M+C plan county exit decisions 1999-2001: implications for payment policy

The primary legislative response to diminishing private plan participation in the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program since 1999 has been substantial payment increases. Analysis of M+C decisions to continue serving or drop counties from 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 reveals that payment amounts, although important, did not have a consistent impact on these decisions. Plan decisions varied depending on the year and the intention to continue participating in M+C at all. Simulations show that M+C plans were better off, on average, with the payment methodology imposed by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 than under the previous payment system and that large payment increases would increase plan retention.     

Having it all: national benefit equity and local payment parity in Medicare

The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has identified two important problems with the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program: nationwide geographic inequity in government-financed benefits, and unequal government payments for M+C plans versus fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare in the same market area. MedPAC concludes that both problems cannot be solved simultaneously. We argue that both problems could be solved if Congress discontinued its policy of underwriting the cost of FFS Medicare. Instead, Congress should define a national entitlement benefit package and have all health plans submit bids on the package in each market area. The government's premium contribution should be equal to the lowest bid submitted by a qualified health plan in each market area. The contribution could be adjusted for health risk, the special obligations of FFS Medicare, and welfare enhancements associated with FFS Medicare that are valued by both beneficiaries and taxpayers but unrelated to beneficiaries' health status.     

Medicare-the development of publicly financed health insurance: Medicare's impact on the nation's health care system

It is useful for health care managers to understand Medicare's history and the impact on providers of ever-changing Medicare payment methods. Initially, Medicare payments resembled those of commercial insurance plans and Blue Cross Blue Shield plans. When Congress became concerned about the increasing costs of Medicare, new payment methods were created to limit payments to providers. The prospective payment system, imposed on hospitals in 1987 and later on nursing homes, home health agencies, and other services, has been adapted by commercial plans, Blue Cross Blue Shield associations, and state Medicaid programs. Changes in payer reimbursements require health care managers to adjust the department's charge master and exert more control of departmental costs. The story of Medicare's beginnings and development can provide some insight into the possibility of national health insurance, given the historic and current politics that limit publicly financed social programs. This article discusses the development of Medicare and its administration and serves as an introduction to the complex realities of health care reimbursement policy.     

A big problem for health plans. Some providers won't play the managed-care game

Lost in all the criticism of HMOs for their decision to abandon many Medicare managed-care markets is a core problem: Many providers are unwilling to join networks serving that population. Hospitals and doctors say they can't offer services to seniors for the low reimbursements from Medicare + Choice and stay solvent. As a result, plans are lobbying Congress for payment relief.     

Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage: Effect of benchmark changes on plan bids

Bidding has been proposed to replace or complement the administered prices that Medicare pays to hospitals and health plans. In 2006, the Medicare Advantage program implemented a competitive bidding system to determine plan payments. In perfectly competitive models, plans bid their costs and thus bids are insensitive to the benchmark. Under many other models of competition, bids respond to changes in the benchmark. We conceptualize the bidding system and use an instrumental variable approach to study the effect of benchmark changes on bids. We use 2006–2010 plan payment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, published county benchmarks, actual realized fee-for-service costs, and Medicare Advantage enrollment. We find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about a $0.53 increase in bids, suggesting that plans in the Medicare Advantage market have meaningful market power.     

The Effect of Health Plan Characteristics on Medicare+Choice Enrollment

Objective. To provide national estimates of the effect of out-of-pocket premiums and benefits on Medicare beneficiaries' choice among managed care health plans.
Data Sources/Study Setting. The data represent the population of all Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans offered to Medicare beneficiaries in the United States in 1999.
Study Design. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the market share of the j th health plan to the lowest cost plan in the beneficiary's county of residence. The explanatory variables are measures of premiums and benefits in the j th health plan relative to the premiums and benefits in the lowest cost plan.
Data Collection Methods. The data are from the 1999 Medicare Compare database, and M+C enrollment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Principal Findings. A $10 increase in an M+C plan's out-of-pocket premium, relative to its competitors, is associated with a decrease of four percentage points in the j th plan's market share (i.e., from 25 to 21 percent), holding the premiums of competing plans constant.
Conclusions. Although our price elasticity estimates are low, the market share losses associated with small changes in a health plan's premium, relative to its competitors, may be sufficient to discipline premiums in a competitive market. Bidding behavior by plans in the Medicare Competitive Pricing Demonstration supports this conclusion.     

