Neural similarity between mentalizing and live social interaction during the transition to adolescence

Social interactions are essential for human development, yet little neuroimaging research has examined their underlying neurocognitive mechanisms using socially interactive paradigms during childhood and adolescence. Recent neuroimaging research has revealed activity in the mentalizing network when children engage with a live social partner, even when mentalizing is not required. While this finding suggests that social‐interactive contexts may spontaneously engage mentalizing, it is not a direct test of how similarly the brain responds to these two contexts. The current study used representational similarity analysis on data from 8‐ to 14‐year‐olds who made mental and nonmental judgments about an abstract character and a live interaction partner during fMRI. A within‐subject, 2 (Mental/Nonmental) × 2 (Peer/Character) design enabled us to examine response pattern similarity between conditions, and estimate fit to three conceptual models of how the two contexts relate: (1) social interaction and mentalizing about an abstract character are represented similarly; (2) interactive peers and abstract characters are represented differently regardless of the evaluation type; and (3) mental and nonmental states are represented dissimilarly regardless of target. We found that the temporal poles represent mentalizing and peer interactions similarly (Model 1), suggesting a neurocognitive link between the two in these regions. Much of the rest of the social brain exhibits different representations of interactive peers and abstract characters (Model 2). Our findings highlight the importance of studying social‐cognitive processes using interactive approaches, and the utility of pattern‐based analyses for understanding how social‐cognitive processes relate to each other.     

Differential involvement of the posterior temporal cortex in mentalizing but not perspective taking

Understanding and predicting other people''s mental states and behavior are important prerequisites for social interactions. The capacity to attribute mental states such as desires, thoughts or intentions to oneself or others is referred to as mentalizing. The right posterior temporal cortex at the temporal–parietal junction has been associated with mentalizing but also with taking someone else''s spatial perspective onto the world—possibly an important prerequisite for mentalizing. Here, we directly compared the neural correlates of mentalizing and perspective taking using the same stimulus material. We found significantly increased neural activity in the right posterior segment of the superior temporal sulcus only during mentalizing but not perspective taking. Our data further clarify the role of the posterior temporal cortex in social cognition by showing that it is involved in processing information from socially salient visual cues in situations that require the inference about other people''s mental states.     

Early and late neural correlates of mentalizing: ALE meta-analyses in adults,children and adolescents

The ability to understand mental states of others is referred to as mentalizing and enabled by our Theory of Mind. This social skill relies on brain regions comprising the mentalizing network as robustly observed in adults but also in a growing number of developmental studies. We summarized and compared neuroimaging evidence in children/adolescents and adults during mentalizing using coordinate-based activation likelihood estimation meta-analyses to inform about brain regions consistently or differentially engaged across age categories. Adults (N = 5286) recruited medial prefrontal and middle/inferior frontal cortices, precuneus, temporoparietal junction and middle temporal gyri during mentalizing, which were functionally connected to bilateral inferior/superior parietal lobule and thalamus/striatum. Conjunction and contrast analyses revealed that children and adolescents (N = 479) recruit similar but fewer regions within core mentalizing regions. Subgroup analyses revealed an early continuous engagement of middle medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and right temporoparietal junction in younger children (8–11 years) and adolescents (12–18 years). Adolescents additionally recruited the left temporoparietal junction and middle/inferior temporal cortex. Overall, the observed engagement of the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and right temporoparietal junction during mentalizing across all ages reflects an early specialization of some key regions of the social brain.     

Differential responses of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and right posterior superior temporal sulcus to spontaneous mentalizing

Previous research suggests a role of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) in metacognitive representation of social information, while the right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) has been linked to social perception. This study targeted these functional roles in the context of spontaneous mentalizing. An animated shapes task was presented to 46 subjects during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Stimuli consisted of video clips depicting animated shapes whose movement patterns prompt spontaneous mentalizing or simple intention attribution. Based on their differential response during spontaneous mentalizing, both regions were characterized with respect to their task‐dependent connectivity profiles and their associations with autistic traits. Functional network analyses revealed highly localized coupling of the right pSTS with visual areas in the lateral occipital cortex, while the dmPFC showed extensive coupling with instances of large‐scale control networks and temporal areas including the right pSTS. Autistic traits were related to mentalizing‐specific activation of the dmPFC and to the strength of connectivity between the dmPFC and posterior temporal regions. These results are in good agreement with the hypothesized roles of the dmPFC and right pSTS for metacognitive representation and perception‐based processing of social information, respectively, and further inform their implication in social behavior linked to autism. Hum Brain Mapp 38:3791–3803, 2017. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Affective and cooperative social interactions modulate effective connectivity within and between the mirror and mentalizing systems

