The influence of insurance status on waiting times in German acute care hospitals: an empirical analysis of new data

Background

There is an ongoing debate in Germany about the assumption that patients with private health insurance (PHI) benefit from better access to medical care, including shorter waiting times (Lüngen et al. 2008), compared to patients with statutory health insurance (SHI).

Problem

Existing analyses of the determinants for waiting times in Germany are a) based on patient self-reports and b) do not cover the inpatient sector. This paper aims to fill both gaps by (i) generating new primary data and (ii) analyzing waiting times in German hospitals.

Methods

We requested individual appointments from 485 hospitals within an experimental study design, allowing us to analyze the impact of PHI versus SHI on waiting times (Asplin et al. 2005).

Results

In German acute care hospitals patients with PHI have significantly shorter waiting times than patients with SHI.

Conclusion

Discrimination in waiting times by insurance status does occur in the German acute hospital sector. Since there is very little transparency in treatment quality in Germany, we do not know whether discrimination in waiting times leads to discrimination in the quality of treatment. This is an important issue for future research.     

Insurance status and waiting times for hospital-based services in Ireland

In Ireland long waits for public hospital services are a feature of the healthcare system, with limited evidence that waits for private hospital services (delivered in both public and private hospitals) are shorter. In 2008, in an attempt to ensure more equitable access to hospital-based services, a ‘common waiting list’ for all patients within public hospitals was proposed. The aim of this paper is to analyse waiting times in Ireland for hospital services for patients with and without private health insurance (PHI) and to examine whether the 2008 reform reduced the differential in waiting. The analysis used data from the 2007 and 2010 health module of the Quarterly National Household survey (QNHS). The impact of insurance status on waiting times was analysed for the period before and after the reforms. A higher proportion of those without PHI were waiting more than three months for hospital services relative to those with PHI. There was no evidence that the 2008 reforms reduced the differential. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the proposals were not fully implemented, although expansion of capacity for private patients’ treatment in private hospitals is a possible confounding factor.     

The effect of a ban on gender‐based pricing on risk selection in the German health insurance market

Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender‐discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. Although gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health insurance (PHI) sector, it was never used as a pricing factor in the social health insurance (SHI) sector. The unisex mandate makes PHI relatively more attractive for women and less attractive for men. Based on data from the German socio‐economic panel, we analyze how the unisex mandate affects the difference between women and men in switching rates between SHI and PHI. We find that the unisex mandate increases the probability of switching from SHI to PHI for women relative to men. On the other hand, the unisex mandate has no effect on the gender difference in switching rates from PHI to SHI. Because women have on average higher health care expenditures than men, our results imply a worsening of the PHI risk pool and an improvement of the SHI risk pool. Our results demonstrate that regulatory measures such as the unisex mandate can affect risk selection between public and private health insurance sectors.     

Combined social and private health insurance versus catastrophic out of pocket payments for private hospital care in Greece

The high level of out of pocket (OOP) payments constitutes a major concern for Greece and several other European and OECD countries as a result of the significant down turning of their public health finances due to the 2008 financial crisis. The basic objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of combining social health insurance (SHI) and private health insurance (PHI) on OOP payments. Further, this study examines the catastrophic impact of OOP payments on insured’s welfare using the incidence and intensity methodological approach of measuring catastrophic health care expenditures. Conducting a cross-sectional survey in Greece in 2013, we find that the combination of SHI–PHI has a strong negative influence on insured OOP payments for inpatient health care in private hospitals. Furthermore, our results indicate that SHI coverage is not sufficient by itself to manage with this issue. Moreover, we find that poor people present a greater tendency to incur catastrophic OOP expenditures for hospital health care in private providers. Drawing evidence from Greece, a country with huge fiscal problems that has suffered the consequences of the economic crisis more than any other, could be a starting point for policymakers to consider the perspective of SHI–PHI co-operation against OOP payments more seriously.     

从国际经验谈我国商业医疗保险经办社会医疗保险

通过对部分实施社会保险体制国家的医疗保障制度作文献整理,分析在社会医疗保险背景下,商业保险的发展现状、实施效果以及与社会医疗保险相互关系等,探索我国商业保险经办社会医疗保险的可行性,为完善我国医疗保障制度提供经验证据。     

Regional distribution of physicians: the role of comprehensive private health insurance in Germany

Objective

In recent years, the co-existence in Germany of two parallel comprehensive insurance systems—statutory health insurance (SHI) and private health insurance (PHI)—has been posited as a possible cause of a persistent unequal regional distribution of physicians. The present study investigates the effect of the proportion of privately insured patients on the density of SHI-licensed physicians, while controlling for regional variations in the average income from SHI patients.

