Semantic memory

Our concepts about objects, states, and events are stored in a cognitive structure termed semantic memory. There are several types of neurologic disorders that may cause impairments of semantic memory. Clinical evaluations of these impairments are complex, because semantic memory is linked to other cognitive systems that, when damaged, may produce related syndromes or difficulties. In an attempt to gain further understanding of these breakdown patterns, we review data from both neuropsychologic and brain activity research that have been concerned with how object concepts are represented and localized in the brain. Although these data have spawned varying and controversial views regarding the content and organization of semantic knowledge, converging evidence suggests that semantic memory is mainly localized in the posterior region of the left temporal lobe, and that particular categories of knowledge may be represented in different but overlapping regions within this area.     

Perceptual and Semantic Representations at Encoding Contribute to True and False Recognition of Objects

When encoding new episodic memories, visual and semantic processing is proposed to make distinct contributions to accurate memory and memory distortions. Here, we used fMRI and preregistered representational similarity analysis to uncover the representations that predict true and false recognition of unfamiliar objects. Two semantic models captured coarse-grained taxonomic categories and specific object features, respectively, while two perceptual models embodied low-level visual properties. Twenty-eight female and male participants encoded images of objects during fMRI scanning, and later had to discriminate studied objects from similar lures and novel objects in a recognition memory test. Both perceptual and semantic models predicted true memory. When studied objects were later identified correctly, neural patterns corresponded to low-level visual representations of these object images in the early visual cortex, lingual, and fusiform gyri. In a similar fashion, alignment of neural patterns with fine-grained semantic feature representations in the fusiform gyrus also predicted true recognition. However, emphasis on coarser taxonomic representations predicted forgetting more anteriorly in the anterior ventral temporal cortex, left inferior frontal gyrus and, in an exploratory analysis, left perirhinal cortex. In contrast, false recognition of similar lure objects was associated with weaker visual analysis posteriorly in early visual and left occipitotemporal cortex. The results implicate multiple perceptual and semantic representations in successful memory encoding and suggest that fine-grained semantic as well as visual analysis contributes to accurate later recognition, while processing visual image detail is critical for avoiding false recognition errors.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT People are able to store detailed memories of many similar objects. We offer new insights into the encoding of these specific memories by combining fMRI with explicit models of how image properties and object knowledge are represented in the brain. When people processed fine-grained visual properties in occipital and posterior temporal cortex, they were more likely to recognize the objects later and less likely to falsely recognize similar objects. In contrast, while object-specific feature representations in fusiform gyrus predicted accurate memory, coarse-grained categorical representations in frontal and temporal regions predicted forgetting. The data provide the first direct tests of theoretical assumptions about encoding true and false memories, suggesting that semantic representations contribute to specific memories as well as errors.     

The functional neuroanatomy of actions

Our current understanding of the neural basis of semantic memory is informed primarily by studies of concrete objects. However, conceptual knowledge encompasses many other, albeit less concrete, domains. This article reviews evidence from neuroimaging and patient studies that speaks to the neural basis of action concepts and the words that refer to them. These data highlight 2 important principles governing the neural instantiation of semantic knowledge. First, the organization of conceptual representations in the brain parallels perception and action. Action concepts are at least partially represented within modality-specific areas responsible for the perception and execution of dynamic actions. Second, unimodal sensory and motor cortices act as "points of entry" for more abstract action knowledge. Increasingly abstract conceptual knowledge derived from these modalities is represented in brain areas located anterior and centripetal to modality-specific regions. Extending research on the neural basis of semantics to include dynamic and relational aspects of the world gives us a more complete appreciation of the range of cognitive and communication impairments that may be experienced by patients with neurologic disease.     

Neurophysiological evidence for the time course of activation of global shape, part, and local contour representations during visual object categorization and memory

Categorization of visual objects entails matching a percept to long-term representations of structural knowledge. This object model selection is central to theories of human visual cognition, but the representational format(s) is largely unknown. To characterize these neural representations, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to fragmented objects during an indirect memory test were compared when only local contour features, but not global shapes of the object and its parts, differed between encoding and retrieval experiences. The ERP effects revealed that the format of object representations varies across time according to the particular neural processing and memory system currently engaged. An occipito-temporal P2(00) showed implicit memory modulation to items that repeatedly engaged similar perceptual grouping processes but not items that merely reinstantiated visual features. After 500 msec, memory modulation of a late positive complex, indexing secondary categorization and/or explicit recollection processes, was sensitive to local contour changes. In between, a frontocentral N350, indexing the model selection and an implicit perceptual memory system, showed reactivation of object representations whenever the same global shapes were reactivated, despite local feature differences. These and prior N350 findings provide direct neurophysiological evidence that the neural representations supporting object categorization include knowledge beyond local contours and about higher-order perceptual structures, such as the global shapes of the object and its parts, that can differ between object views. The N350 is proposed to index a second state of interactive, recurrent, and feedback processing in occipital and ventral temporal neocortex supporting higher-order cognitive abilities and phenomenological awareness with objects.     