Decoding the meaning of others’ actions, a crucial step for social cognition, involves different neural mechanisms. While the “mirror” and “mentalizing” systems have been associated with, respectively, the processing of biological actions versus more abstract information, their respective contribution to intention understanding is debated. Processing social interactions seems to recruit both neural systems, with a different weight depending on cues emphasizing either shared action goals or shared mental states. We have previously shown that observing cooperative and affective social interactions elicits stronger activity in key nodes of, respectively, the mirror (left posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), superior parietal cortex (SPL), and ventral/dorsal premotor cortex (vPMC/dPMC)) and mentalizing (ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)) systems. To unveil their causal organization, we investigated the effective connectivity underlying the observation of human social interactions expressing increasing cooperativity (involving left pSTS, SPL, and vPMC) versus affectivity (vmPFC) via dynamic causal modeling in 36 healthy human subjects. We found strong evidence for a model including the pSTS and vPMC as input nodes for the observed interactions. The extrinsic connectivity of this model undergoes oppositely valenced modulations, with cooperativity promoting positive modulations of connectivity between pSTS and both SPL (forward) and vPMC (mainly backward), and affectivity promoting reciprocal positive modulations of connectivity between pSTS and vmPFC (mainly backward). Alongside fMRI data, such divergent effective connectivity suggests that different dimensions underlying the processing of social interactions recruit distinct, although strongly interconnected, neural pathways associated with, respectively, the bottom–up visuomotor processing of motor intentions, and the top–down attribution of affective/mental states.     

Mentalizing about emotion and its relationship to empathy

Mentalizing involves the ability to predict someone else''s behavior based on their belief state. More advanced mentalizing skills involve integrating knowledge about beliefs with knowledge about the emotional impact of those beliefs. Recent research indicates that advanced mentalizing skills may be related to the capacity to empathize with others. However, it is not clear what aspect of mentalizing is most related to empathy. In this study, we used a novel, advanced mentalizing task to identify neural mechanisms involved in predicting a future emotional response based on a belief state. Subjects viewed social scenes in which one character had a False Belief and one character had a True Belief. In the primary condition, subjects were asked to predict what emotion the False Belief Character would feel if they had a full understanding about the situation. We found that neural regions related to both mentalizing and emotion were involved when predicting a future emotional response, including the superior temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles, somatosensory related cortices (SRC), inferior frontal gyrus and thalamus. In addition, greater neural activity in primarily emotion-related regions, including right SRC and bilateral thalamus, when predicting emotional response was significantly correlated with more self-reported empathy. The findings suggest that predicting emotional response involves generating and using internal affective representations and that greater use of these affective representations when trying to understand the emotional experience of others is related to more empathy.     

Cognitive and affective theory of mind share the same local patterns of activity in posterior temporal but not medial prefrontal cortex

Understanding emotions in others engages specific brain regions in temporal and medial prefrontal cortices. These activations are often attributed to more general cognitive ‘mentalizing’ functions, associated with theory of mind and also necessary to represent people’s non-emotional mental states, such as beliefs or intentions. Here, we directly investigated whether understanding emotional feelings recruit similar or specific brain systems, relative to other non-emotional mental states. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging with multivoxel pattern analysis in 46 volunteers to compare activation patterns in theory-of-mind tasks for emotions, relative to beliefs or somatic states accompanied with pain. We found a striking dissociation between the temporoparietal cortex, that exhibited a remarkable voxel-by-voxel pattern overlap between emotions and beliefs (but not pain), and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, that exhibited distinct (and yet nearby) patterns of activity during the judgment of beliefs and emotions in others. Pain judgment was instead associated with activity in the supramarginal gyrus, middle cingulate cortex and middle insular cortex. Our data reveal for the first time a functional dissociation within brain networks sub-serving theory of mind for different mental contents, with a common recruitment for cognitive and affective states in temporal regions, and distinct recruitment in prefrontal areas.     

