Quarantine for SARS, Taiwan

During the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan, >150,000 persons were quarantined, 24 of whom were later found to have laboratory-confirmed SARS-coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. Since no evidence exists that SARS-CoV is infective before the onset of symptoms and the quarantined persons were exposed but not symptomatic, we thought the quarantine's effectiveness should be investigated. Using the Taiwan quarantine data, we found that the onset-to-diagnosis time of previously quarantined confirmed case-patients was significantly shortened compared to that for those who had not been quarantined. Thus, quarantine for SARS in Taiwan screened potentially infective persons for swift diagnosis and hospitalization after onset, thereby indirectly reducing infections. Full-scale quarantine measures implemented on April 28 led to a significant improvement in onset-to-diagnosis time of all SARS patients, regardless of previous quarantine status. We discuss the temporal effects of quarantine measures and other interventions on detection and isolation as well as the potential usefulness of quarantine in faster identification of persons with SARS and in improving isolation measures.     

Control measures for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Taiwan

As of April 14, 2003, Taiwan had had 23 probable cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), 19 of which were imported. Taiwan isolated all 23 patients in negative-pressure rooms; extensive personal protective equipment was used for healthcare workers and visitors. For the first 6 weeks of the SARS outbreak, recognized spread was limited to one healthcare worker and three household contacts.     

SARS outbreak, Taiwan, 2003

We studied the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Taiwan, using the daily case-reporting data from May 5 to June 4 to learn how it had spread so rapidly. Our results indicate that most SARS-infected persons had symptoms and were admitted before their infections were reclassified as probable cases. This finding could indicate efficient admission, slow reclassification process, or both. The high percentage of nosocomial infections in Taiwan suggests that infection from hospitalized patients with suspected, but not yet classified, cases is a major factor in the spread of disease. Delays in reclassification also contributed to the problem. Because accurate diagnostic testing for SARS is currently lacking, intervention measures aimed at more efficient diagnosis, isolation of suspected SARS patients, and reclassification procedures could greatly reduce the number of infections in future outbreaks.     

Viral load distribution in SARS outbreak

An unprecedented community outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in the Amoy Gardens, a high-rise residential complex in Hong Kong. Droplet, air, contaminated fomites, and rodent pests have been proposed to be mechanisms for transmitting SARS in a short period. We studied nasopharyngeal viral load of SARS patients on admission and their geographic distribution. Higher nasopharyngeal viral load was found in patients living in adjacent units of the same block inhabited by the index patient, while a lower but detectable nasopharyngeal viral load was found in patients living further away from the index patient. This pattern of nasopharyngeal viral load suggested that airborne transmission played an important part in this outbreak in Hong Kong. Contaminated fomites and rodent pests may have also played a role.     

Body temperature monitoring and SARS fever hotline, Taiwan

In Taiwan, a temperature-monitoring campaign and hotline for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) fever were implemented in June 2003. Among 1,966 calls, fever was recorded in 19% (n = 378); 18 persons at high risk for SARS were identified. In a cross-sectional telephone survey, 95% (n = 1,060) of households knew about the campaign and 7 households reported fever.     

Late recognition of SARS in nosocomial outbreak, Toronto

Late recognition of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was associated with no known SARS contact, hospitalization before the nosocomial outbreak was recognized, symptom onset while hospitalized, wards with SARS clusters, and postoperative status. SARS is difficult to recognize in hospitalized patients with a variety of underlying conditions in the absence of epidemiologic links.     

Valuation of the risk of SARS in Taiwan

Two surveys conducted in Taiwan during the spring 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic reveal a high degree of concern about the threat posed by SARS to Taiwan and its residents, although respondents believe they are knowledgeable about the risk of SARS and that it is susceptible to individual control. Willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce the risk of infection and death from SARS is elicited using contingent valuation methods. Estimated WTP is high, implying values per statistical life of US dollars 3 to 12 million. While consistent with estimates for high-income countries, these values are substantially larger than previous estimates for Taiwan and may be attributable to the high degree of concern about SARS at the time the data were collected.     

Media effects on students during SARS outbreak

A few months after the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak, a sample of Canadian undergraduate university students completed a questionnaire that showed that, despite believing media coverage of the outbreak was excessive, they had little anxiety about acquiring SARS. Additionally, 69% of participants failed a SARS-specific knowledge section of the questionnaire.     

Hospice utilization during the SARS outbreak in Taiwan

Background  

The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic threw the world into turmoil during the first half of 2003. Many subsequent papers have addressed its impact on health service utilization, but few have considered palliative (hospice) care. The aim of the present study was to describe changes in hospice inpatient utilization during and after the SARS epidemic in 2003 in Taiwan.     

Model parameters and outbreak control for SARS

Control of the 2002-2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak was based on rapid diagnosis coupled with effective patient isolation. We used uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of the basic reproductive number R0 to assess the role that model parameters play in outbreak control. The transmission rate and isolation effectiveness have the largest fractional effect on R0. We estimated the distribution of the reproductive number R0 under perfect isolation conditions. The distribution lies in the interquartile range 0.19-1.08, with a median of 0.49. Even though the median of R0 is <1, we found that 25% of our R0 distribution lies at R0 > 1, even with perfect isolation. This implies the need to simultaneously apply more than one method of control.     

