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1.
Kirsten Simmons Manoj Gambhir Juan Leon Ben Lopman 《Emerging infectious diseases》2013,19(8):1260-1267
The duration of immunity to norovirus (NoV) gastroenteritis has been believed to be from 6 months to 2 years. However, several observations are inconsistent with this short period. To gain better estimates of the duration of immunity to NoV, we developed a mathematical model of community NoV transmission. The model was parameterized from the literature and also fit to age-specific incidence data from England and Wales by using maximum likelihood. We developed several scenarios to determine the effect of unknowns regarding transmission and immunity on estimates of the duration of immunity. In the various models, duration of immunity to NoV gastroenteritis was estimated at 4.1 (95% CI 3.2–5.1) to 8.7 (95% CI 6.8–11.3) years. Moreover, we calculated that children (<5 years) are much more infectious than older children and adults. If a vaccine can achieve protection for duration of natural immunity indicated by our results, its potential health and economic benefits could be substantial.Key words: Norovirus, modeling, mathematical model, immunity, incidence, vaccination, vaccine development, viruses, enteric infections, acute gastroenteritisNoroviruses (NoVs) are the most common cause of acute gastroenteritis (AGE) in industrialized countries. In the United States, NoV causes an estimated 21 million cases of AGE (1), 1.7 million outpatient visits (2), 400,000 emergency care visits, 70,000 hospitalizations (3), and 800 deaths annually across all age groups (4). Although the highest rates of disease are in young children, infection and disease occur throughout life (5), despite an antibody seroprevalence >50%, and infection rates approach 100% in older adults (6,7).Frequently cited estimates of the duration of immunity to NoV are based on human challenge studies conducted in the 1970s. In the first, Parrino et al. challenged volunteers with Norwalk virus (the prototype NoV strain) inoculum multiple times. Results suggested that the immunity to Norwalk AGE lasts from ≈2 months to 2 years (8). A subsequent study with a shorter challenge interval suggested that immunity to Norwalk virus lasts for at least 6 months (9). In addition, the collection of volunteer studies together demonstrate that antibodies against NoV may not confer protection and that protection from infection (serologic response or viral shedding) is harder to achieve than protection from disease (defined as AGE symptoms) (10–14). That said, most recent studies have reported some protection from illness and infection in association with antibodies that block binding of virus-like particles to histo-blood group antigen (HBGA) (13,14). Other studies have also associated genetic resistance to NoV infections with mutations in the 1,2-fucosyltransferase (FUT2) gene (or “secretor” gene) (15). Persons with a nonsecretor gene (FUT2−/−) represent as much as 20% of the European population. Challenge studies have also shown that recently infected volunteers are susceptible to heterologous strains sooner than to homotypic challenge, indicating limited cross-protection (11).One of many concerns with all classic challenge studies is that the virus dose given to volunteers was several thousand–fold greater than the small amount of virus capable of causing human illness (estimated as 18–1,000 virus particles) (16). Thus, immunity to a lower challenge dose, similar to what might be encountered in the community, might be more robust and broadly protective than the protection against artificial doses encountered in these volunteer studies. Indeed, Teunis et al. have clearly demonstrated a dose-response relationship whereby persons challenged with a higher NoV dose have substantially greater illness risk (16).Furthermore, in contrast with results of early challenge studies, several observations can be made that, when taken together, are inconsistent with a duration of immunity on the scale of months. First, the incidence of NoV in the general population has been estimated in several countries as ≈5% per year, with substantially higher rates in children (5). Second, Norwalk virus (GI.1) volunteer studies conducted over 3 decades, indicate that approximately one third of genetically susceptible persons (i.e., secretor-positive persons with a functional FUT2 gene) are immune (18,20,22). The point prevalence of immunity in the population (i.e., population immunity) can be approximated by the incidence of infection (or exposure) multiplied by the duration of immunity. If duration of immunity is truly <1 year and incidence is 5%, <5% of the population should have acquired immunity at any given time. However, challenge studies show population immunity levels on the order of 30%–45%, suggesting that our understanding of the duration of immunity is incomplete (8,11,17,18). HBGA–mediated lack of susceptibility may play a key role, but given the high seroprevalence of NoV antibodies and broad diversity of human HBGAs and NoV, HBGA–mediated lack of susceptibility cannot solely explain the discrepancy between estimates of duration of immunity and observed NoV incidence. Moreover, population immunity levels may be driven through the acquisition of immunity of fully susceptible persons or through boosting of immunity among those previously exposed.