Payment policy and competition in the Medicare+Choice program

Over the last 2 years, Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans raised premiums and reduced benefits to an unprecedented degree, arguing that these were unavoidable consequences of inadequate payments. We investigate plan premium and benefit decisions, taking advantage of a natural experiment to separate the influences of payment rates, the intensity of interplan competition, and the underlying cost of providing coverage. We find that the effects of competition are comparable in importance to the effects of payment rates, confirming empirically that it is possible for the Medicare Program to improve benefits without increasing spending or shifting additional costs to beneficiaries.     

Prospective payment for Medicare skilled nursing facilities: background and issues.

Strong interest by Congress in a Medicare prospective payment system for skilled nursing facilities (SNF's) resulted in a major study by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicare SNF benefit. This article highlights findings from that study, which addressed the following: the Medicare SNF benefit, utilization and expenditures, the Medicare SNF industry, problems with the current Medicare SNF reimbursement system, efforts to develop a Medicare SNF case-mix measure, and case-mix differences between hospital-based and freestanding SNF's. In addition, we discuss the implications of the study findings for the design of a Medicare SNF prospective payment system (PPS).     

Pay-for-performance: the MedPAC perspective

Medicare payment systems are neutral and sometimes negative toward quality of care. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has recommended that Congress build incentives for quality into Medicare's payment systems for hospitals, physicians, home health agencies, facilities that treat dialysis patients, and Medicare Advantage plans. In this Commentary we describe the rationale for the recommendations, criteria for determining which settings are ready, program design principles, and potential measures.     

Competitive bidding for Medicare Part B clinical laboratory services

The traditional Medicare fee-for-service program may be able to purchase clinical laboratory test services at a lower cost through competitive bidding. Demonstrations of competitive bidding for clinical laboratory tests have been twice mandated or authorized by Congress but never implemented. This article provides a summary and review of the final design of the laboratory competitive bidding demonstration mandated by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. The design was analogous to a sealed bid (first price), clearing price auction. Design elements presented include covered laboratory tests and beneficiaries, laboratory bidding and payment status under the demonstration, composite bids, determining bidding winners and the demonstration fee schedule, and quality under the demonstration. Expanded use of competitive bidding in Medicare, including specifically for clinical laboratory tests, has been recommended in some proposals for Medicare reform. The presented design may be a useful point of departure if Medicare clinical laboratory competitive bidding is revived in the future.     

Premium rebates and the quiet consensus on market reform for Medicare

Premium rebates allow beneficiaries who choose more efficient Medicare options to receive cash rebates, rather than extra benefits. That simple idea has been controversial. Without fanfare, however, premium rebates have become a key area of agreement in the debate on Medicare reform. Moreover, in legislation in late 2000, it became official policy: Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans will be allowed to offer rebates beginning in 2003. This article explores the economic rationale for premium rebates, provides a historical perspective on the rebate debate, discusses some of the implementation issues that need to be addressed before 2003, and reviews the implications of premium rebates for current legislative proposals for Medicare reform.     

Risk-adjustment system for the Medicare capitated ESRD program

Medicare is the principal payer for medical services for those in the U.S. population suffering from end-stage renal disease (ESRD). By law, beneficiaries diagnosed with ESRD may not subsequently enroll in Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, however, the potential benefits of managed care for this population have stimulated interest in changing the law and developing demonstration plans. We describe a new risk-adjustment system developed for Medicare to pay for ESRD beneficiaries in managed care plans. The model improves on current payment methodology by adjusting payments for treatment status and comorbidities.     

Impact of Disease and Health Management Strategies on Formulary Design and Management

Although Medicare risk plans have been withdrawn in a number of US geographical areas, the size and dollar value associated with the senior demographic group is too large for health plans to ignore.Unlike other developed nations, the US government offers to Medicare-eligible citizens a choice between payment methods for health services. The fee-for-service reimbursement system (Medicare Parts A and B) has been in effect for 30 years; capitated prepaid Medicare risk plans (Medicare+Choice), the subject of this article, are a more recent addition. Active discussion has emerged on how best to pursue disease management in the Medicare risk environment.Disease management must constructively address comorbidities and realise bottom-line medical management savings. With limited medical management resources and a requirement for near-term results, successful programmes will anticipate and concentrate on the tiny fraction of members who generate a large portion of costs.In the future, health plans will make use of the Internet to share essential information across fragmented delivery systems and individually engage seniors, who are increasingly on-line, in their care.     