SARS-related virus predating SARS outbreak, Hong Kong

Using immunofluorescence and neutralization assays, we detected antibodies to human severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and/or animal SARS-CoV-like virus in 17 (1.8%) of 938 adults recruited in 2001. This finding suggests that a small proportion of healthy persons in Hong Kong had been exposed to SARS-related viruses at least 2 years before the recent SARS outbreak.     

Public health measures implemented during the SARS outbreak in Singapore, 2003

The SARS outbreak hit Singapore between March and May 2003. Public health control measures were applied along three fronts; prevention and control within healthcare settings, community and at the borders. Nosocomial spread composed majority of SARS cases in Singapore. To prevent infection within healthcare facilities, cases were centralized in a SARS-designated hospital, a no-visitors rule was applied and movement of patients and healthcare staff were restricted. For triaging purposes, fever clinics were established. A dedicated ambulance service was used to transport possible cases to the SARS-designated hospital. Hospitals were surveyed for fever clusters. The challenge was to identify cases with atypical presentation. Effective and safe discharge criteria were established from the lessons learnt. To prevent community spread, contacts of cases were stringently traced, quarantined in their homes and monitored daily. For prompt identification of a case and to reduce the time between onset of symptoms and isolation, the Infectious Diseases Act was amended. A large wholesale market closure resulted in massive quarantine thereby limiting the spread of infection. A mass education campaign was implemented in order to educate and raise awareness of the public. At all air, sea and land points-of-entry, exit and entry screening took place that resulted in zero importation and exportation of SARS cases after implementation of screening. Coordinated effort of the cross sectional inter-ministerial collaboration and strong coordination by the Task Force and commitment from different professionals made it possible to conquer the disease.     

加深了解非典,战胜非典

随着全球科学家的努力，对SARS及其病原体的认识愈来愈深入。本文对非典型肺炎(非典)名称的由来、传统非典型肺炎的病原体、SARS病原体的发现过程及冠状病毒本质的争论、SARS的流行病学调查、SARS病毒在人体内存在的部位和抵抗力、SARS的传播途径及来源问题、SARS的实验室诊断及免疫预防等方面予以介绍。     

严重急性呼吸综合征爆发的大气环境和院内感染的职业卫生因素

目的　探讨大气环境和医院职业卫生因素对非典型肺炎爆发的影响。方法　 (1)对全球 9个城市 (广州、北京、天津、太原、香港、台北、新加坡、多伦多和河内 ) 2 0 0 3年严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)爆发前后的气象参数进行分析 ;(2 )从职业卫生的角度分析医院院内感染的原因。结果　 (1)大多数城市在SARS爆发前后 ,都出现气温、气压和气温日较差的大幅波动 ,风力微弱。在疫情最严重的城市 ,SARS爆发前大气悬浮物增多。各地SARS爆发前 10d的平均气温为 16 .6℃± 7.6℃ ,提示目前被认为造成SARS的冠状病毒可能在 9℃～ 2 4℃之间最活跃 ;(2 )医院的职业卫生是SARS爆发的重要社会行为因素 ,医院院内感染与职业卫生各个环节有密切关系。结论　冬春季节气温急剧变化、大气悬浮物增多和医院不良的职业卫生条件是SARS爆发的重要触发因素。加强天气变化和大气污染的预警 ,完善医院的职业卫生管理 ,对预防SARS爆发和季节性重现具有重大意义。     

The Singaporean response to the SARS outbreak: knowledge sufficiency versus public trust

During the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Singapore from 1 March to 11 May 2003, various national prevention and control measures were undertaken to control and eliminate the transmission of the infection. During the initial period of the epidemic, public communication was effected through press releases and media coverage of the epidemic. About a month into the epidemic, a public education campaign was mounted to educate Singaporeans on SARS and adoption of appropriate behaviours to prevent the spread of the disease. A survey was conducted in late April 2003 to assess Singaporeans' knowledge about SARS and infection control measures, and their concerns and anxiety in relation to the outbreak. The survey also sought to assess their confidence in the ability of various institutions to deal with SARS and their opinion on the seemingly tough measures enforced. The study involved 853 adults selected from a telephone-sampling frame. Stratified sampling was used to ensure adequate representation from major ethnic groups and age groups. The study showed that the overall knowledge about SARS and control measures undertaken was low (mean per cent score of 24.5 +/- 8.9%). While 82% of respondents expressed confidence in measures undertaken by Tan Tock Seng Hospital (the hospital designated to manage SARS), only 36% had confidence in nursing homes. However, >80% of the public agreed that the preventive and control measures instituted were appropriate. Despite the low knowledge score, the overall mean satisfaction score of the government's response to SARS was 4.47 (out of possible highest score of 5.00), with >93% of adult Singaporeans indicating that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the government's response to SARS. Generally, Singaporeans had a high level of public trust (satisfaction with government, confidence in institutions, deeming government measures appropriate), scoring 11.4 out of possible maximum of 14. The disparity between low knowledge on the one hand and high confidence and trust in the actions of the government on the other suggests that Singaporeans do not require high knowledge sufficiency to be confident in measures undertaken by the government to control the SARS crisis.     

Melioidosis outbreak after typhoon, southern Taiwan

From July through September 2005, shortly after a typhoon, 40 cases of Burkholderia pseudomallei infection (melioidosis) were identified in southern Taiwan. Two genotypes that had been present in 2000 were identified by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. Such a case cluster confirms that melioidosis is endemic to Taiwan.