Open in a separate window*AGE, acute gastroenteritis; SM, Snow Mountain virus; NV, Norwalk virus; MC, Montgomery County virus; HI, Hawaii virus; GII.4, genogroup 2 type 4.
†Only includes initial challenge, not subsequent re-challenge.
‡Only includes placebo or control group.In this study, we aimed to gain better estimates of the duration of immunity to NoV by developing a community-based transmission model that represents the transmission process and natural history of NoV, including the waning of immunity. The model distinguishes between persons susceptible to disease and those susceptible to infection but not disease. We fit the model to age-specific incidence data from a community cohort study. However, several factors related to NoV transmission remain unknown (e.g., the role asymptomatic persons who shed virus play in transmission). Therefore, we constructed and fit a series of 6 models to represent the variety of possible infection processes to gain a more robust estimate of the duration of immunity. This approach does not consider multiple strains or the emergence of new variants, so we are effectively estimating minimum duration of immunity in the absence of major strain changes. 相似文献
Table 1
Summary of literature review of Norwalk virus volunteer challenge studies*Study | All | Secretor positive | Secretor negative | Strain | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
No. challenged | No. (%) infected | No. (%) AGE | No. challenged | No. (%) infected | No. (%) AGE | No. challenged | No. (%) infected | ||||
Dolin 1971 (10) | 12 | 9 (75) | SM | ||||||||
Wyatt 1974 (11)† | 23 | 16 (70) | NV, MC, HI | ||||||||
Parrino 1977 (8)† | 12 | 6 (50) | NV | ||||||||
Johnson 1990 (17)† | 42 | 31 (74) | 25 (60) | NV | |||||||
Graham 1994 (12) | 50 | 41 (82) | 34 (68) | NV | |||||||
Lindesmith 2003 (18) | 77 | 34 (44) | 21 (27) | 55 | 35 (64) | 21 (38) | 21 | 0 | NV | ||
Lindesmith 2005 (19) | 15 | 9 (60) | 7 (47) | 12 | 8 (67) | 3 | 1 (33) | SM | |||
Atmar 2008 (20) | 21 | 16 (76) | 11 (52) | 21 | 16 (76) | 11 (52) | NV | ||||
Leon 2011 (21)‡ | 15 | 7 (47) | 5 (33) | 15 | 7 (47) | 5 (33) | NV | ||||
Atmar 2011 (14)‡ | 41 | 34 (83) | 29 (71) | 41 | 34 (83) | 29 (71) | NV | ||||
Seitz 2011 (22) | 13 | 10 (77) | 10 (77) | 13 | 10 (77) | 10 (77) | 1 (5.6) | NV | |||
Frenck 2012 (23) | 40 | 17 (42) | 12 (30) | 23 | 16 (70) | 12 (52.1) | 17 | GII.4 |
†Only includes initial challenge, not subsequent re-challenge.
‡Only includes placebo or control group.In this study, we aimed to gain better estimates of the duration of immunity to NoV by developing a community-based transmission model that represents the transmission process and natural history of NoV, including the waning of immunity. The model distinguishes between persons susceptible to disease and those susceptible to infection but not disease. We fit the model to age-specific incidence data from a community cohort study. However, several factors related to NoV transmission remain unknown (e.g., the role asymptomatic persons who shed virus play in transmission). Therefore, we constructed and fit a series of 6 models to represent the variety of possible infection processes to gain a more robust estimate of the duration of immunity. This approach does not consider multiple strains or the emergence of new variants, so we are effectively estimating minimum duration of immunity in the absence of major strain changes. 相似文献
2.