Self-development: integrating cognitive, socioemotional, and neuroimaging perspectives

This review integrates cognitive, socioemotional, and neuroimaging perspectives on self-development. Neural correlates of key processes implicated in personal and social identity are reported from studies of children, adolescents, and adults, including autobiographical memory, direct and reflected self-appraisals, and social exclusion. While cortical midline structures of medial prefrontal cortex and medial posterior parietal cortex are consistently identified in neuroimaging studies considering personal identity from a primarily cognitive perspective (“who am I?”), additional regions are implicated by studies considering personal and social identity from a more socioemotional perspective (“what do others think about me, where do I fit in?”), especially in child or adolescent samples. The involvement of these additional regions (including tempo–parietal junction and posterior superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, anterior insula, ventral striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, middle cingulate cortex, and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) suggests mentalizing, emotion, and emotion regulation are central to self-development. In addition, these regions appear to function atypically during personal and social identity tasks in autism and depression, exhibiting a broad pattern of hypoactivation and hyperactivation, respectively.     

Somatic engagement alters subsequent neurobehavioral correlates of affective mentalizing

Socio‐emotional encounters involve a resonance of others'' affective states, known as affect sharing (AS); and attribution of mental states to others, known as theory‐of‐mind (ToM). Empathy necessitates the integration of both processes, yet their interaction during emotional episodes and subsequent generation of inferences on others'' affective states has rarely been tested. To address this, we developed a novel experimental design, wherein we manipulated AS by presenting nonverbal emotionally negative movies twice—each time accompanied by one of two soundtracks that accentuated either somatic cues or externally generated sounds. Movies were followed by questions addressing affective‐ToM (emotional inferences), cognitive‐ToM (inferences on beliefs and knowledge), and non‐ToM aspects. Results revealed a neural differentiation between AS, affective‐ToM, and cognitive‐ToM. AS movies activated regions that have been implicated in emotional (e.g., amygdala) and somatosensory processing, and synchronized brain activity between participants in the latter. Affective‐ToM activated the middle insula, limbic regions, and both ventral and dorsal portions of the medial prefrontal cortex (ventral medial prefrontal cortex [VMPFC] and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex [DMPFC], respectively), whereas cognitive‐ToM activated posteromedial and lateral–prefrontal and temporal cortices. Critically, AS movies specifically altered neural activation in AS and ToM‐related regions during subsequent affective‐ToM inferences, most notably in the DMPFC. Moreover, DMPFC–VMPFC connectivity correlated with affective‐ToM accuracy, when such questions followed AS movies. Our results associate empathic processes with designated neural activations and shed light on how neuro‐behavioral indices of affective ToM are shaped by preceding somatic engagement.     

Superior mentalizing abilities of female patients with schizophrenia

Mentalizing abilities are severely disrupted in patients with schizophrenia, but gender-related differences in this domain are virtually unexplored. Given the importance of these abilities in understanding psychopathology, social functioning and outcome, this study aimed to examine the mentalizing abilities of male and female patients with schizophrenia. The cognitive and affective mentalizing abilities of self and other of clinically stable male and female patients with schizophrenia were analyzed using the abbreviated version of the Metacognitive Assessment Scale (MAS-A). Compared to their male counterparts, the female patients demonstrated superior overall mentalizing abilities. This advantage was also evident when mentalizing about the Self or the Other. When examining cognitive versus affective mentalizing, women were significantly better in their ability to attribute and understand the affective mental states of others. These differences were unrelated to intelligence or psychopathology. The superior mentalizing abilities of female patients extend gender-related differences in schizophrenia to include social cognition. This suggests that our current knowledge of socio-cognitive abilities in schizophrenia is generalizable to male but not to female patients. The findings also provide important insights to understanding how etiological differences affect social cognition. Awareness to such differences has important implications for diagnosis and clinical treatment.     