Neural and molecular mechanisms of visual memory and imagery in the primate]

In this talk, I examined the cortical mechanisms involved in the memory formation and activation for visual images. Our ability to "see with the mind's eye" has been of interest to philosophers and scientists for a long time. Today we have a variety of approaches (including neuroimaging, electrophysiological, psychophysical and neuropsychological methods) to investigate where and how the images of objects, scenes and living beings are generated, stored and maintained in the brain. The aim of my study is to provide the solid neurophysiological basis for these studies. I first devised an animal model of imagery task: Macaque monkeys were trained to memorize visual objects in associative memory and to retrieve the image of an object from long-term storage according to an associative cue. I addressed the following basic questions, and described the answers we obtained: (1) Where in the brain is the mnemonic representation of visual images stored and how is it organized? (2) How is the representation created and what is the molecular basis of neural circuit reorganization? (3) Which neural circuits enable the reactivation of the image representation and the memory retrieval? (See for further details. http://www.physiol.m.u-tokyo.ac.jp/).     

Abnormal object recall and anterior cingulate overactivation correlate with formal thought disorder in schizophrenia.

BACKGROUND: The neural basis of formal thought disorder (FTD) is unknown. An influential theory is that FTD results from impaired semantic memory processing. We explored the neural correlates of semantic memory retrieval in schizophrenia using an imaging task assessing semantic object recall. METHOD: Sixteen healthy control subjects and sixteen schizophrenia patients whose FTD symptoms were measured with the Thought Disorder Index completed a verbal object-recall task during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Participants viewed two words describing object features that either evoked (object recall) or did not evoke a semantic concept. RESULTS: Schizophrenia patients tended to overrecall objects for feature pairs that did not describe the same object. Functionally, rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activation in patients positively correlated with FTD severity during both correct recalled and overrecalled trials. Compared with control subjects, during object recalling, patients overactivated bilateral ACC, temporooccipital junctions, temporal poles and parahippocampi, right inferior frontal gyrus, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but underactivated inferior parietal lobules. CONCLUSIONS: Our results support impaired semantic memory retrieval as underlying FTD pathophysiology. Schizophrenia patients showed abnormal activations of brain areas involved in semantic memory, verbal working memory, and initiation and suppression of conflicting responses, which were associated with semantic overrecall and FTD.     

Neurocomputational approaches to modelling multisensory integration in the brain: A review

The Brain’s ability to integrate information from different modalities (multisensory integration) is fundamental for accurate sensory experience and efficient interaction with the environment: it enhances detection of external stimuli, disambiguates conflict situations, speeds up responsiveness, facilitates processes of memory retrieval and object recognition. Multisensory integration operates at several brain levels: in subcortical structures (especially the Superior Colliculus), in higher-level associative cortices (e.g., posterior parietal regions), and even in early cortical areas (such as primary cortices) traditionally considered to be purely unisensory. Because of complex non-linear mechanisms of brain integrative phenomena, a key tool for their understanding is represented by neurocomputational models. This review examines different modelling principles and architectures, distinguishing the models on the basis of their aims: (i) Bayesian models based on probabilities and realizing optimal estimator of external cues; (ii) biologically inspired models of multisensory integration in the Superior Colliculus and in the Cortex, both at level of single neuron and network of neurons, with emphasis on physiological mechanisms and architectural schemes; among the latter, some models exhibit synaptic plasticity and reproduce development of integrative capabilities via Hebbian-learning rules or self-organizing maps; (iii) models of semantic memory that implement object meaning as a fusion between sensory–motor features (embodied cognition). This overview paves the way to future challenges, such as reconciling neurophysiological and Bayesian models into a unifying theory, and stimulates upcoming research in both theoretical and applicative domains.     

