Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition

Paying insurers risk-adjusted prices for covering different individuals can correct selection incentives and induce the market to provide optimal insurance policies. To calculate the optimal risk-adjusted prices we need to know (a) what the optimal policies are; (b) how much they cost; and (c) how competitive the market is. We examine these issues in a model with spatial heterogeneity and adverse selection. Market equilibrium is characterized, and delivery of the socially optimal insurance policies is possible, as long as providers are paid risk-adjusted fees for each individual they serve. When the payment can be made on the basis of an individual's risk, it should be sufficient to cover the expected cost of the socially optimal policy for that person, plus a mark-up. If payments can be made only on the basis of a partially informative signal, the optimal risk-based payments should be adjusted according to a simple linear transformation, identified by Glazer and McGuire [Glazer, J., McGuire, T., 2000. Optimal risk adjustment of health insurance premiums: an application to managed care.     

An "All-American" health reform proposal

Reforming the U.S. health care system is frequently thought of in absolutist terms: managed competition versus rate regulation; federal versus state administration; and business mandates versus individual insurance purchases. While these choices must be resolved over the long run, the transition to a new health care system will take several years and require more flexible solutions. The "All-American" Deal offers just that. It requires individual households to be insured and allows businesses to voluntarily offer health insurance; relies on the federal income tax system to collect income-based premiums and transfer funds to states through risk-adjusted payments; and lets states manage the disbursement of funds for uninsured residents.     

Risk-adjusted capitation. The Israeli experience.

As in a number of countries during the 1990s, Israel's health system has been undergoing structural reform based on public contracting and regulated markets. The main element of the reform was the enactment of the National Health Insurance Law (NHI), which went into effect on 1 January 1995. According to the Law, the sick funds receive risk-adjusted capitation payments, which place them fully at risk for the cost of supplying a legally mandated basket of health benefits. The paper analyses the effects of the NHI on the Israeli competitive health insurance market and discusses the major policy issues facing the Israeli system.     

Modified capitation and treatment incentives for end stage renal disease

This study developed a modified capitation payment method for the Medicare end stage renal disease (ESRD) program designed to support appropriate treatment choices and protect health plans from undue financial risk. The payment method consists of risk-adjusted monthly capitated payments for individuals on dialysis or with functioning kidney grafts, lump sum event payments for expected incremental costs of kidney transplantations or graft failures, and outlier payments for expensive patients. The methodology explained 25 percent of variation in annual payments per patient. Risk adjustment captured substantial variations across patient groups. Outlier payments reduced health plan risk by up to 15 percent.     

Physicians' perceptions of risk adjustment and health policy formation in Minnesota

A questionnaire was used to assess Minnesota physicians' knowledge of and opinions about risk adjustment, a policy designed to modify payments to health providers based on the relative "sickness" level of the provider's patient population. Additionally, attitudes toward this policy were measured to examine physicians' perceptions of health policy formation in Minnesota. Although familiarity with this policy appears low, respondents support the concept of diagnosis-based risk adjustment. Physicians are divided on whether to further modify risk-adjusted rates with a conversion factor; their written comments suggest a mistrust of the policymaking process. Physicians most often listed the Minnesota Medical Association as a primary source for health policy information, while few respondents reported any communication with state legislators in health policy matters. Respondents perceive an imbalance in the influence wielded by various entities in health policy formation. Only 5% believe individual physicians have significant influence in policymaking. Increased communication between physicians and their legislators may be one way for physicians to gain such influence.     

Premium Variation in the Individual Health Insurance Market

Recent proposals to decrease the number of uninsured in the U.S. indicate that the individual health insurance market's role may increase. Amid fears of possible risk-segmentation in individual insurance, there exists limited information of the functioning of such markets. This paper examines the relationship between expected medical expense and actual paid premiums for households with individual insurance in the 1996–1997 Community Tracking Study's Household Survey. We find that premiums vary less than proportionately with expected expense and vary only with certain risk characteristics. We also explore how the relationship between risk and premiums is affected by local regulations and market characteristics. We find that premiums vary significantly less strongly with risk for persons insured by HMOs and in markets dominated by managed care insurers.     

Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: an empirical study

If premiums for health insurance are not risk related, there exists a consumer information surplus that may result in adverse selection. Our results indicate that insurers can greatly reduce this surplus by risk-adjusting the premium. We conclude that there need not be any substantial unavoidable consumer information surplus if consumers can choose whether to take a deductible for a one- or two-year health insurance contract with otherwise identical benefits. Therefore, adverse selection need not be a problem in a competitive insurance market with risk-adjusted premiums or vouchers and with such a consumer choice of health plan.     