In early 1976, the novel A/New Jersey/76 (Hsw1N1) influenza virus caused severe respiratory illness in 13 soldiers with 1 death at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Since A/New Jersey was similar to the 1918–1919 pandemic virus, rapid outbreak assessment and enhanced surveillance were initiated. A/New Jersey virus was detected only from January 19 to February 9 and did not spread beyond Fort Dix. A/Victoria/75 (H3N2) spread simultaneously, also caused illness, and persisted until March. Up to 230 soldiers were infected with the A/New Jersey virus. Rapid recognition of A/New Jersey, swift outbreak assessment, and enhanced surveillance resulted from excellent collaboration between Fort Dix, New Jersey Department of Health, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and Center for Disease Control personnel. Despite efforts to define the events at Fort Dix, many questions remain unanswered, including the following: Where did A/New Jersey come from? Why did transmission stop?Key words: Influenza, military, respiratory disease, swine, perspectiveRevisiting events surrounding the 1976 swine influenza A (H1N1) outbreak may assist those planning for the rapid identification and characterization of threatening contemporary viruses, like avian influenza A (H5N1) (1). The severity of the 1918 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic and evidence for a cycle of pandemics aroused concern that the 1918 disaster could recur (2,3). Following the 1918 pandemic, H1N1 strains circulated until the "Asian" influenza A (H2N2) pandemic in 1957 (3). When in early 1976, cases of influenza in soldiers, mostly recruits, at Fort Dix, New Jersey, were associated with isolation of influenza A (H1N1) serotypes (which in 1976 were labeled Hsw1N1), an intense investigation followed (4).Of 19,000 people at Fort Dix in January 1976, ≈32% were recruits (basic trainees) (4). Recruits reported to Fort Dix for 7 weeks of initial training through the basic training reception center, where they lived and were processed into the Army during an intense 3 days of examinations, administrative procedures, and indoctrination. At the reception center, training unit cohorts were formed. Recruits were grouped into 50-member units (platoons) and organized into companies of 4 platoons each. Units formed by week''s end moved from the reception center to the basic training quarters. To prevent respiratory illnesses, recruits were isolated in their company areas for 2 weeks and restricted to the military post for 4 weeks (4). Platoon members had close contact with other platoon members, less contact with other platoons in their company, and even less contact with other companies.On arrival, recruits received the 1975–1976 influenza vaccine (A/Port Chalmers/1/73 [H3N2], A/Scotland/840/74 [H3N2], and B/Hong Kong/15/72) (4). Other soldiers reported directly to advanced training programs of 4 to 12 weeks at Fort Dix immediately after basic training at Fort Dix or elsewhere. These soldiers received influenza vaccinations in basic training. Civilian employees and soldiers'' families were offered vaccine, but only an estimated <40% accepted (4).Training stopped over the Christmas–New Year''s holidays and resumed on January 5, 1976, with an influx of new trainees. The weather was cold (wind chill factors of 0° to –43°F), and the reception center was crowded (4). Resumption of training was associated with an explosive febrile respiratory disease outbreak involving new arrivals and others. Throat swabs were collected from a sample of hospitalized soldiers with this syndrome. On January 23, the Fort Dix preventive medicine physician learned of 2 isolations of adenovirus type 21 and suspected an adenovirus outbreak (4). He notified the county health department and the New Jersey (NJ) Department of Health of the outbreak (4). On January 28, an NJ Department of Health official consulted with the military physician and suggested that the explosive, widespread outbreak could be influenza (4). Over the next 2 days, 19 specimens were delivered to the state laboratory and 7 A/Victoria-like viruses and 3 unknown hemagglutinating agents were identified (4). Specimens were flown to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia, on February 6, where a fourth unknown agent was found (4).On February 2, Fort Dix and NJ Department of Health personnel arranged for virologic studies of deaths possibly caused by influenza (4). Tracheal swabs taken on February 5 from a recruit who died on February 4 yielded a fifth unknown agent on February 9. By February 10, laboratory evidence had confirmed that a novel influenza strain was circulating at Fort Dix and that 2 different influenza strains were causing disease. By February 13, all 5 unknown strains were identified as swine influenza A (Hsw1N1). The possibility of laboratory contamination was evaluated (4). No known swine influenza A strains were present in the NJ Department of Health Virus Laboratory before the Fort Dix outbreak. Additionally, all unknown Fort Dix viruses were independently isolated from original specimens at CDC and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), Washington, DC. Also, 2 patients with novel virus isolates had convalescent-phase, homologous, hemagglutination-inhibition (HAI) antibody titers of 1:40–1:80, consistent with recent infections. The new influenza strain had been independently identified in 3 different laboratories and supporting serologic evidence developed within 15 days after the original specimens were collected (4).