Conceptual grounding of language in action and perception: a neurocomputational model of the emergence of category specificity and semantic hubs

Current neurobiological accounts of language and cognition offer diverging views on the questions of ‘where’ and ‘how’ semantic information is stored and processed in the human brain. Neuroimaging data showing consistent activation of different multi‐modal areas during word and sentence comprehension suggest that all meanings are processed indistinctively, by a set of general semantic centres or ‘hubs’. However, words belonging to specific semantic categories selectively activate modality‐preferential areas; for example, action‐related words spark activity in dorsal motor cortex, whereas object‐related ones activate ventral visual areas. The evidence for category‐specific and category‐general semantic areas begs for a unifying explanation, able to integrate the emergence of both. Here, a neurobiological model offering such an explanation is described. Using a neural architecture replicating anatomical and neurophysiological features of frontal, occipital and temporal cortices, basic aspects of word learning and semantic grounding in action and perception were simulated. As the network underwent training, distributed lexico‐semantic circuits spontaneously emerged. These circuits exhibited different cortical distributions that reached into dorsal‐motor or ventral‐visual areas, reflecting the correlated category‐specific sensorimotor patterns that co‐occurred during action‐ or object‐related semantic grounding, respectively. Crucially, substantial numbers of neurons of both types of distributed circuits emerged in areas interfacing between modality‐preferential regions, i.e. in multimodal connection hubs, which therefore became loci of general semantic binding. By relating neuroanatomical structure and cellular‐level learning mechanisms with system‐level cognitive function, this model offers a neurobiological account of category‐general and category‐specific semantic areas based on the different cortical distributions of the underlying semantic circuits.     

The role of episodic memory in controlled evaluative judgments about attitudes: an event-related potential study

Event-related potentials (ERPs) are unique in their ability to provide information about the timing of activity in the neural networks that perform complex cognitive processes. Given the dearth of extant data from normal controls on the question of whether attitude representations are stored in episodic or semantic memory, the goal here was to study the nature of the memory representations used during conscious attitude evaluations. Thus, we recorded ERPs while participants performed three tasks: attitude evaluations (i.e., agree/disagree), autobiographical cued recall (i.e., You/Not You) and semantic evaluations (i.e., active/inactive). The key finding was that the parietal episodic memory (EM) effect, a well-established correlate of episodic recollection, was elicited by both attitude evaluations and autobiographical retrievals. By contrast, semantic evaluations of the same attitude items elicited less parietal activity, like that elicited by Not You cues, which only access semantic memory. In accord with hemodynamic results, attitude evaluations and autobiographical retrievals also produced overlapping patterns of slow potential (SP) activity from 500 to 900 ms preceding the response over left and right inferior frontal, anterior medial frontal and occipital brain areas. Significantly different patterns of SP activity were elicited in these locations for semantic evaluations and Not You cues. Taken together, the results indicate that attitude representations are stored in episodic memory. Retrieval timing varied as a function of task, with earlier retrievals in both evaluation conditions relative to those in the autobiographical condition. The differential roles and timing of memory retrieval in evaluative judgment and memory retrieval tasks are discussed.     

Editorial: Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory

Abstract

The anatomical and neurophysiological bases of memory have been significantly advanced by integrative approaches bridging previously existing gaps between individual neuroscientific disciplines. The time- and content-based division of memory has been widely accepted: episodic and semantic memory, procedural memory and priming are frequently used terms. On the anatomical side, a division into forms of memory dependent on the limbic system (episodic and semantic information) and others (procedural memory and priming) being independent of these regions, has gained entrance into cognitive neuroscience as well. More disputed are ideas on the possible representation of stored information in the brain and on the existence of regions centrally implicated in its retrieval. Even more controversial are possible similarities between psychogenic and organic forms of amnesia. The present overview discusses these and related issues and points to some possibilities for integration. Last, but not least, this overview introduces the nine individual contributions making up this special issue on brain-memory interrelations.     

ERPs elicited by a cognitive incongruity paradigm: a semantic memory study

The cognitive incongruity paradigm consists in presenting congruous or incongruous factual information to subjects, who are instructed to judge the truth of this information by comparing it with the factual knowledge stored in their semantic long-term memory. The factual information tested was whether a city presented after the name of a country, belongs (congruity) or not (incongruity) to that country. Results revealed that the recognition of incongruous factual information is characterized by a negative wave (N400), while the processing of congruous factual knowledge is characterized by a positive wave (P300) about 600 ms post-stimulus. In addition, these two components were sensitive to subject performance and subject confidence levels. The neurophysiological brain pattern observed during the cognitive incongruity paradigm reveals that the N400 and P300 are jointly affected by the task and reflect the recognition processes of factual knowledge.     