Medicare+Choice: an interim report card.

While the aim of Medicare+Choice (M+C) was to expand choice, the choices available to Medicare beneficiaries have diminished since its inception: Existing plans have withdrawn from M+C, few new plans have entered the program from among the newly authorized plan types, greater choice has not developed in areas that lacked choice, and the inequities in benefits and offerings between higher- and lower-paid areas of the country have widened rather than narrowed. Operational constraints probably explain the most immediate declines in M+C enrollment, but Congress's ability to foster success for M+C will ultimately depend on the way in which historical tensions related to competing goals and ideologies for the Medicare program are resolved.     

The costs of decedents in the Medicare program: implications for payments to Medicare + Choice plans

OBJECTIVE: To discuss and quantify the incentives that Medicare managed care plans have to avoid (through selective enrollment or disenrollment) people who are at risk for very high costs, focusing on Medicare beneficiaries in the last year of life-a group that accounts for more than one-quarter of Medicare's annual expenditures. DATA SOURCE: Medicare administrative claims for 1994 and 1995. STUDY DESIGN: We calculated the payment a plan would have received under three risk-adjustment systems for each beneficiary in our 1995 sample based on his or her age, gender, county of residence, original reason for Medicare entitlement, and principal inpatient diagnoses received during any hospital stays in 1994. We compared these amounts to the actual costs incurred by those beneficiaries. We then looked for clinical categories that were predictive of costs, including costs in a beneficiary's last year of life, not accounted for by the risk adjusters. DATA EXTRACTION METHODS: The analyses were conducted using claims for a 5 percent random sample of Medicare beneficiaries who died in 1995 and a matched group of survivors. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Medicare is currently implementing the Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Groups (PIP-DCG) risk adjustment payment system to address the problem of risk selection in the Medicare+Choice program. We quantify the strong financial disincentives to enroll terminally ill beneficiaries that plans still have under this risk adjustment system. We also show that up to one-third of the selection observed between Medicare HMOs and the traditional fee-for-service system could be due to differential enrollment of decedents. A risk adjustment system that incorporated more of the available diagnostic information would attenuate this disincentive; however, plans could still use clinical information (not included in the risk adjustment scheme) to identify beneficiaries whose expected costs exceed expected payments. CONCLUSIONS: More disaggregated prospective risk adjustment methods and alternative payment systems that compensate plans for delivering care to certain classes of patients should be considered to ensure access to high-quality managed care for all beneficiaries.     

Prospective per diem rates for skilled nursing care

On July 1, 1998, Medicare's cost-related reimbursement method for skilled nursing facility care was replaced with a prospective payment system that includes a case-mix adjustment based on the Resource Utilization Groups to which Medicare residents are assigned. Shortly thereafter, Congress modified the new system in response to the industry's complaints about low payment rates. The new system aims to align Medicare payments more closely with the costs facility's incur in serving Medicare residents and slow Medicare spending growth. Recent rate increases have reduced the new system's ability to trim Medicare outlays.     

Medicare expenditures for physician and supplier services, 1970-88

The trend data in this article focus on Medicare expenditures and allowed charges for physician and supplier services rendered during the period from 1970 through 1988. A brief overview is presented on the provisions of the new Medicare physician payment system mandated by Congress and scheduled to be phased in starting January 1, 1992. The data provide one of the baselines that could be used for measuring and evaluating the impact of the new Medicare payment system for physician services.     

Payment Policy and Inefficient Benefits in the Medicare+Choice Program

We investigated whether constraints on premium rebates by health plans in the Medicare+Choice program result in inefficient benefits. Since relationships between revenue and benefits could be confounded by unobserved variation in the cost of coverage, we took advantage of a natural experiment that occurred following passage of the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000. Our findings indicate that benefits in zero premium plans were more sensitive to changes in payment rates than were benefits in plans that charged nonzero premiums. These results strongly suggest that current Medicare policy induces plans to offer benefits that are not valued by enrollees at or above their cost.