Neural processing of social interaction: Coordinate‐based meta‐analytic evidence from human neuroimaging studies

While the action observation and mentalizing networks are considered to play complementary roles in understanding others' goals and intentions, they might be concurrently engaged when processing social interactions. We assessed this hypothesis via three activation‐likelihood‐estimation meta‐analyses of neuroimaging studies on the neural processing of: (a) social interactions, (b) individual actions by the action observation network, and (c) mental states by the mentalizing network. Conjunction analyses and direct comparisons unveiled overlapping and specific regions among the resulting maps. We report quantitative meta‐analytic evidence for a “social interaction network” including key nodes of the action observation and mentalizing networks. An action–social interaction‐mentalizing gradient of activity along the posterior temporal cortex highlighted a hierarchical processing of interactions, from visuomotor analyses decoding individual and shared intentions to in‐depth inferences on actors' intentional states. The medial prefrontal cortex, possibly in conjunction with the amygdala, might provide additional information concerning the affective valence of the interaction. This evidence suggests that the functional architecture underlying the neural processing of interactions involves the joint involvement of the action observation and mentalizing networks. These data might inform the design of rehabilitative treatments for social cognition disorders in pathological conditions, and the assessment of their outcome in randomized controlled trials.     

Neuroanatomical and neurochemical bases of theory of mind

This paper presents a novel neurobiological model of theory of mind (ToM) that incorporates both neuroanatomical and neurochemical levels of specificity. Within this model, cortical and subcortical regions are functionally organized into networks that subserve the ability to represent cognitive and affective mental states to both self and other. The model maintains that (1) cognitive and affective aspects of ToM are subserved by dissociable, yet interacting, prefrontal networks. The cognitive ToM network primarily engages the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsal striatum; and the affective ToM network primarily engages the ventromedial and orbitofrontal cortices, the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala and the ventral striatum; (2) self and other mental-state representation is processed by distinct brain regions within the mentalizing network, and that the ability to distinguish between self and other mental states is modulated by a functionally interactive dorsal and ventral attention/selection systems at the temporoparietal junction and the anterior cingulate cortex; and (3) ToM functioning is dependent on the integrity of the dopaminergic and serotonergic systems which are primarily engaged in the maintenance and application processes of represented mental states. In addition to discussing the mechanisms involved in mentalizing in terms of its component processes, we discuss the model's implications to pathologies that variably impact one's ability to represent, attribute and apply mental states.     

Social interaction recruits mentalizing and reward systems in middle childhood

Social cognition develops in the context of reciprocal social interaction. However, most neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have used noninteractive tasks that may fail to capture important aspects of real‐world mentalizing. In adults, social‐interactive context modulates activity in regions linked to social cognition and reward, but few interactive studies have been done with children. The current fMRI study examines children aged 8–12 using a novel paradigm in which children believed they were interacting online with a peer. We compared mental and non‐mental state reasoning about a live partner (Peer) versus a story character (Character), testing the effects of mentalizing and social interaction in a 2 × 2 design. Mental versus Non‐Mental reasoning engaged regions identified in prior mentalizing studies, including the temporoparietal junction, superior temporal sulcus, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Moreover, peer interaction, even in conditions without explicit mentalizing demands, activated many of the same mentalizing regions. Peer interaction also activated areas outside the traditional mentalizing network, including the reward system. Our results demonstrate that social interaction engages multiple neural systems during middle childhood and contribute further evidence that social‐interactive paradigms are needed to fully capture how the brain supports social processing in the real world.     

Distinct and temporally associated neural mechanisms underlying concurrent,postsuccess, and posterror cognitive controls: Evidence from a stop‐signal task