Object activation in semantic memory from visual multimodal feature input.

The human brain's representation of objects has been proposed to exist as a network of coactivated neural regions present in multiple cognitive systems. However, it is not known if there is a region specific to the process of activating an integrated object representation in semantic memory from multimodal feature stimuli (e.g., picture-word). A previous study using word-word feature pairs as stimulus input showed that the left thalamus is integrally involved in object activation (Kraut, Kremen, Segal, et al., this issue). In the present study, participants were presented picture-word pairs that are features of objects, with the task being to decide if together they "activated" an object not explicitly presented (e.g., picture of a candle and the word "icing" activate the internal representation of a "cake"). For picture-word pairs that combine to elicit an object, signal change was detected in the ventral temporo-occipital regions, pre-SMA, left primary somatomotor cortex, both caudate nuclei, and the dorsal thalami bilaterally. These findings suggest that the left thalamus is engaged for either picture or word stimuli, but the right thalamus appears to be involved when picture stimuli are also presented with words in semantic object activation tasks. The somatomotor signal changes are likely secondary to activation of the semantic object representations from multimodal visual stimuli.     

How does the brain rapidly learn and reorganize view-invariant and position-invariant object representations in the inferotemporal cortex?

All primates depend for their survival on being able to rapidly learn about and recognize objects. Objects may be visually detected at multiple positions, sizes, and viewpoints. How does the brain rapidly learn and recognize objects while scanning a scene with eye movements, without causing a combinatorial explosion in the number of cells that are needed? How does the brain avoid the problem of erroneously classifying parts of different objects together at the same or different positions in a visual scene? In monkeys and humans, a key area for such invariant object category learning and recognition is the inferotemporal cortex (IT). A neural model is proposed to explain how spatial and object attention coordinate the ability of IT to learn invariant category representations of objects that are seen at multiple positions, sizes, and viewpoints. The model clarifies how interactions within a hierarchy of processing stages in the visual brain accomplish this. These stages include the retina, lateral geniculate nucleus, and cortical areas V1, V2, V4, and IT in the brain’s What cortical stream, as they interact with spatial attention processes within the parietal cortex of the Where cortical stream. The model builds upon the ARTSCAN model, which proposed how view-invariant object representations are generated. The positional ARTSCAN (pARTSCAN) model proposes how the following additional processes in the What cortical processing stream also enable position-invariant object representations to be learned: IT cells with persistent activity, and a combination of normalizing object category competition and a view-to-object learning law which together ensure that unambiguous views have a larger effect on object recognition than ambiguous views. The model explains how such invariant learning can be fooled when monkeys, or other primates, are presented with an object that is swapped with another object during eye movements to foveate the original object. The swapping procedure is predicted to prevent the reset of spatial attention, which would otherwise keep the representations of multiple objects from being combined by learning. Li and DiCarlo (2008) have presented neurophysiological data from monkeys showing how unsupervised natural experience in a target swapping experiment can rapidly alter object representations in IT. The model quantitatively simulates the swapping data by showing how the swapping procedure fools the spatial attention mechanism. More generally, the model provides a unifying framework, and testable predictions in both monkeys and humans, for understanding object learning data using neurophysiological methods in monkeys, and spatial attention, episodic learning, and memory retrieval data using functional imaging methods in humans.     

Remembrance of things touched: how sensorimotor experience affects the neural instantiation of object form

Numerous neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies have highlighted the role of the ventral, occipitotemporal visual processing stream in the representation and retrieval of semantic memory for the appearance of objects. Here, we examine the role of the parietal cortex in retrieval of object shape information. fMRI data were acquired as subjects listened to the names of common objects and made judgments about their shape. Recruitment of the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL) during shape retrieval was modulated by the amount of prior tactile experience associated with the objects. In addition, the same pattern of activity was observed in right postcentral gyrus, suggesting that the representation of object shape is distributed amongst regions that are relevant to the sensorimotor acquisition history of this attribute, as predicted by distributed models of semantic memory.     

