Eroding the Boundaries of Cognition: Implications of Embodiment1

To accept that cognition is embodied is to question many of the beliefs traditionally held by cognitive scientists. One key question regards the localization of cognitive faculties. Here we argue that for cognition to be embodied and sometimes embedded, means that the cognitive faculty cannot be localized in a brain area alone. We review recent research on neural reuse, the 1/f structure of human activity, tool use, group cognition, and social coordination dynamics that we believe demonstrates how the boundary between the different areas of the brain, the brain and body, and the body and environment is not only blurred but indeterminate. In turn, we propose that cognition is supported by a nested structure of task‐specific synergies, which are softly assembled from a variety of neural, bodily, and environmental components (including other individuals), and exhibit interaction dominant dynamics.     

Explaining Embodied Cognition Results

From the late 1950s until 1975, cognition was understood mainly as disembodied symbol manipulation in cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, and the nascent field of Cognitive Science. The idea of embodied cognition entered the field of Cognitive Linguistics at its beginning in 1975. Since then, cognitive linguists, working with neuroscientists, computer scientists, and experimental psychologists, have been developing a neural theory of thought and language (NTTL). Central to NTTL are the following ideas: (a) we think with our brains, that is, thought is physical and is carried out by functional neural circuitry; (b) what makes thought meaningful are the ways those neural circuits are connected to the body and characterize embodied experience; (c) so‐called abstract ideas are embodied in this way as well, as is language. Experimental results in embodied cognition are seen not only as confirming NTTL but also explained via NTTL, mostly via the neural theory of conceptual metaphor. Left behind more than three decades ago is the old idea that cognition uses the abstract manipulation of disembodied symbols that are meaningless in themselves but that somehow constitute internal “representations of external reality” without serious mediation by the body and brain. This article uniquely explains the connections between embodied cognition results since that time and results from cognitive linguistics, experimental psychology, computational modeling, and neuroscience.     

Grounded Cognition Entails Linguistic Relativity: A Neglected Implication of a Major Semantic Theory

According to the popular Grounded Cognition Model (GCM), the sensory and motor features of concepts, including word meanings, are stored directly within neural systems for perception and action. More precisely, the core claim is that these concrete conceptual features reuse some of the same modality-specific representations that serve to categorize experiences involving the relevant kinds of objects and events. Research in semantic typology, however, has shown that word meanings vary significantly across the roughly 6500 languages in the world. I argue that this crosslinguistic semantic diversity has significant yet previously unrecognized theoretical consequences for the GCM. In particular, to accommodate the typological data, the GCM must assume that the concrete features of word meanings are not merely stored within sensory/motor brain systems, but are represented there in ways that are, to a nontrivial degree, language-specific. Moreover, it must assume that these conceptual representations are also activated during the nonlinguistic processing of the relevant kinds of objects and events (e.g., during visual perception and action planning); otherwise, they would not really be grounded, which is to say, embedded inside sensory/motor systems. Crucially, however, such activations would constitute what is traditionally called linguistic relativity—that is, the influence of language-specific semantic structures on other forms of cognition. The overarching aim of this paper is to elaborate this argument more fully and explore its repercussions. To that end, I discuss in greater detail the key aspects of the GCM, the evidence for crosslinguistic semantic diversity, pertinent work on linguistic relativity, the central claim that the GCM entails linguistic relativity, some initial supporting results, and some important limitations and future directions.     

Mental number space in three dimensions

A large number of experimental findings from neuroscience and experimental psychology demonstrated interactions between spatial cognition and numerical cognition. In particular, many researchers posited a horizontal mental number line, where small numbers are thought of as being to the left of larger numbers. This review synthesizes work on the mental association between space and number, indicating the existence of multiple spatial mappings: recent research has found associations between number and vertical space, as well as associations between number and near/far space. We discuss number space in three dimensions with an eye on potential origins of the different number mappings, and how these number mappings fit in with our current knowledge of brain organization and brain-culture interactions. We derive novel predictions and show how this research fits into a general view of cognition as embodied, grounded and situated.     

