessary to address the negative features of informal payments in those countries undergoing transition.     

Impact of demographic changes on healthcare expenditures and funding in the EU

While there are many international comparisons on the impact of demographic changes on future healthcare expenditures, there are few such comparisons with regard to the impact of demographic changes on future healthcare funding. The purpose of this article is to analyse the impact of demographic changes on healthcare expenditures and funding in 14 selected EU Member States. This article shows that in most countries, healthcare costs per worker are predicted to increase at a faster rate than per capita costs, because workers comprise a decreasing proportion of the total population. On the other hand, the impact of aging on healthcare payments per worker is about the same as healthcare costs per capita because citizens have to make out-of-pocket payments for healthcare. Roughly one-quarter of the predicted income growth of the work-force will be used for aging-related healthcare payments.     

农村基层卫生服务人员工作行为决定机制：基于工作动机理论的分析

目的:利用认知理论对工作动机的解释,提出一个工作行为决定机制理论框架;并利用两县农村基层卫生服务人员的实证数据,验证此框架中激励人员为卫生系统期望的绩效目标而付出努力的前提条件是否实现。结果:农村基层卫生人员"被激励"的两个条件并未得到满足:农村基层卫生服务工作并不能赋予农村基层卫生人员价值观中偏好的生活和技术支持性物质条件;在农村基层卫生人员认知中机构的技术设备是很少或无法满足工作需要的,并且他们在公共卫生和基本医疗服务方面的工作能力有限。结论:为了引导农村基层卫生人员提高对公共卫生工作的积极性和基本医疗服务质量,需要有针对性地设计和改革人员激励制度。     

Human resource development: the management, planning and training of health personnel.

The morale of health personnel is fast becoming the major factor affecting both the sustainability and the quality of health care world-wide. Low morale mirrors problems ranging from declining balance of payments allocation to GNP, and a lack of support for the health system from the very top down to the rigid application of national pay, grading and career structures, and the stress of not being able to do the job properly. While many of these and other problems have been voiced again and again in the press and in the academic literature, much of the work on health manpower development has focused on the planning and production of personnel. This has been with the aim of producing specific categories of better-trained health workers with relevant qualifications, resulting in a heavy emphasis on a quantitative output. In this paper it is argued that the management of health personnel, the qualitative aspect of staff development, has been relatively neglected. Unless and until the management of human resource development receives the attention it needs, seeds of discontent, disillusion and dissatisfaction will ultimately lead to national health services losing their competitiveness as employers. The sustainability and quality of health programmes will then be in even greater jeopardy than they are at present. The planning, production and management components of health manpower development have developed haphazardly as verticle activities. A new term such as 'human resource development; the management of health personnel' might help ensure the concept of an integrated process contingent on economic, political, organizational and other important circumstances.     

Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives

Financial incentives for quality improvement in hospital care [known as pay for performance (P4P)] can be directed to either the hospital level or redistributed to the department level. Theoretically, performance payments distributed to lower organisational levels are more effective in increasing performance than payments directed to the hospital level, but the empirical evidence for this expectation is scarce. This paper compares the performance of hospital departments at hospitals that do and do not redistribute performance payments to the department level. We study a Danish P4P scheme to provide patients with case managers. Applying difference in differences analysis, we estimate a 5 percentage points higher performance at hospital departments that are subject to a direct financial incentive. Our results suggest that payers can improve the effectiveness of P4P payments by distributing payments to the department level rather than the hospital level.     

The inequity of informal payments for health care: the case of Hungary

As in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, informal payments have been a characteristic feature of the Hungarian health care system both during and since the demise of Soviet type socialist rule. Although informal payments continue to be so characteristic in the region, little empirical evidence exists on their scope or working. As far as equity is concerned, it has sometimes been suggested that physicians play a 'Robin Hood' role and subsidise the poor at the expense of the rich. With the aid of an interview survey of a representative sample of the Hungarian population, we examine the distribution of the burden of informal payments across income groups. Results indicate that informal payments are a highly regressive way of funding health care, with Kakwani progressivity indices of -0.38, -0.39, -0.35 and -0.36 for GP, outpatient specialist, hospital, and total care, respectively. The finding that people with lower income pay proportionally more for public health care through informal payments underlines the emptiness of the 'Robin Hood' claims and the need for reform.