Open in a separate window 相似文献
Table
Key events in the swine influenza A (Hsw1N1) outbreak, Fort Dix, NJDate (1976) | Event |
---|---|
January 5 | After the holidays, basic training resumed at Fort Dix, NJ; a sudden, dramatic outbreak of acute respiratory disease followed the influx of new recruit trainees (4). |
January 19 | Earliest hospitalization of a Fort Dix soldier with acute respiratory disease attributed to swine influenza A (Hsw1N1) (identified retrospectively by serologic tests) (7,14) |
January 21 | Influenza A/Victoria (H3N2) identified away from Fort Dix in NJ civilians (4) |
January 23 | Fort Dix received reports of adenovirus type 21 isolations from soldiers ill with respiratory disease and reported the outbreak to the local and state health departments (4) |
January 28 | A NJ Department of Health official suggested the Fort Dix outbreak may be due to influenza and offered to process specimens for virus isolation (4) |
January 29–30 | 19 specimens sent to NJ Department of Health in 2 shipments (4) |
February 2–3 | NJ Department of Health identified 4 isolates of H3N2-like viruses and 2 unknown hemagglutinating agents in 8 specimens sent on January 29. Fort Dix and NJ Department of Health arranged for the study of deaths possibly due to influenza. NJ Department of Health identified 3 H3N2-like viruses and a third unknown hemagglutinating agent in 11 specimens sent on January 30 (4). |
February 4 | Fort Dix soldier died with acute respiratory disease (4). |
February 5 | Tracheal specimens from the soldier who died on February 4 were sent to NJ Department of Health (4). |
February 6 | NJ Department of Health sent the Fort Dix specimens to Center for Disease Control (CDC), Atlanta, GA; CDC identified a fourth unknown hemagglutinating agent in the Fort Dix specimens (4). |
February 9 | Specimens from the soldier who died on February 4 yielded a fifth unknown hemagglutinating agent (4). Last hospitalization of an identified Fort Dix soldier with febrile, acute respiratory disease attributed to swine influenza A (Hsw1N1) (identified retrospectively by serologic tests) (7,14). |
February 10 | Laboratory evidence supported 2 influenza type A strains circulating on Fort Dix; 1 was a radically new strain. Prospective surveillance for cases in the areas around Fort Dix was initiated; only cases of H3N2 were found (4). |
February 13 | Review of laboratory data and information found that all 5 unknown agents were swine influenza A strains (later named A/New Jersey [Hsw1N1]); 3 laboratories independently identified the swine virus from original specimens (serologic data supporting swine influenza A virus infection was later obtained from 2 survivors with A/New Jersey isolates) (4). |
February 14–16 | Initial planning meeting between CDC, NJ Department of Health, Fort Dix, and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research personnel was held in Atlanta, GA. Prospective case finding was initiated at Fort Dix; H3N2 was isolated; Hsw1N1 was not isolated (7). Retrospective case finding was initiated by serologic study of stored serum specimens from Fort Dix soldiers who had been hospitalized for acute respiratory disease; 8 new cases of disease due to Hsw1N1 were identified with hospitalization dates between January 19 and February 9 (7,14). |
February 22–24 | Prospective case finding was again conducted at Fort Dix; H3N2 virus was isolated but not Hsw1N1 (7). |
February 27 | Thirty-nine new recruits entering Fort Dix February 21–27 gave blood samples after arrival and 5 weeks later; serologic studies were consistent with influenza immunization but not spread of H3N2 virus. None had a titer rise to Hsw1N1 (11). |
March 19 | Prospective surveillance identified the last case of influenza in the areas around Fort Dix; only H3N2 viruses were identified outside of Fort Dix (4). |
3.
Miranda G. Law Stephanie Komura Ann P. Murchison Laura T. Pizzi 《American Health & Drug Benefits》2013,6(9):548-552