Cognitive memory

Regarding the workings of the human mind, memory and pattern recognition seem to be intertwined. You generally do not have one without the other. Taking inspiration from life experience, a new form of computer memory has been devised. Certain conjectures about human memory are keys to the central idea. The design of a practical and useful “cognitive” memory system is contemplated, a memory system that may also serve as a model for many aspects of human memory. The new memory does not function like a computer memory where specific data is stored in specific numbered registers and retrieval is done by reading the contents of the specified memory register, or done by matching key words as with a document search. Incoming sensory data would be stored at the next available empty memory location, and indeed could be stored redundantly at several empty locations. The stored sensory data would neither have key words nor would it be located in known or specified memory locations. Sensory inputs concerning a single object or subject are stored together as patterns in a single “file folder” or “memory folder”. When the contents of the folder are retrieved, sights, sounds, tactile feel, smell, etc., are obtained all at the same time. Retrieval would be initiated by a query or a prompt signal from a current set of sensory inputs or patterns. A search through the memory would be made to locate stored data that correlates with or relates to the prompt input. The search would be done by a retrieval system whose first stage makes use of autoassociative artificial neural networks and whose second stage relies on exhaustive search. Applications of cognitive memory systems have been made to visual aircraft identification, aircraft navigation, and human facial recognition.Concerning human memory, reasons are given why it is unlikely that long-term memory is stored in the synapses of the brain’s neural networks. Reasons are given suggesting that long-term memory is stored in DNA or RNA. Neural networks are an important component of the human memory system, and their purpose is for information retrieval, not for information storage. The brain’s neural networks are analog devices, subject to drift and unplanned change. Only with constant training is reliable action possible. Good training time is during sleep and while awake and making use of one’s memory.A cognitive memory is a learning system. Learning involves storage of patterns or data in a cognitive memory. The learning process for cognitive memory is unsupervised, i.e. autonomous.     

A Heteromodal Word-Meaning Binding Site in the Visual Word Form Area under Top-Down Frontoparietal Control

The integral capacity of human language together with semantic memory drives the linkage of words and their meaning, which theoretically is subject to cognitive control. However, it remains unknown whether, across different language modalities and input/output formats, there is a shared system in the human brain for word-meaning binding and how this system interacts with cognitive control. Here, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment based on a large cohort of subjects (50 females, 50 males) to comprehensively measure the brain responses evoked by semantic processing in spoken and written word comprehension and production tasks (listening, speaking, reading, and writing). We found that heteromodal word input and output tasks involved distributed brain regions within a frontal-parietal-temporal network and focally coactivated the anterior lateral visual word form area (VWFA), which is located in the basal occipitotemporal area. Directed connectivity analysis revealed that the VWFA was invariably under significant top-down modulation of the frontoparietal control network and interacts with regions related to attention and semantic representation. This study reveals that the VWFA is a key site subserving general semantic processes linking words and meaning, challenging the predominant emphasis on this area''s specific role in reading or more general visual processes. Our findings also suggest that the dynamics between semantic memory and cognitive control mechanisms during word processing are largely independent of the modalities of input or output.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Binding words and their meaning into a coherent whole during retrieval requires accessing semantic memory and cognitive control, allowing our thoughts to be expressed and comprehended through mind-external tokens in multiple modalities, such as written or spoken forms. However, it is still unknown whether multimodal language comprehension and production share a common word-meaning binding system in human brains and how this system is connected to a cognitive control mechanism. By systematically measuring brain activity evoked by spoken and written verbal input and output tasks tagging word-meaning binding processes, we demonstrate a general word-meaning binding site within the visual word form area (VWFA) and how this site is modulated by the frontal-parietal control network.     

Depression of cortical activity in humans by mild hypercapnia

The effects of neural activity on cerebral hemodynamics underlie human brain imaging with functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission tomography. However, the threshold and characteristics of the converse effects, wherein the cerebral hemodynamic and metabolic milieu influence neural activity, remain unclear. We tested whether mild hypercapnia (5% CO2 ) decreases the magnetoencephalogram response to auditory pattern recognition and visual semantic tasks. Hypercapnia induced statistically significant decreases in event-related fields without affecting behavioral performance. Decreases were observed in early sensory components in both auditory and visual modalities as well as later cognitive components related to memory and language. Effects were distributed across cortical regions. Decreases were comparable in evoked versus spontaneous spectral power. Hypercapnia is commonly used with hemodynamic models to calibrate the blood oxygenation level-dependent response. Modifying model assumptions to incorporate the current findings produce a modest but measurable decrease in the estimated cerebral metabolic rate for oxygen change with activation. Because under normal conditions, low cerebral pH would arise when bloodflow is unable to keep pace with neuronal activity, the cortical depression observed here may reflect a homeostatic mechanism by which neuronal activity is adjusted to a level that can be sustained by available bloodflow. Animal studies suggest that these effects may be mediated by pH-modulating presynaptic adenosine receptors. Although the data is not clear, comparable changes in cortical pH to those induced here may occur during sleep apnea, sleep, and exercise. If so, these results suggest that such activities may in turn have generalized depressive effects on cortical activity.     