Methods

The proportion of residents in a district with private health insurance is estimated using complete administrative data from the SHI system and the German population census. Missing values are estimated using multiple imputation techniques. All models control for the estimated average income ambulatory physicians generate from treating SHI insured patients and a well-defined set of covariates on the level of districts in Germany in 2010.

Results

Our results show that every percentage change in the proportion of residents with private health insurance is associated with increases of 2.1 and 1.3 % in the density of specialists and GPs respectively. Higher SHI income in rural areas does not compensate for this effect.

Conclusion

From a financial perspective, it is rational for a physician to locate a new practice in a district with a high proportion of privately insured patients. From the perspective of patients in the SHI system, the incentive effects of PHI presumably contribute to a concentration of health care services in wealthy and urban areas. To date, the needs-based planning mechanism has been unable to address this imbalance.

     

Universal Health Insurance in India: Ensuring Equity, Efficiency, and Quality

Indian health system is characterized by a vast public health infrastructure which lies underutilized, and a largely unregulated private market which caters to greater need for curative treatment. High out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditures poses barrier to access for healthcare. Among those who get hospitalized, nearly 25% are pushed below poverty line by catastrophic impact of OOP healthcare expenditure. Moreover, healthcare costs are spiraling due to epidemiologic, demographic, and social transition. Hence, the need for risk pooling is imperative. The present article applies economic theories to various possibilities for providing risk pooling mechanism with the objective of ensuring equity, efficiency, and quality care. Asymmetry of information leads to failure of actuarially administered private health insurance (PHI). Large proportion of informal sector labor in India''s workforce prevents major upscaling of social health insurance (SHI). Community health insurance schemes are difficult to replicate on a large scale. We strongly recommend institutionalization of tax-funded Universal Health Insurance Scheme (UHIS), with complementary role of PHI. The contextual factors for development of UHIS are favorable. SHI schemes should be merged with UHIS. Benefit package of this scheme should include preventive and in-patient curative care to begin with, and gradually include out-patient care. State-specific priorities should be incorporated in benefit package. Application of such an insurance system besides being essential to the goals of an effective health system provides opportunity to regulate private market, negotiate costs, and plan health services efficiently. Purchaser-provider split provides an opportunity to strengthen public sector by allowing providers to compete.     

Demand for private health insurance: how important is the quality gap?

Perceived quality of private and public health care, income and insurance premium are among the determinants of demand for private health insurance (PHI). In the context of a model in which individuals are expected utility maximizers, the non purchasing choice can result in consuming either public health care or private health care with full cost paid out-of-pocket. This paper empirically analyses the effect of the determinants of the demand for PHI on the probability of purchasing PHI by estimating a pseudo-structural model to deal with missing data and endogeneity issues. Our findings support the hypothesis that the demand for PHI is indeed driven by the quality gap between private and public health care. As expected, PHI is a normal good and a rise in the insurance premium reduces the probability of purchasing PHI albeit displaying price elasticities smaller than one in absolute value for different groups of individuals.     

The impact of health insurance in Africa and Asia: a systematic review

Objective

To evaluate the impact of health insurance on resource mobilization, financial protection, service utilization, quality of care, social inclusion and community empowerment in low- and lower-middle-income countries in Africa and Asia.

Methods

A systematic search for randomized controlled trials, quasi-experimental and observational studies published before the end of 2011 was conducted in 20 literature databases, reference lists of relevant studies, web sites and the grey literature. Study quality was assessed with a quality grading protocol.

Findings

Inclusion criteria were met by 159 studies – 68 in Africa and 91 in Asia. Most African studies reported on community-based health insurance (CBHI) and were of relatively high quality; social health insurance (SHI) studies were mostly Asian and of medium quality. Only one Asian study dealt with private health insurance (PHI). Most studies were observational; four had randomized controls and 20 had a quasi-experimental design. Financial protection, utilization and social inclusion were far more common subjects than resource mobilization, quality of care or community empowerment. Strong evidence shows that CBHI and SHI improve service utilization and protect members financially by reducing their out-of-pocket expenditure, and that CBHI improves resource mobilization too. Weak evidence points to a positive effect of both SHI and CBHI on quality of care and social inclusion. The effect of SHI and CBHI on community empowerment is inconclusive. Findings for PHI are inconclusive in all domains because of insufficient studies.

Conclusion

Health insurance offers some protection against the detrimental effects of user fees and a promising avenue towards universal health-care coverage.     

