The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention convened panels of anthrax experts to review and update guidelines for anthrax postexposure prophylaxis and treatment. The panels included civilian and military anthrax experts and clinicians with experience treating anthrax patients. Specialties represented included internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics, infectious disease, emergency medicine, critical care, pulmonology, hematology, and nephrology. Panelists discussed recent patients with systemic anthrax; reviews of published, unpublished, and proprietary data regarding antimicrobial drugs and anthrax antitoxins; and critical care measures of potential benefit to patients with anthrax. This article updates antimicrobial postexposure prophylaxis and antimicrobial and antitoxin treatment options and describes potentially beneficial critical care measures for persons with anthrax, including clinical procedures for infected nonpregnant adults. Changes from previous guidelines include an expanded discussion of critical care and clinical procedures and additional antimicrobial choices, including preferred antimicrobial drug treatment for possible anthrax meningitis. 相似文献
BACKGROUND: In 1998, the United States Department of Defense initiated the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program. Concerns about vaccine-related adverse health effects followed, prompting several studies. Although some studies used self-reported vaccination data, the reliability of such data has not been established. The purpose of this study was to compare self-reported anthrax vaccination to electronic vaccine records among a large military cohort and to evaluate the relationship between vaccine history and health outcome data. METHODS: Between September 2005 and February 2006 self-reported anthrax vaccination was compared to electronic records for 67,018 participants enrolled in the Millennium Cohort Study between 2001 and 2003 using kappa statistics. Multivariable modeling investigated vaccination concordance as it pertains to subjective health (functional status) and objective health (hospitalization) metrics. RESULTS: Greater than substantial agreement (kappa=0.80) was found between self-report and electronic recording of anthrax vaccination. Of all participants with electronic documentation of anthrax vaccination, 98% self-reported being vaccinated; and of all participants with no electronic record of vaccination, 90% self-reported not receiving a vaccination. There were no differences between vaccinated and unvaccinated participants in overall measures of health. Only the subset of participants who self-reported anthrax vaccination, but had no electronic confirmation, differed from others in the cohort, with consistently lower measures of health as indicated by Medical Outcomes Study 36-Item Short Form Health Survey for Veterans (SF-36V) scores. CONCLUSIONS: These results indicate that military members accurately recall their anthrax vaccinations. Results also suggest that anthrax vaccination among Millennium Cohort participants is not associated with self-reported health problems or broad measures of health problems severe enough to require hospitalization. Service members who self-report vaccination with no electronic documentation of vaccination, however, report lower measures of physical and mental health and deserve further research. 相似文献
We investigated animal and human anthrax cases during a 13-year period in eastern Turkey. From 1992 to 2004, a total of 464 animal and 503 human anthrax cases were detected. Most cases occurred in summer. Anthrax remains a health problem in eastern Turkey, and preventive measures should be taken. 相似文献
Despite the apparently low disease rate from exposure, protection for remediation workers at B. anthracis-contaminated sites is warranted because inhalational anthrax is rapidly progressive and highly fatal, PPE does not guarantee 100% protection, and the risk for developing disease cannot be characterized adequately. The guidelines described here go beyond HAZWOPER requirements and include recommendations for treating inhalation exposure to B. anthracis spores as a medical emergency, medical follow-up as long as the risk for anthrax persists or a worker is receiving antibiotic prophylaxis, accommodation of a mobile workforce, and assurance that workers understand the need for immediate medical attention should symptoms of anthrax occur. Completion of the 6-dose series of anthrax vaccine followed by annual booster doses will decrease the reliance on antibiotics for the prevention of anthrax. Measures to protect workers must include both medical measures (i.e., vaccination, antibiotic prophylaxis, or a combination of both) and measures to prevent exposure (e.g., PPE and environmental controls). 相似文献
Background: A century ago anthrax was a continuing health risk in the town of Kidderminster. The distribution of cases in people and in animals provides an indication of the routes by which spores were disseminated. The response to these cases provides an insight into attitudes to an occupational and environmental risk at the time and can be compared with responses in more recent times.
Aims: To assess the distribution of anthrax cases associated with the use of contaminated wool and to review the response to them.
Methods: The area studied was Kidderminster, Worcestershire, England, from 1900 to 1914. Data sources were national records of the Factory Inspectorate and local records from the infirmary, Medical Officer of Health and inquest reports, and county agricultural records, supplemented by contemporary and later review articles. Case reports and summary data were analysed, and discussions and actions taken to improve precautions reviewed.
Results: There were 36 cases of anthrax, with five deaths, one of which was the sole case of the internal form of the disease. Cases of cutaneous anthrax were most frequently found in those handling raw wool, but they also occurred in workers at later stages of the spinning process and in people with little or no recorded exposure to contaminated wool. Limited precautionary measures were in place at the start of the study period. Some improvements were made, especially in the treatment of infections, but wool with a high risk of anthrax contamination continued to be used and cases continued to arise. Major changes were made to the disposal of waste and to agricultural practice in contaminated areas to curtail outbreaks in farm animals.
Conclusions: The introduction of anthrax as a contaminant of imported wool led not only to cases in the highly exposed groups of workers but also to cases in other members of the population and in farm animals. The measures taken during the study period reduced fatalities from cutaneous anthrax but did not eliminate the disease. Public concern about the cases was muted.