Embodied cognition and beyond: Acting and sensing the body

Embodied cognition (EC) underlines that cognition is constrained by the kind of body we possess, and stresses the importance of action for cognition. In this perspective the body is always considered as an acting body. Here, we review EC literature discussing studies that show that body parts are not considered independent of their involvement in action. We propose to extend EC perspective through studying the body independently from its direct involvement in goal-directed action. Through this we aim to avoid the risk of limiting the notion of “sense of the body” to the restricted boundaries of the flesh of brain-body system. In our extended perspective language is considered as a form of action too. We propose that: (a) internal language (i.e. social language used as an internal medium for thought and planning) can contribute to form a unitary sense of our body, and (b) language can help to reshape the way we implicitly perceive our own body. Namely, it can modify our sense of body by extending its boundaries beyond the boundaries of the anatomical body. We argue for an integrated notion of bodily self-suggesting that the internal sense and the boundaries of the human body coincide with the extensions that linguistic tools allow. In sum, the basic idea we hold is that human body is a social entity.     

Social participation and cognitive functioning in older adults

The association between aspects of social participation and components of cognitive functioning and the ability of these aspects to predict cognitive performance was studied in an age and gender stratified sample of 116 individuals aged 55-89 years in the Netherlands. Measures of social participation included questionnaires on societal participation, sociocultural activities and media use. Cognitive functioning was measured by tests of fluid intelligence, processing speed, word learning and recall, and everyday memory. All aspects of social participation showed significant bivariate correlations with all components of cognitive functioning. Independent of age, gender, education and functional limitations, societal participation and sociocultural activities contributed significantly to the prediction of processing speed and of delayed recall. Tendencies of independent association were apparent between both societal participation and sociocultural activities and word learning. No aspect of social participation independently predicted fluid intelligence or everyday memory. The evidence suggests independent associations between social participation characterized by an organizational setting and high level of activity, and basic components of cognitive functioning, such as information-processing speed and measures of learning and delayed recall. Further research needs to clarify the process underlying the causal relation between cognitive functioning and forms of participation.     

Curb Your Embodiment

To explain how abstract concepts are grounded in sensory-motor experiences, several theories have been proposed. I will discuss two of these proposals, Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Situated Cognition, and argue why they do not fully explain grounding. A central idea in Conceptual Metaphor Theory is that image schemas ground abstract concepts in concrete experiences. Image schemas might themselves be abstractions, however, and therefore do not solve the grounding problem. Moreover, image schemas are too simple to explain the full richness of abstract concepts. Situated cognition might provide such richness. Research in our laboratory, however, has shown that even for concrete concepts, sensory-motor grounding is task dependent. Therefore, it is questionable whether abstract concepts can be significantly grounded in sensory-motor processing.     

Social Connection Through Joint Action and Interpersonal Coordination

The pull to coordinate with other individuals is fundamental, serving as the basis for our social connectedness to others. Discussed is a dynamical and ecological perspective to joint action, an approach that embeds the individual’s mind in a body and the body in a niche, a physical and social environment. Research on uninstructed coordination of simple incidental rhythmic movement, along with research on goal‐directed, embodied cooperation, is reviewed. Finally, recent research is discussed that extends the coordination and cooperation studies, examining how synchronizing with another, and how emergent social units of perceiving and acting are reflected in people’s feelings of connection to others.     

The Meaning of Embodiment

There is substantial disagreement among philosophers of embodied cognitive science about the meaning of embodiment. In what follows, I describe three different views that can be found in the current literature. I show how this debate centers around the question of whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, which I will label body functionalism, takes the body to play the functional role of linking external resources for problem solving with internal biological machinery. Embodiment is thus understood in terms of the role the body plays in supporting the computational circuits that realize cognition. Body enactivism argues by contrast that no computational account of cognition can account for the role of commonsense knowledge in our everyday practical engagement with the world. I will attempt a reconciliation of these seemingly opposed views.     

The Role of Neuroimaging in Developmental Social Psychology

The development of social cognition is defined as the behavioral patterns, feelings, attitudes, and concepts that children manifest in relation to other people, and the way in which these different functions change with age. To understand the development of social cognition, modelling based on longitudinal behavioral observation is essential. Neuroimaging techniques will aid in this process by providing the neural basis of the psychological constructs, and the constraints for the model. Here, the issue of self-recognition and self-evaluation is presented as an example. Technical advances will allow the application of functional neuroimaging techniques directly to babies and/or children, particularly under the age of 6 years old , in the near future.     