Cognitive control is built upon the interactions of multiple brain regions. It is currently unclear whether the involved regions are temporally separable in relation to different cognitive processes and how these regions are temporally associated in relation to different task performances. Here, using stop‐signal task data acquired from 119 healthy participants, we showed that concurrent and poststop cognitive controls were associated with temporally distinct but interrelated neural mechanisms. Specifically, concurrent cognitive control activated regions in the cingulo‐opercular network (including the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex [dACC], insula, and thalamus), together with superior temporal gyrus, secondary motor areas, and visual cortex; while regions in the fronto‐parietal network (including the lateral prefrontal cortex [lPFC] and inferior parietal lobule) and cerebellum were only activated during poststop cognitive control. The associations of activities between concurrent and poststop regions were dependent on task performance, with the most notable difference in the cerebellum. Importantly, while concurrent and poststop signals were significantly correlated during successful cognitive control, concurrent activations during erroneous trials were only correlated with posterror activations in the fronto‐parietal network but not cerebellum. Instead, the cerebellar activation during posterror cognitive control was likely to be driven secondarily by posterror activation in the lPFC. Further, a dynamic causal modeling analysis demonstrated that postsuccess cognitive control was associated with inhibitory connectivity from the lPFC to cerebellum, while excitatory connectivity from the lPFC to cerebellum was present during posterror cognitive control. Overall, these findings suggest dissociable but temporally related neural mechanisms underlying concurrent, postsuccess, and posterror cognitive control processes in healthy individuals.     

Supramodal neural networks support top‐down processing of social signals

The perception of facial and vocal stimuli is driven by sensory input and cognitive top‐down influences. Important top‐down influences are attentional focus and supramodal social memory representations. The present study investigated the neural networks underlying these top‐down processes and their role in social stimulus classification. In a neuroimaging study with 45 healthy participants, we employed a social adaptation of the Implicit Association Test. Attentional focus was modified via the classification task, which compared two domains of social perception (emotion and gender), using the exactly same stimulus set. Supramodal memory representations were addressed via congruency of the target categories for the classification of auditory and visual social stimuli (voices and faces). Functional magnetic resonance imaging identified attention‐specific and supramodal networks. Emotion classification networks included bilateral anterior insula, pre‐supplementary motor area, and right inferior frontal gyrus. They were pure attention‐driven and independent from stimulus modality or congruency of the target concepts. No neural contribution of supramodal memory representations could be revealed for emotion classification. In contrast, gender classification relied on supramodal memory representations in rostral anterior cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. In summary, different domains of social perception involve different top‐down processes which take place in clearly distinguishable neural networks.     

Fronto‐temporal connectivity predicts cognitive empathy deficits and experiential negative symptoms in schizophrenia

Impaired cognitive empathy is a core social cognitive deficit in schizophrenia associated with negative symptoms and social functioning. Cognitive empathy and negative symptoms have also been linked to medial prefrontal and temporal brain networks. While shared behavioral and neural underpinnings are suspected for cognitive empathy and negative symptoms, research is needed to test these hypotheses. In two studies, we evaluated whether resting‐state functional connectivity between data‐driven networks, or components (referred to as, inter‐component connectivity), predicted cognitive empathy and experiential and expressive negative symptoms in schizophrenia subjects. Study 1 : We examined associations between cognitive empathy and medial prefrontal and temporal inter‐component connectivity at rest using a group‐matched schizophrenia and control sample. We then assessed whether inter‐component connectivity metrics associated with cognitive empathy were also related to negative symptoms. Study 2 : We sought to replicate the connectivity‐symptom associations observed in Study 1 using an independent schizophrenia sample. Study 1 results revealed that while the groups did not differ in average inter‐component connectivity, a medial‐fronto‐temporal metric and an orbito‐fronto‐temporal metric were related to cognitive empathy. Moreover, the medial‐fronto‐temporal metric was associated with experiential negative symptoms in both schizophrenia samples. These findings support recent models that link social cognition and negative symptoms in schizophrenia. Hum Brain Mapp 38:1111–1124, 2017. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Neural correlates of recursive thinking during interpersonal strategic interactions

To navigate the complex social world, individuals need to represent others'' mental states to think strategically and predict their next move. Strategic mentalizing can be classified into different levels of theory of mind according to its order of mental state attribution of other people''s beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth. For example, reasoning people''s beliefs about simple world facts is the first‐order attribution while going further to reason people''s beliefs about the minds of others is the second‐order attribution. The neural substrates that support such high‐order recursive reasoning in strategic interpersonal interactions are still unclear. Here, using a sequential‐move interactional game together with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we showed that recursive reasoning engaged the frontal‐subcortical regions. At the stimulus stage, the ventral striatum was more activated in high‐order reasoning as compared with low‐order reasoning. At the decision stage, high‐order reasoning activated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and other mentalizing regions. Moreover, functional connectivity between the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the insula/hippocampus was positively correlated with individual differences in high‐order social reasoning. This work delineates the neural correlates of high‐order recursive thinking in strategic games and highlights the key role of the interplay between mPFC and subcortical regions in advanced social decision‐making.     