Waiting times for elective surgery and the decision to buy private health insurance

More than 45% of Australians buy health insurance for private treatment in hospital. This is despite having access to universal and free public hospital treatment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that avoidance of long waits for public treatment is one possible explanation for the high rate of insurance coverage. In this study, we investigate the effect of waiting on individual decisions to buy private health insurance. Individuals are assumed to form an expectation of their own waiting time as a function of their demographics and health status. We model waiting times using administrative data on the population hospitalised for elective procedures in public hospitals and use the parameter estimates to impute the expected waiting time and the probability of a long wait for a representative sample of the population. We find that expected waiting time does not increase the probability of buying insurance but a high probability of experiencing a long wait does. On average, waiting time has no significant impact on insurance. In addition, we find that favourable selection into private insurance, measured by self-assessed health, is no longer significant once waiting time variables are included. This result suggests that a source of favourable selection may be aversion to waiting among healthier people.     

Public health care and private insurance demand: The waiting time as a link

This paper analyzes the effect of waiting times in the Spanish public health system on the demand for private health insurance. Expected utility maximization determines whether or not individuals buy a private health insurance. The decision depends not only on consumer's covariates such as income, socio-demographic characteristics and health status, but also on the quality of the treatment by the public provider. We interpret waiting time as a qualitative attribute of the health care provision. The empirical analysis uses the Spanish Health Survey of 1993. We cope with the absence of income data by using the Spanish Family Budget Survey of 1990–91 as a complementary data set, following the Arellano–Meghir method [4]. Results indicate that a reduction in the waiting time lowers the probability of buying private health insurance. This suggests the existence of a crowd-out in the health care provision market. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Private expenditure and the role of private health insurance in Greece: status quo and future trends

The health care system in Greece is financed in almost equal proportions by public and private sources. Private expenditure, consists mostly of out-of-pocket and under-the-table payments. Such payments strongly suggest dissatisfaction with the public system, due to under financing during the last 25 years. This gap has been filled rapidly by the private sector. From this point of view, one might suggest that the flourishing development of private provision may lead in turn to a corresponding growth in private health insurance (PHI). This paper aims to examine the role of PHI in Greece, to identify the factors influencing its development, and to make some suggestions about future policies and trends. In the decade of 1985–1995 PHI show increasing activity, reflecting the intention of some citizens to seek health insurance solutions in the form of supplementary cover in order to ensure faster access, better quality of services, and increased consumer choice. The benefits include programs covering hospital expenses, cash benefits, outpatient care expenses, disability income insurance, as well as limited managed care programs. However, despite recent interest, PHI coverage remains low in Greece compared to other EU countries. Economic, social and cultural factors such as low average household income, high unemployment, obligatory and full coverage by social insurance, lead to reluctance to pay for second-tier insurance. Instead, there is a preference to pay a doctor or hospital directly even in the form of under-the-table payments (which are remarkably high in Greece), when the need arises. There are also factors endogenous to the PHI industry, related to market policies, low organisational capacity, cream skimming, and the absence of insurance products meeting consumer requirements, which explain the relatively low state of development of PHI in Greece.      

Tax incentives and the demand for private health insurance

We analyze the effect of an individual insurance mandate (Medicare Levy Surcharge) on the demand for private health insurance (PHI) in Australia. With administrative income tax return data, we show that the mandate has several distinct effects on taxpayers’ behavior. First, despite the large tax penalty for not having PHI coverage relative to the cost of the cheapest eligible insurance policy, compliance with mandate is relatively low: the proportion of the population with PHI coverage increases by 6.5 percentage points (15.6%) at the income threshold where the tax penalty starts to apply. This effect is most pronounced for young taxpayers, while the middle aged seem to be least responsive to this specific tax incentive. Second, the discontinuous increase in the average tax rate at the income threshold created by the policy generates a strong incentive for tax avoidance which manifests itself through bunching in the taxable income distribution below the threshold. Finally, after imposing some plausible assumptions, we extrapolate the effect of the policy to other income levels and show that this policy has not had a significant impact on the overall demand for private health insurance in Australia.     

Optional deductibles in social health insurance systems

A fundamental aspect of the German health insurance system is the principle of solidarity. At the same time, it is possible for certain socio-economic groups to opt out of the otherwise compulsory system. To determine whether rates incorporating deductibles are compatible with the principles of solidarity and have the ability to heighten the appeal of statutory health insurance (SHI) funds compared with private health insurance companies, Germany's third largest SHI fund, Techniker Krankenkasse, implemented a pilot scheme involving the use of deductibles. Preliminary scientific evaluations of the pilot scheme indicate three main results for these deductibles: Firstly, they are compatible with the principles of solidarity in the statutory health insurance system; secondly, they provide an effective means of preventing defection to private health insurance companies and thirdly, they reduced the volume of insurance claims (moral hazard).     

