流感大流行非药物性干预措施

流行性感冒(流感)大流行是指人群中出现甲型流感病毒血凝素新亚型或旧亚型重现,人群普遍缺乏免疫力,病毒在人群中快速传播,超出国界和洲界,引起全球范围的广泛流行[1-3].流感大流行的干预措施包括药物性和非药物性干预措施.药物性干预措施包括疫苗和抗病毒药物,但数量有限.特别是对于资源匮乏的国家,非药物性干预措施是阻止疫情蔓延的有效途径[4].常见的非药物性干预措施包括隔离、检疫、社会隔离、旅行措施、医院内感染控制、个人卫生、公共卫生信息沟通和消毒等.     

何谓药物性流感

康医生：最近，我在某杂志上看到关于“药物性流感”的名称，这是一种什么新的“流感”？它与我们平时所说的流行性感冒、禽流感等有什幺区别？请解答。     

一起企业流感暴发流行的预防控制及社区护理干预

目的探索社区护理干预在控制流感流行中的作用,为预防控制流感提供依据。方法对所有病例进行个案调查。结果疫情波及全厂每一个车间,发病人数339例,患病率为1.3％。暴发流行主要原因与流感疫苗接种率低、疫情发现和报告不及时和防治措施不完善等因素有关。结论通过完善了传染病防治制度,特别是晨检制度和预警制度,落实普及防病知识,强化防病意识、及时隔离治疗病人及重点防护区消毒等预防控制措施,并进行有效的护理干预,能及时消除传染病流行隐患．防止疫情扩散蔓延。     

流感的流行及防治现状研究

流行性感冒是由流感病毒引起的一种急性发热性呼吸道传染病 ,在世界各地都有流行。在历史上流感的大流行曾夺去数以万计人的生命。由于流感病毒抗原经常发生变异 ,易造成人群的反复感染 ,发病率极高。流感引起的并发症如肺炎、中耳炎、鼻炎、肌炎、雷伊氏综合症等严重威胁人类健康 ;流感病毒引起的缺勤及高额医疗费用 ,给个人、卫生系统及社会带来沉重经济负担 ,因此 ,人们越来越重视对流感的研究。现将流感的流行情况及免疫预防作综述如下。1　流行病学1 1　流行概况　流感发病呈全球性分布。从 15 80年起 ,世界上已经记录过 3 1起大规模的…     

流感大流行的疾病负担和经济影响研究进展

甲型流感病毒常以流行形式出现,能引起世界性流感大流行。流感大流行是指当甲型流感病毒出现新亚型或旧亚型重现,人群普遍缺乏相应免疫力,病毒在人群中快速传播,从而引起流感在全球范围的广泛流行。历史上每次流感大流行都给人类健康和社会经济带来灾难性打击。     

国内外流感流行动态

国内外流感流行动态一、１９９６～１９９７流感疫苗代表株世界卫生组织总部召开的国际专家会议，公布了用于１９９６～１９９７年度流感疫苗的新成分。科学家们必须经常鉴定新出现的流感病毒株，以便能及时制定出有效的疫苗代表株。与去年的推荐相比，流感疫苗的３个代表...     

医院感染预防与控制的非药物性干预措施

许多非药物性的干预方式能显著降低医院获得性感染(HAIs)的发生率已渐达成共识.笔者查阅近些年有关非药物干预减少HAIs的文献,对HAIs的发生率、死亡率以及医疗费用进行综述.1 HAIs的感染传播途径 HAIs主要通过接触(手)、导管、静脉或外科手术切口传播,但仍有一些可以通过空气传播.包括耐甲氧西林金黄色葡萄球菌(MRSA)、凝固酶阴性葡萄球菌(CNS)、白喉棒杆菌、脑膜炎奈瑟菌、鲍氏不动杆菌、假单胞菌属等多种病原菌均可以通过空气传播[1-3].一项小白鼠的研究表明,两种肺炎克雷伯菌通过空气传播,并在小白鼠肺内繁殖,导致小白鼠感染.因此,我们可以得出结论,虽然许多医院感染是通过接触或静脉途径传播,但空气传播也是许多HAIs发生的重要途径.     

流感流行生态学的流行病学研究

在山东和河南两省６９７个农村疾病监测点中对养鱼,综合养鱼技术,养猪、鸡和鸭五个变量和流感流行关系进行横断面研究。结果提示了鸭在流感流行生态学中的重要作用;而猪的作用似不明显和不支持“综合养鱼”导致“流感流行”假设的见解。     

流感流行疾病负担概述

流感是由流感病毒感染引起的急性呼吸道传染病,起病急;在高危人群中,流感还可使原有慢性病(如肺部或心血管疾病)恶化,或伴随其他病毒或细菌合并感染,导致相关并发症[1].     

短缺基本药物的现状及干预措施研究

目前,基本药物在供给方面存在一定不足,这主要是由基本药物目录限制、药品定价机制缺陷、流通成本过高和体制性漏洞等因素造成的.要缓解上述问题对基本药物制度的影响,国家必须在基本药物储备机制、生产企业激励制度、招标定价政策等方面进行调整和完善,从而提高基本药物的可及性.     