Convergence of distinct functional networks supporting naming and semantic recognition in the left inferior frontal gyrus

Naming individual objects is accompanied with semantic recognition. Previous studies examined brain‐networks responsible for these operations individually. However, it remains unclear how these brain‐networks are related. To address this problem, we examined the brain‐networks during a novel object‐naming task, requiring participants to name animals in photographs at a specific‐level (e.g., “pigeon”). When the participants could not remember specific names, they answered basic names (e.g., “bird”). After fMRI scanning during the object‐naming task, the participants rated familiarity of the animals based on their sense of knowing. Since participants tend to remember specific names for familiar objects compared with unfamiliar objects, a typical issue in an object‐naming task is an internal covariance between the naming and familiarity levels. We removed this confounding factor by adjusting the familiarity/naming level of stimuli, and demonstrated distinct brain regions related to the two operations. Among them, the left inferior frontal gyrus triangularis (IFGtri) contained object‐naming and semantic‐recognition related areas in its anterior‐ventral and posterior‐dorsal parts, respectively. Psychophysiological interaction analyses suggested that both parts show connectivity with the brain regions related to object‐naming. By examining the connectivity under control tasks requiring nonlexical semantic retrieval (e.g., animal's body color), we found that both IFGtri parts altered their targeting brain areas according to the required memory attributes, while only the posterior‐dorsal part connected the brain regions related to semantic recognition. Together, the semantic recognition may be processed by distinct brain network from those for voluntary semantic retrievals including object‐naming although all these networks are mediated by the posterior‐dorsal IFGtri.     

The cognitive and neural expression of semantic memory impairment in mild cognitive impairment and early Alzheimer's disease

Semantic deficits in Alzheimer's disease have been widely documented, but little is known about the integrity of semantic memory in the prodromal stage of the illness. The aims of the present study were to: (i) investigate naming abilities and semantic memory in amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI), early Alzheimer's disease (AD) compared to healthy older subjects; (ii) investigate the association between naming and semantic knowledge in aMCI and AD; (iii) examine if the semantic impairment was present in different modalities; and (iv) study the relationship between semantic performance and grey matter volume using voxel-based morphometry. Results indicate that both naming and semantic knowledge of objects and famous people were impaired in aMCI and early AD groups, when compared to healthy age- and education-matched controls. Item-by-item analyses showed that anomia in aMCI and early AD was significantly associated with underlying semantic knowledge of famous people but not with semantic knowledge of objects. Moreover, semantic knowledge of the same concepts was impaired in both the visual and the verbal modalities. Finally, voxel-based morphometry analyses revealed that semantic impairment in aMCI and AD was associated with cortical atrophy in the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) region as well as in the inferior prefrontal cortex (IPC), some of the key regions of the semantic cognition network. These findings suggest that the semantic impairment in aMCI may result from a breakdown of semantic knowledge of famous people and objects, combined with difficulties in the selection, manipulation and retrieval of this knowledge.     

Transient perceptual neglect: visual working memory load affects conscious object processing

Visual working memory (VWM) is a capacity-limited cognitive resource that plays an important role in complex cognitive behaviors. Recent studies indicate that regions subserving VWM may play a role in the perception and recognition of visual objects, suggesting that conscious object perception may depend on the same cognitive and neural architecture that supports the maintenance of visual object information. In the present study, we examined this question by testing object processing under a concurrent VWM load. Under a high VWM load, recognition was impaired for objects presented in the left visual field, in particular when two objects were presented simultaneously. Multivariate fMRI revealed that two independent but partially overlapping networks of brain regions contribute to object recognition. The first network consisted of regions involved in VWM encoding and maintenance. Importantly, these regions were also sensitive to object load. The second network comprised regions of the ventral temporal lobes traditionally associated with object recognition. Importantly, activation in both networks predicted object recognition performance. These results indicate that information processing in regions that mediate VWM may be critical to conscious visual perception. Moreover, the observation of a hemifield asymmetry in object recognition performance has important theoretical and clinical significance for the study of visual neglect.