Time spent on waiting lists for medical care: an insurance approach

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the benefits and costs of being on a waiting list. The model shows that complex factors are in operation, implying that a shorter waiting time need not necessarily be preferred to a longer waiting time. We also present an empirical study, where a sample of Swedes are offered the possibility of purchasing private insurance, thus reducing waiting time for surgery beyond the three-month guarantee offered by the public sector health care system. Respondents could choose between two insurance contracts. A 'spike' model, where the probability of a zero WTP is strictly positive, was developed and estimated to obtain demand functions for private insurance.     

Testing for selection bias and moral hazard in private health insurance: Evidence from a mixed public-private health system

Separating selection bias from moral hazard in private health insurance (PHI) markets has been a challenging task. We estimate selection bias and moral hazard in Australia's mixed public-private health system, where PHI premiums are community-rated rather than risk-rated. Using longitudinal cohort data, with fine-grained measures for medical services predominantly funded by PHI providers, we find consistent and robust estimates of advantageous selection among hospitalized cardiovascular disease (CVD) patients. Specifically, we show that in addition to their risk-averse attributes, CVD patients who purchase PHI use fewer services that are not covered by PHI providers (e.g., general practitioners and emergency departments) and have fewer comorbidities. Finally, unlike previous studies, we show that ex-post moral hazard exists in the use of specific “in-hospital” medical services such as specialist and physician services, miscellaneous diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic treatments. From the perspective of PHI providers, the annual cost of moral hazard translates to a lower bound estimate of $707 per patient, equivalent to a 3.03% reduction in their annual profits.     

Accessing a new medication in Germany: a novel approach to assess a health insurance-related barrier

PURPOSE: Knowledge of the existence, position, and magnitude of barriers to equitable healthcare is an important consideration in shaping healthcare policies. METHODS: The authors developed a novel three-dimensional person-time-related hurdle model and followed a cohort of 7358 statutorily (SHI) and 457 privately health insured (PHI) patients with migraine headaches at 377 primary-care practices (MediPlus, IMS Health) in the second to fourth year of the HealthCare Structural Reform Act in Germany. RESULTS: For SHI compared with PHI migraine patients, there was a hurdle to receiving sumatriptan at all (2.4-fold lower hazard, 95% confidence interval, 1.8-3.2). Among patients who received sumatriptan, frequency and intensity of use differed only minimally between SHI and PHI patients. CONCLUSIONS: These findings have implications for healthcare researchers and healthcare policies. The framework extends traditional hurdle models and can serve as a model for quantifying barriers to receipt of services under different funding policies.     

Tackling excessive waiting times for elective surgery: a comparative analysis of policies in 12 OECD countries

This paper compares policies to tackle excessive waiting times for elective surgery in 12 OECD countries. It is found that waiting times may be reduced by acting on the supply of or on the demand for surgery (or both). On the supply side, evidence suggests that both capacity and financial incentives towards productivity can play an important role. On the demand side, inducing a raising of clinical thresholds may reduce waiting times but may also provoke tension between clinicians and policy makers. Preliminary evidence also suggests that an increase in private health insurance coverage may reduce waiting times.     

Impact of supplementary private health insurance on stomach cancer care in Korea: a cross-sectional study

Background  

Korea achieved universal health insurance coverage in only 12 years; however, insufficient government funding has resulted in high out-of-pocket payments and, in turn, a demand for supplementary private health insurance (PHI). Supplementary PHI provides a fixed amount of benefits in the event of critical illness (e.g., cancer or stroke), surgery, or hospitalization. In this study, we tried to identify factors that influence the decision to purchase supplementary PHI and investigate the impacts of PHI on various aspects of cancer care.     

Private medical insurance and saving: evidence from the British Household Panel Survey

This paper uses the British Household Panel Survey for the years 1996-2000 to investigate the relationship between saving and private medical insurance in the UK. Because the National Health Service (NHS) gives comprehensive health coverage and is generally free at source, one would not expect private medical insurance to crowd-out saving. However, the NHS being characterised by long waiting lists and generally poor quality, many people prefer to use private health services. In such circumstances, those individuals who are not covered by private medical insurance, and who are therefore more exposed to facing unexpected out-of-pocket private health care expenditures or income losses while waiting for public treatment might save more for precautionary reasons than those who are covered. According to our findings, which are based on a wide range of econometric specifications, there is a positive association between insurance coverage and saving, suggesting that private medical insurance does not generally crowd-out private saving. However, we found some evidence of crowding-out in those areas where the quality of medical facilities is perceived as poor, and in rural areas, characterised by fewer NHS providers.