Social functioning in adults with neurofibromatosis type 1

Neurofibromatosis type 1 (NF1) is a common single-gene disorder characterised by a diverse range of cutaneous, neurological and neoplastic manifestations. It is well recognised that children with NF1 have poor peer interactions and are at risk for deficits in social skills. Few studies, however, have examined social functioning in adults with NF1. We aimed to determine whether adults with NF1 are at greater risk for impairment in social skills and to identify potential risk factors for social skills deficits. We evaluated social skills in 62 adults with NF1 and 39 controls using self-report and observer-report measures of social behaviour. We demonstrate that adults with NF1 exhibit significantly less prosocial behaviour than controls. This deficit was associated with social processing abilities and was more evident in males. The frequency of antisocial behaviour was comparable between the two groups, however was significantly associated with behavioural regulation in the NF1 group. These findings suggest that poor social skills in individuals with NF1 are due to deficits in prosocial behaviour, rather than an increase in antisocial behaviour. This will aid the design of interventions aimed at improving social skills in individuals with NF1.     

Social perception in people with eating disorders

ObjectiveSocial perception is a key aspect of social cognition which has so far not been investigated in eating disorders (ED). This study aimed to investigate social perception in individuals with anorexia nervosa (AN) and bulimia nervosa (BN).MethodsOutpatients with AN (restricting subtype [AN-R]: n = 51; binge-purge subtype [AN-BP]: n = 26) or BN (n = 57) and 50 healthy control (HC) participants completed the Interpersonal Perception Task (IPT-15). This is an ecologically valid task, which consists of 15 video clips, depicting complex social situations relating to intimacy, status, kinship, competition and deception. The participants have to assess relationships between protagonists’ based on non-verbal cues.ResultsOverall, there was no difference between groups on the IPT total score and subscale scores. Group differences on the Intimacy subscale approached significance so post hoc comparisons were carried out. HCs performed significantly better than AN-R participants in determining the degree of intimacy between others.ConclusionsSocial perception is largely preserved in ED patients. Individuals with AN-R show impairments in identifying intimacy in social situations, this may be due to the lack of relationship experience. Further research into different aspects of social cognition is required to establish the link between interpersonal difficulties and ED psychopathology.     

Social cognition and negative symptoms in psychosis

This study examined the relationship between negative symptoms and social cognition in individuals with psychosis. Although negative symptoms were associated with social cognition, stereotyped thinking, which is cognitive in nature, emerged as the most significant predictor, suggesting that cognition rather than symptoms may have a greater impact on social cognition.     

Social Optimization in the Presence of Cognitive Local Optima: Effects of Social Network Topology and Interaction Mode

The combined tendency for positive self‐presentation and mimicry or social learning results in the capability of a population of simulated individuals to optimize their cognitive structures. A population of parallel constraint satisfaction networks was created, with globally and locally optimal activation patterns. Individuals started with random activations and interacted to find optimal vectors. Two social network topologies were tested, as well as two modes of interaction; results indicated that the ability to optimize activation vectors depends on the social network configuration and whether individuals are influenced by their best neighbor or are attracted to a neighborhood centroid. Simulated individuals are able to find suitable patterns of belief or attitude with very little internal information processing, using social interaction.     

Social cognition and neurocognition as independent domains in psychosis

Patients with psychosis display alterations in social cognition as well as in the realm of neurocognition. It is unclear, however, to what degree these cognitive domains represent two separate dimensions of liability or the pleiotropic expression of a single deficit. The purpose of the present study was to investigate (i) to what extent alterations in social cognition represent an independent area of vulnerability to psychosis, separate from neurocognitive deficits and (ii) whether social cognition is one construct or can be divided into several subcomponents. Five social cognition and three neurocognitive tasks were completed by 186 participants with different levels of vulnerability for psychosis: 44 patients with psychotic disorder; 47 subjects at familial risk; 41 subjects at psychometric risk and 54 control subjects. The social cognition tasks covered important basic subcomponents of social cognition, i.e. mentalisation (or theory of mind), data gathering bias (jumping to conclusions), source monitoring and attribution style. Neurocognitive tasks assessed speed of information processing, inhibition, cognitive shifting and strategy-driven retrieval from semantic memory. The results of factor analysis suggested that neurocognition and social cognition are two separate areas of vulnerability in psychosis. Furthermore, the social cognition measures lacked significant overlap, suggesting a multidimensional construct. Cognitive liabilities to psychosis are manifold, and include key processes underlying basic person-environment interactions in daily life, independent of cognition quantified by neuropsychological tests.     

