Evaluation of the Effect of a Consumer-Driven Health Plan on Medical Care Expenditures and Utilization

Objective. To compare medical care costs and utilization in a consumer-driven health plan (CDHP) to other health insurance plans.
Study Design. We examine claims and employee demographic data from one large employer that adopted a CDHP in 2001. A quasi-experimental pre–post design is used to assign employees to three cohorts: (1) enrolled in a health maintenance organization (HMO) from 2000 to 2002, (2) enrolled in a preferred provider organization (PPO) from 2000 to 2002, or (3) enrolled in a CDHP in 2001 and 2002, after previously enrolling in either an HMO or PPO in 2000. Using this approach we estimate a difference-in-difference regression model for expenditure and utilization measures to identify the impact of CDHP.
Principal Findings. By 2002, the CDHP cohort experienced lower total expenditures than the PPO cohort but higher expenditures than the HMO cohort. Physician visits and pharmaceutical use and costs were lower in the CDHP cohort compared to the other groups. Hospital costs and admission rates for CDHP enrollees, as well as total physician expenditures, were significantly higher than for enrollees in the HMO and PPO plans.
Conclusions. An early evaluation of CDHP expenditures and utilization reveals that the new health plan is a viable alternative to existing health plan designs. Enrollees in the CDHP have lower total expenditures than PPO enrollees, but higher utilization of resource-intensive hospital admissions after an initially favorable selection.     

The Mandatory Health Insurance System in Chile: Explaining the Choice between Public and Private Insurance

In Chile, dependent workers and retirees are mandated by law to purchase health insurance, and can choose between private and public health insurance. This paper studies the determinants of the choice of health insurance. Earnings are generally considered the key factor in this choice, and we confirm this, but find that other factors are also important. It is particularly interesting to analyze how the individual's characteristics interact with the design of the system to influence choice. Worse health, as signaled by age or sex (e.g., older people or women in reproductive ages), results in adverse selection against the public health insurance system. This is due to the lack of risk adjustment of the public health insurance's premium. Hence, Chile's risk selection problem is, at least in part, due to the design of the Chilean public insurance system.     

Consumer Choice in Dutch Health Insurance after Reform

This article investigates the scope and effects of enhanced consumer choice in health insurance that is presented as a cornerstone of the new health insurance legislation in the Netherlands that will come into effect in 2006. The choice for choice marks the current libertarian trend in Dutch health care policymaking. One of our conclusions is that the scope of enhanced choice should not be overstated due to many legal and non-legal restrictions to it. The consumer choice advocates have great expectations of the impact of enhanced choice. A critical analysis of its impact demonstrates that these expectations may not become true and that enhanced consumer choice should not be perceived as the 'magic bullet' for many problems in health care.     

Employer Health Insurance Offerings and Employee Enrollment Decisions

Objective. To determine how the characteristics of the health benefits offered by employers affect worker insurance coverage decisions.
Data Sources. The 1996–1997 and the 1998–1999 rounds of the nationally representative Community Tracking Study Household Survey.
Study Design. We use multinomial logistic regression to analyze the choice between own-employer coverage, alternative source coverage, and no coverage among employees offered health insurance by their employer. The key explanatory variables are the types of health plans offered and the net premium offered. The models include controls for personal, health plan, and job characteristics.
Principal Findings. When an employer offers only a health maintenance organization married employees are more likely to decline coverage from their employer and take-up another offer (odds ratio (OR)=1.27, p <.001), while singles are more likely to accept the coverage offered by their employer and less likely to be uninsured (OR=0.650, p <.001). Higher net premiums increase the odds of declining the coverage offered by an employer and remaining uninsured for both married (OR=1.023, p <.01) and single (OR=1.035, p <.001) workers.
Conclusions. The type of health plan coverage an employer offers affects whether its employees take-up insurance, but has a smaller effect on overall coverage rates for workers and their families because of the availability of alternative sources of coverage. Relative to offering only a non-HMO plan, employers offering only an HMO may reduce take-up among those with alternative sources of coverage, but increase take-up among those who would otherwise go uninsured. By modeling the possibility of take-up through the health insurance offers from the employer of the spouse, the decline in coverage rates from higher net premiums is less than previous estimates.     

Premium Variation in the Individual Health Insurance Market

Recent proposals to decrease the number of uninsured in the U.S. indicate that the individual health insurance market's role may increase. Amid fears of possible risk-segmentation in individual insurance, there exists limited information of the functioning of such markets. This paper examines the relationship between expected medical expense and actual paid premiums for households with individual insurance in the 1996–1997 Community Tracking Study's Household Survey. We find that premiums vary less than proportionately with expected expense and vary only with certain risk characteristics. We also explore how the relationship between risk and premiums is affected by local regulations and market characteristics. We find that premiums vary significantly less strongly with risk for persons insured by HMOs and in markets dominated by managed care insurers.     