Neurobiological correlates of theory of mind in psychosis proneness

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to infer one's own and other persons’ mental states. ToM abilities are compromised in schizophrenia, in association with dysfunctional activity in predominantly prefrontal brain regions. Prior behavioral studies have also suggested ToM deficits in healthy individuals with psychosis proneness (PP), although no study to date had investigated the associated neural mechanisms in such a sample. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare brain activation of subjects with high versus low scores on positive-dimension PP and a ToM task. The ToM task involved first and second order attribution of cognitive and affective mental states to a cartoon character based on verbal and eye-gaze cues. No between-group differences were found on behavioral performance. fMRI analyses revealed a group interaction in anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10), with the high PP group showing significantly more activity thereof, relative to the low PP, during second order mentalizing than during first order mentalizing. Further between-group differences were observed in dorsomedial and lateral prefrontal regions (BA 46/9), with the high PP group also showing greater activation during second order mentalizing. These results suggest that subjects with positive-dimension PP require more activation of prefrontal areas to adequately mentalize. Differences in the neural mechanisms underlying ToM might be associated with vulnerability to psychosis.     

Theory of mind and empathy in preclinical and clinical Huntington’s disease

We investigated cognitive and affective Theory of Mind (ToM) and empathy in patients with premanifest and manifest Huntington’s disease (HD). The relationship between ToM performance and executive skills was also examined. Sixteen preclinical and 23 clinical HD patients, and 39 healthy subjects divided into 2 control groups were given a French adaptation of the Yoni test (Shamay-Tsoory, S.G., Aharon-Peretz, J. (2007). Dissociable prefrontal networks for cognitive and affective theory of mind: a lesion study. Neuropsychologia, 45(3), 3054–67) that examines first- and second-order cognitive and affective ToM processing in separate conditions with a physical control condition. Participants were also given questionnaires of empathy and cognitive tests which mainly assessed executive functions (inhibition and mental flexibility). Clinical HD patients made significantly more errors than their controls in the first- and second-order cognitive and affective ToM conditions of the Yoni task, but exhibited no empathy deficits. However, there was no evidence that ToM impairment was related to cognitive deficits in these patients. Preclinical HD patients were unimpaired in ToM tasks and empathy measures compared with their controls. Our results are consistent with the idea that impaired affective and cognitive mentalizing emerges with the clinical manifestation of HD, but is not necessarily part of the preclinical stage. Furthermore, these impairments appear independent of executive dysfunction and empathy.     

Neural correlates of empathy for babies in postpartum women: A longitudinal study

This study investigated the empathic response of postpartum women to babies in pain and the underlying neural mechanism. Postpartum women responded with more empathy and speed to babies over other stimuli compared to controls. Brain scans taken 3 months after birth showed more elevated activation in the Middle cingulate cortex/middle frontal gyrus (MCC/MFG) than the controls regardless of the task condition. When compared to the adult and neutral conditions, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) region was consistently more activated when postpartum women saw babies than controls. In addition, higher activation levels in the PCC region for the baby condition significantly correlated with faster and more empathic responses to babies. Considering that PCC is a core region for the theory of mind or mentalizing which requires cognitive reasoning to understand others, these results suggest that PCC might be a pivotal neural locus facilitating cognitive efforts to empathize with babies during the postpartum period. In a follow‐up experiment at 12 months after birth, we were still able to observe higher activity in the MCC/MFG of postpartum women. However, previously observed PCC activation patterns disappeared 12 months after birth, despite the women''s response patterns to babies still being maintained. These results suggest that the mentalizing process activated to empathize with babies in the early postpartum period becomes less cognitively demanding over time.