Social cognition,social competence,negative symptoms and social outcomes: Inter-relationships in people with schizophrenia

Social deficits are common in people with schizophrenia and the treatment of deficits in social competence has been a long-time treatment strategy. However, negative symptoms and social cognitive deficits also contribute to social dysfunction. In this study, we examined the correlations between everyday social outcomes, a performance based measure of social competence, and performance on 8 different social cognition tests in 179 patients with schizophrenia. Social cognition, social competence, and motivation-related negative symptoms accounted for 32% of the variance in real-world social outcomes. In addition, two different social cognition tests, along with expression-related negative symptoms accounted for 32% of the variance in performance-based assessments of social competence. These data suggest that negative symptoms exert an important influence on social outcomes and social competence, but not social cognition, and that social cognition and social competence exert separable influences on real-world social outcomes. Improving social outcomes seems to require a multi-faceted approach which considers social cognition, social competence, and negative symptoms.     

Social cognition and social problem solving abilities in individuals with alcohol use disorder

Background: Up to now, little is known about higher order cognitive abilities like social cognition and social problem solving abilities in alcohol-dependent patients. However, impairments in these domains lead to an increased probability for relapse and are thus highly relevant in treatment contexts. Method: This cross-sectional study assessed distinct aspects of social cognition and social problem solving in 31 hospitalized patients with alcohol use disorder (AUD) and 30 matched healthy controls (HC). Three ecologically valid scenario-based tests were used to gauge the ability to infer the mental state of story characters in complicated interpersonal situations, the capacity to select the best problem solving strategy among other less optimal alternatives, and the ability to freely generate appropriate strategies to handle difficult interpersonal conflicts. Standardized tests were used to assess executive function, attention, trait empathy, and memory, and correlations were computed between measures of executive function, attention, trait empathy, and tests of social problem solving. Results: AUD patients generated significantly fewer socially sensitive and practically effective solutions for problematic interpersonal situations than the HC group. Furthermore, patients performed significantly worse when asked to select the best alternative among a list of presented alternatives for scenarios containing sarcastic remarks and had significantly more problems to interpret sarcastic remarks in difficult interpersonal situations.

Conclusions: These specific patterns of impairments should be considered in treatment programs addressing impaired social skills in individuals with AUD.     

Anchoring on Self and Others During Social Inferences

When making inferences about similar others, people anchor and adjust away from themselves (Tamir & Mitchell, 2013). However, research on relational self theory (Andersen & Chen, 2002) suggests the possibility of using knowledge about others as an anchor when they are more similar to a target. We investigated whether social inferences are made on the basis of significant other knowledge through an anchoring and adjustment process, and whether anchoring on a significant other is more effortful than anchoring on the self. Participants answered questions about their likes and habits, as well as the likes and habits of a significant other, a target similar to their significant other, and a yoked control. We found that prediction differences between the significant other and similar target led to longer response times, and we found the opposite effect for self and target differences, suggesting anchoring and adjustment from the significant other rather than the self. These effects were moderated by the source-relative salience of the dimension being evaluated. The evidence was mixed with respect to the question of whether anchoring on a significant other is more effortful than anchoring on the self.     

Social cognition: a multi level analysis

This paper investigates the construct of social cognition from an interdisciplinary perspective blending social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This perspective argues for the inclusion of processes used to decode and encode the self, other people and interpersonal knowledge in the definition of social cognition. The neural modularity of social cognition is considered. The paper concludes by considering a number of challenges for social cognition research including questions of accuracy and the influence of motivation and bias in social cognitive processing.