Price elasticities in the German Statutory Health Insurance market before and after the health care reform of 2009

This paper investigates the change in price elasticity of health insurance choice in Germany after a reform of health insurance contributions. Using a comprehensive data set of all sickness funds between 2004 and 2013, price elasticities are calculated both before and after the reform for the entire market. The general price elasticity is found to be increased more than 4-fold from −0.81 prior to the reform to −3.53 after the reform. By introducing a new kind of health insurance contribution the reform seemingly increased the price elasticity of insured individuals to a more appropriate level under the given market parameters. However, further unintended consequences of the new contribution scheme were massive losses of market share for the more expensive sickness funds and therefore an undivided focus on pricing as the primary competitive element to the detriment of quality.     

Consumer Price Sensitivity and Social Health Insurer Choice in Germany and the Netherlands

In this paper, we examine the effects of the introduction of free choice and price competition in social health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands. Using panel data at the sickness fund level we estimate the price elasticity of sickness fund choice in both countries. We find that the price elasticity in Germany is high and rapidly increasing. Consistent with findings of other studies on health plan choice, the price elasticity is much lower for elderly than for non-elderly. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the price elasticity of fund choice is negligible. Only when people were forced to choose a sickness fund, they were quite sensitive to premium differences. Key factors in explaining the observed differences in switching behavior between both countries are the degree of financial risk for sickness funds, the features of the risk-adjustment mechanism and the role of employers.     

Consumers, health insurance and dominated choices

We analyze employee health plan choices when the choice set offered by their employer includes a dominated plan. During our study period, one-third of workers were enrolled in the dominated plan. Some may have selected the plan before it was dominated and then failed to switch out of it. However, a substantial number actively chose the dominated plan when they had an unambiguously better choice. These results suggest limitations in the ability of health reform based solely on consumer choice to achieve efficient outcomes and that implementation of health reform should anticipate, monitor and account for this consumer behavior.     

Employee choice of flexible spending account participation and health plan

Despite the fact that flexible spending accounts (FSAs) are becoming an increasingly popular employer-provided health benefit, there has been very little empirical study of FSA use among employees at the individual level. This study contributes to the literature on FSAs using a unique data set that provides three years of employee-level-matched benefits data. Motivated by the theoretical model of FSA choice presented in Cardon and Showalter (J. Health Econ. 2001; 20(6):935-954), we examine the determinants of FSA participation and contribution levels using cross-sectional and random-effect two-part models. FSA participation and health plan choice are also modeled jointly in each year using conditional logit models. We find that, even after controlling for a number of other demographic characteristics, non-whites are less likely to participate in the FSA program, have lower contributions conditional on participation, and have a lower probability of switching to new lower cost share, higher premium plans when they were introduced. We also find evidence that choosing health plans with more expected out-of-pocket expenses is correlated with participation in the FSA program.     

Consumer Experiences in a Consumer-Driven Health Plan

Objective. To assess the experience of enrollees in a consumer-driven health plan (CDHP).
Data Sources/Study Setting. Survey of University of Minnesota employees regarding their 2002 health benefits.
Study Design. Comparison of regression-adjusted mean values for CDHP and other plan enrollees: customer service, plan paperwork, overall satisfaction, and plan switching. For CDHP enrollees only, use of plan features, willingness to recommend the plan to others, and reports of particularly negative or positive experiences.
Principal Findings. There were significant differences in experiences of CDHP enrollees versus enrollees in other plans with customer service and paperwork, but similar levels of satisfaction (on a 10-point scale) with health plans. Eight percent of CDHP enrollees left their plan after one year, compared to 5 percent of enrollees leaving other plans. A minority of CDHP enrollees used online plan features, but enrollees generally were satisfied with the amount and quality of the information provided by the CDHP. Almost half reported a particularly positive experience, compared to a quarter reporting a particularly negative experience. Thirty percent said they would recommend the plan to others, while an additional 57 percent said they would recommend it depending on the situation.
Conclusions. Much more work is needed to determine how consumer experience varies with the number and type of plan options available, the design of the CDHP, and the length of time in the CDHP. Research also is needed on the factors that affect consumer decisions to leave CDHPs.     