Technology transfer hub for pandemic influenza vaccine

Increase of influenza vaccine production capacity in developing countries has been identified as an important element of global pandemic preparedness. Nevertheless, technology transfer for influenza vaccine production to developing country vaccine manufacturers has proven difficult because of lack of interested technology providers. As an alternative to an individual provider–recipient relationship, a technology and training platform (a “hub”) for a generic non-proprietary process was established at a public sector European manufacturer's site. The conditions for setting up such a platform and the potential applicability of this model to other biologicals are discussed.     

Introduction to pandemic influenza through history

For the past 400 years, epidemics resembling influenza have been recorded in many countries. Epidemics from as early as the 16th Century in England and the 18th Century in the USA are recognizable as influenza, even in the absences of precise knowledge of their causative agents.     

State plans for containment of pandemic influenza

This review assesses differences and similarities of the states in planning for pandemic influenza. We reviewed the recently posted plans of 49 states for vaccination, early epidemic surveillance and detection, and intraepidemic plans for containment of pandemic influenza. All states generally follow vaccination priorities set by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. They all also depend on National Sentinel Physician Surveillance and other passive surveillance systems to alert them to incipient epidemic influenza, but these systems may not detect local epidemics until they are well established. Because of a lack of epidemiologic data, few states explicitly discuss implementing nonpharmaceutical community interventions: voluntary self-isolation (17 states [35%]), school or other institutional closing (18 [37%]), institutional or household quarantine (15 [31%]), or contact vaccination or chemoprophylaxis (12 [25%]). This review indicates the need for central planning for pandemic influenza and for epidemiologic studies regarding containment strategies in the community.     

The association of seasonal influenza vaccination with pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 infection

In 2010 Skowronski and colleagues reported that seasonal influenza vaccine appeared to increase the risk of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009 (pH1N1) infection during the first pandemic wave in Canada [1]. They suggested a number of possible explanations for their unexpected finding: firstly, that the results were an artefact of selection bias or confounding; secondly, that the results were due to partial mediation through a biological mechanism; and thirdly, that the results were due to a direct immune mechanism, such as antibody dependent enhancement [1]. In a recent paper in Vaccine, Rosella and colleagues have investigated in detail the first of these possibilities, confirming that it is unlikely an unidentified confounder could have explained the findings [2].     

Targeted social distancing design for pandemic influenza

Targeted social distancing to mitigate pandemic influenza can be designed through simulation of influenza's spread within local community social contact networks. We demonstrate this design for a stylized community representative of a small town in the United States. The critical importance of children and teenagers in transmission of influenza is first identified and targeted. For influenza as infectious as 1957-58 Asian flu (=50% infected), closing schools and keeping children and teenagers at home reduced the attack rate by >90%. For more infectious strains, or transmission that is less focused on the young, adults and the work environment must also be targeted. Tailored to specific communities across the world, such design would yield local defenses against a highly virulent strain in the absence of vaccine and antiviral drugs.     

Cost-benefit of stockpiling drugs for influenza pandemic

We analyzed strategies for the use of stockpiled antiviral drugs in the context of a future influenza pandemic and estimated cost-benefit ratios. Current stockpiling of oseltamivir appears to be cost-saving to the economy under several treatment strategies, including therapeutic treatment of patients and postexposure prophylactic treatment of patients' close contacts.     

Therapeutic approaches of clinicians to influenza pandemic

In the event of influenza pandemic, clinicians have to be sure that vaccination has been correctly performed in all patients in whom it is usually recommended. Pregnant women should probably be vaccinated. Vaccination of health personnel is recommended to limit transmission of nosocomial influenza to high-risk persons, and to decrease the risk of absenteeism related to influenza. Chemoprophylaxis is effective in preventing influenza A, and is indicated in high-risk persons with major contraindication or impaired response to vaccination or who have not yet been vaccinated.     

流感大流行期间孕妇的防治

流行性感冒(流感)可引起世界性大流行,已成为全球重大的公共卫生问题.孕妇为流感的高危人群,故在流感大流行时加强这一人群的保护尤为重要.此文就近年来国内外流感对孕妇及其胎儿的影响以及采取的防治措施等研究进展进行了综述.     

The PHLS response to a pandemic of influenza

This document sets out the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) action plan for responding to an influenza pandemic. The plan entails, in phase 0, interpandemic surveillance by the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) and the Enteric & Respiratory Virus Laboratory (ERVL) of the Central Public Health Laboratory (CPHL), as well as maintenance by Area & Regional (A & R) Public Health Laboratories of updated diagnostic techniques for influenza. In phase 1 (the emergence of a shifted influenza virus strain) a Pandemic Working Group will be convened to consider what action by PHLS is necessary. In phase 2 (pandemic influenza outside UK) the pre-defined roles for PHLS laboratories and CDSC will be adopted. When a pandemic is imminent in the United Kingdom (phase 3) the Working Group will co-ordinate PHLS activities and the Director of the Service will assess what special studies should be implemented. In phase 4, when the pandemic has reached the UK, the action plan sets out comprehensive measures that will be taken by CDSC, ERVL and A & R Laboratories to gather and collate information, provide DoH with weekly surveillance data and develop recommendations for prophylaxis, clinical management and treatment. When influenza activity has returned to background levels (phase 5) a report will be drafted by the Working Group prior to it being stood down by the Director of the Service. The response is summarised in tabular form in Table 1.Reproduced by kind permissin of thePHLS Microbiology Digest (first published 1993, 10: 147–154)