An economic history of Medicare part C

Context: Twenty‐five years ago, private insurance plans were introduced into the Medicare program with the stated dual aims of (1) giving beneficiaries a choice of health insurance plans beyond the fee‐for‐service Medicare program and (2) transferring to the Medicare program the efficiencies and cost savings achieved by managed care in the private sector. Methods: In this article we review the economic history of Medicare Part C, known today as Medicare Advantage, focusing on the impact of major changes in the program's structure and of plan payment methods on trends in the availability of private plans, plan enrollment, and Medicare spending. Additionally, we compare the experience of Medicare Advantage and of employer‐sponsored health insurance with managed care over the same time period. Findings: Beneficiaries’ access to private plans has been inconsistent over the program's history, with higher plan payments resulting in greater choice and enrollment and vice versa. But Medicare Advantage generally has cost more than the traditional Medicare program, an overpayment that has increased in recent years. Conclusions: Major changes in Medicare Advantage's payment rules are needed in order to simultaneously encourage the participation of private plans, the provision of high‐quality care, and to save Medicare money.     

The costs of decedents in the Medicare program: implications for payments to Medicare + Choice plans

OBJECTIVE: To discuss and quantify the incentives that Medicare managed care plans have to avoid (through selective enrollment or disenrollment) people who are at risk for very high costs, focusing on Medicare beneficiaries in the last year of life-a group that accounts for more than one-quarter of Medicare's annual expenditures. DATA SOURCE: Medicare administrative claims for 1994 and 1995. STUDY DESIGN: We calculated the payment a plan would have received under three risk-adjustment systems for each beneficiary in our 1995 sample based on his or her age, gender, county of residence, original reason for Medicare entitlement, and principal inpatient diagnoses received during any hospital stays in 1994. We compared these amounts to the actual costs incurred by those beneficiaries. We then looked for clinical categories that were predictive of costs, including costs in a beneficiary's last year of life, not accounted for by the risk adjusters. DATA EXTRACTION METHODS: The analyses were conducted using claims for a 5 percent random sample of Medicare beneficiaries who died in 1995 and a matched group of survivors. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Medicare is currently implementing the Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Groups (PIP-DCG) risk adjustment payment system to address the problem of risk selection in the Medicare+Choice program. We quantify the strong financial disincentives to enroll terminally ill beneficiaries that plans still have under this risk adjustment system. We also show that up to one-third of the selection observed between Medicare HMOs and the traditional fee-for-service system could be due to differential enrollment of decedents. A risk adjustment system that incorporated more of the available diagnostic information would attenuate this disincentive; however, plans could still use clinical information (not included in the risk adjustment scheme) to identify beneficiaries whose expected costs exceed expected payments. CONCLUSIONS: More disaggregated prospective risk adjustment methods and alternative payment systems that compensate plans for delivering care to certain classes of patients should be considered to ensure access to high-quality managed care for all beneficiaries.     

Trends in Medicare Part D Medication Therapy Management Eligibility Criteria

Background

To increase the enrollment rate of medication therapy management (MTM) programs in Medicare Part D plans, the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) lowered the allowable eligibility thresholds based on the number of chronic diseases and Part D drugs for Medicare Part D plans for 2010 and after. However, an increase in MTM enrollment rates has not been realized.

Objectives

To describe trends in MTM eligibility thresholds used by Medicare Part D plans and to identify patterns that may hinder enrollment in MTM programs.

Methods

This study analyzed data extracted from the Medicare Part D MTM Programs Fact Sheets (2008–2014). The annual percentages of utilizing each threshold value of the number of chronic diseases and Part D drugs, as well as other aspects of MTM enrollment practices, were analyzed among Medicare MTM programs that were established by Medicare Part D plans.

Results

For 2010 and after, increased proportions of Medicare Part D plans set their eligibility thresholds at the maximum numbers allowable. For example, in 2008, 48.7% of Medicare Part D plans (N = 347:712) opened MTM enrollment to Medicare beneficiaries with only 2 chronic disease states (specific diseases varied between plans), whereas the other half restricted enrollment to patients with a minimum of 3 to 5 chronic disease states. After 2010, only approximately 20% of plans opened their MTM enrollment to patients with 2 chronic disease states, with the remaining 80% restricting enrollment to patients with 3 or more chronic diseases.

Conclusion

The policy change by CMS for 2010 and after is associated with increased proportions of plans setting their MTM eligibility thresholds at the maximum numbers allowable. Changes to the eligibility thresholds by Medicare Part D plans might have acted as a barrier for increased MTM enrollment. Thus, CMS may need to identify alternative strategies to increase MTM enrollment in Medicare plans.     

Achieving Equity in Medicare Disproportionate Share Payments to Rural Hospitals: An Assessment of the Financial Impact of Recent and Proposed Changes to the Disproportionate Share Hospital Payment Formula

Historically, the Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment program has been less favorable to rural hospitals: eligibility thresholds were higher and the payment adjustment was smaller for rural than for urban hospitals. Although the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefit Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000 established a uniform low-income threshold and increased the magnitude of the adjustment for certain small and rural hospitals as a means to promote payment equity, the DSH distribution formula continues to vary by location. This study examines how the DSH revisions mandated under BIPA are likely to affect rural hospitals' financial performance and simulates the financial impact of implementing a uniform DSH payment adjustment. Using data from the 1998 Medicare cost report and impact files, this study found that two-thirds of both rural and urban hospitals would have qualified for DSH payments following BIPA compared with only one-fifth of rural hospitals and one-half of urban hospitals prior to BIPA. Although the impact of BIPA revisions on rural hospitals' total margins were found to be modest, the financial impact of a uniform payment adjustment would be somewhat greater: rural hospitals' average total margins would have increased by 1.6 percentage points. Importantly, 20% of rural hospitals with negative total margins would have been "in the black" if rural and urban hospitals were reimbursed using the same DSH formula. These findings suggest that elimination of rural and urban disparities in DSH payment could strengthen the rural health care safety net.     

Why do so few HMOs offer Medicare risk plans in rural areas?

Only 17 of the 38 health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that have Medicare risk contracts and offer coverage to commercial clients in rural counties include the rural counties in their Medicare plan service areas. Rural counties in which HMOs offer Medicare coverage have higher average adjusted average per capita costs (AAPCCs), larger populations, and more physicians per capita than rural counties excluded by risk plans. Interviewed plans cite low and erratic AAPCCs, scarcity of potential enrollees, lack of negotiating power with physicians, and adverse selection as drawbacks in rural areas. Proposed changes to the payment methodology would probably lead HMOs to increase their Medicare offerings in urban fringe areas, but not in isolated rural areas.