Lifetime Cover in Private Insurance Markets

In the last few decades, private health insurance rates have declined in many countries. In countries and states with community rating, a major cause is adverse selection. In order to address age-based adverse selection, Australia has recently begun a novel approach which imposes stiff penalties for buying private insurance later in life, when expected costs are higher. In this paper, we analyze Australias Lifetime Cover in the context of a modified version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). We allow empirically-based probabilities to increase by age for low-risk types. The model highlights the shortcomings of the Australian plan. Based on empirically-based probabilities of illness, we predict that Lifetime Cover will not arrest adverse selection. The model has many policy implications for government regulation encouraging long-term health coverage.This revised version was published online in March 2005 with corrections to the cover date     

Determinants of the Use of Health Plan Information in Formulating Health Plan Selection Decisions

Abstract

This study seeks to identify the impact of information on employees' health plan selection decision-making. Surveys were administered to 1,722 Federal employees working in the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) enrolled in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). This study focuses on the enrollees' access to and use of three types of health plan information: print information issued by the Federal government (in particular, The Guide to Federal Employees Health Benefit Plans), print information issued by the health plans, and web-based information. Literature from health plans was utilized to a greater degree than The Guide. Web-based information was the least accessed and used. Major positive predictors of the use of health plan information from any source were: race, time in Federal employment, whether the employee was considering a plan change, employees with less time in current plan, employees who search for information to make decisions, and spouses' health status. Younger and more-educated employees were more likely to access web-based information. Implications for management, policy, and future research are discussed.     

Health Insurance,Health Savings Accounts and Healthcare Utilization

Assuming symmetric information, we show that a high‐deductible health plan (HDHP) combined with a tax‐favored health savings account (HSA) induces more savings and less treatment compared with a full coverage plan under reasonable risk preferences. Furthermore, a higher tax subsidy increases savings in any case but decreases medical utilization if and only if treatment expenses are above the deductible. A larger deductible increases savings but does not necessarily decrease healthcare utilization. Whether an HDHP/HSA combination is preferred over a full coverage contract depends on absolute risk aversion. A higher tax advantage increases the attractiveness of an HDHP/HSA combination, whereas the effects of changes in the deductible are ambiguous. The paper shows that a potential regulator needs to carefully set the size of the deductible as only in a certain corridor of the probability of sickness, its effect on aggregate healthcare costs are unambiguously favorable. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Health insurance,cost expectations,and adverse job turnover

Because less healthy employees value health insurance more than the healthy ones, when health insurance is newly offered job turnover rates for healthier employees decline less than turnover rates for the less healthy. We call this adverse job turnover, and it implies that a firm's expected health costs will increase when health insurance is first offered. Health insurance premiums may fail to adjust sufficiently fast because state regulations restrict annual premium changes, or insurers are reluctant to change premiums rapidly. Even with premiums set at the long run expected costs, some firms may be charged premiums higher than their current expected costs and choose not to offer insurance. High administrative costs at small firms exacerbate this dynamic selection problem. Using 1998–1999 MEDSTAT MarketScan and 1997 Employer Health Insurance Survey data, we find that expected employee health expenditures at firms that offer insurance have lower within‐firm and higher between‐firm variance than at firms that do not. Turnover rates are systematically higher in industries in which firms are less likely to offer insurance. Simulations of the offer decision capturing between‐firm health‐cost heterogeneity and expected turnover rates match the observed pattern across firm sizes well. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Determinants of Coverage Decisions in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Consumers' Decision‐Making Abilities and the Amount of Information in Their Choice Environment

Objective

To investigate the determinants and quality of coverage decisions among uninsured choosing plans in a hypothetical health insurance marketplace.

Study Setting

Two samples of uninsured individuals: one from an Internet-based sample comprised largely of young, healthy, tech-savvy individuals (n = 276), and the other from low-income, rural Virginians (n = 161).

Study Design

We assessed whether health insurance comprehension, numeracy, choice consistency, and the number of plan choices were associated with participants'' ability to choose a cost-minimizing plan, given their expected health care needs (defined as choosing a plan costing no more than $500 in excess of the total estimated annual costs of the cheapest plan available).

Data Collection

Primary data were collected using an online questionnaire.

Principal Findings

Uninsured who were more numerate showed higher health insurance comprehension; those with more health insurance comprehension made choices of health insurance plans more consistent with their stated preferences; and those who made choices more concordant with their stated preferences were less likely to choose a plan that cost more than $500 in excess of the cheapest plan available.

Conclusions

Increasing health insurance comprehension and designing exchanges to facilitate plan comparison will be critical to ensuring the success of health insurance marketplaces.