Determinants of health care utilization by German sickness fund members--with application to risk adjustment

In many countries, social health insurance systems are being reformed in favor of more competition among insurers, while premiums are community rated by regulation. The implicit incentives for insurers to engage in risk selection can only be curtailed using appropriate systems of risk-adjusted equalization payments among insurers. To develop these systems, predictors of individual utilization patterns have to be identified, e.g. via regression analysis using previous utilization data. In some countries such as Germany, such data are hardly ever available. In the early nineties, a number of sickness funds participated in an experiment in which individual utilization data were collected. Our data set covers more than 70,000 members of company sickness funds over a 5-year period. We analyze socio-demographic determinants of utilization which could be used as risk adjusters in a risk equalization scheme. Our results suggest that besides age and sex, the set of risk adjusters should include income, family status and a dummy for the last year of life.     

The effect of price on switching among health plans

A recent policy change by the University of California (UC) provides a unique natural experiment for investigating the sensitivity of consumers to health plan premiums. When the UC moved to a policy of limiting its contribution to the cost of the least expensive plan, out-of-pocket premiums increased for roughly one-third of UC employees. We examine the extent to which UC employees switched plans in response to this change in premiums. Our results indicate a strong response. Individuals facing premium increases of less than $10 were roughly 5 times as likely to switch plans as those whose premiums remained constant.     

Hospitals' Negotiating Leverage with Health Plans: How and Why Has It Changed?

Objective.  To describe how hospitals' negotiating leverage with managed care plans changed from 1996 to 2001 and to identify factors that explain any changes.
Data Sources.  Primary semistructured interviews, and secondary qualitative (e.g., newspaper articles) and quantitative (i.e., InterStudy, American Hospital Association) data.
Study Design.  The Community Tracking Study site visits to a nationally representative sample of 12 communities with more than 200,000 people. These 12 markets have been studied since 1996 using a variety of primary and secondary data sources.
Data Collection Methods.  Semistructured interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of individuals from hospitals, health plans, and knowledgeable market observers. Secondary quantitative data on the 12 markets was also obtained.
Principal Findings.  Our findings suggest that many hospitals' negotiating leverage significantly increased after years of decline. Today, many hospitals are viewed as having the greatest leverage in local markets. Changes in three areas—the policy and purchasing context, managed care plan market, and hospital market—appear to explain why hospitals' leverage increased, particularly over the last two years (2000–2001).
Conclusions.  Hospitals' increased negotiating leverage contributed to higher payment rates, which in turn are likely to increase managed care plan premiums. This trend raises challenging issues for policymakers, purchasers, plans, and consumers.     

Medigap premiums and Medicare HMO enrollment

OBJECTIVE: Markets for Medicare HMOs (health maintenance organizations) and supplemental Medicare coverage are often treated separately in existing literature. Yet because managed care plans and Medigap plans both cover services not covered by basic Medicare, these markets are clearly interrelated. We examine the extent to which Medigap premiums affect the likelihood of the elderly joining managed care plans. DATA SOURCES: The analysis is based on a sample of Medicare beneficiaries drawn from the 1996-1997 Community Tracking Study (CTS) Household Survey by the Center for Studying Health System Change. Respondents span 56 different CTS sites from 30 different states. Measures of premiums for privately-purchased Medigap policies were collected from a survey of large insurers serving this market. Data for individual, market, and HMO characteristics were collected from the CTS, InterStudy, and HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration). STUDY DESIGN: Our analysis uses a reduced-form logit model to estimate the probability of Medicare HMO participation as a function of Medigap premiums controlling for other market- and individual-level characteristics. The logit coefficients were then used to simulate changes in Medicare participation in response to changes in Medigap premiums. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: We found that Medigap premiums vary considerably among the geographic markets included in our sample. Measures of premiums from different insurers and for different types of Medigap policies were generally highly correlated across markets. Our models consistently indicate a strong positive relationship between Medigap premiums and HMO participation. This result is robust across several specifications. Simulations suggest that a one standard deviation increase in Medigap premiums would increase HMO participation by more than 8 percentage points. CONCLUSIONS: This research provides strong evidence that Medigap premiums have a significant effect on seniors' participation in Medicare HMOs. Policy initiatives aimed at lowering Medigap premiums will likely discourage enrollment in Medicare HMOs, holding other factors constant. Although the Medigap premiums are just one factor affecting the future penetration rate of Medicare HMOs, they are an important driver of HMO enrollment and should be considered carefully when creating policy related to seniors' supplemental coverage. Similarly, our results imply that reforms to the Medicare HMO market would influence the demand for Medigap policies.     

Impact of Medicare managed care market withdrawal on beneficiaries

The 2001 Survey of Involuntary Disenrollees was conducted to investigate the impact of Medicare+Choice (M+C) plan withdrawals on Medicare beneficiaries. Eighty-four percent of a total of 4,732 beneficiaries whose Medicare managed care (MMC) plan stopped serving them at the end of 2000 responded to the survey. Their responses indicated that the withdrawal of plans from Medicare affected beneficiaries in terms of concerns about getting and paying for care, increased payments for premiums and out-of-pocket costs, and changes in health care arrangements. Of particular concern were the impacts on those in vulnerable subgroups such as the disabled, less educated, and minorities.     

Identifying barriers to move to better health coverage: preferences for health insurance benefits among the rural poor population in La Guajira,Colombia

Even though access to health insurance in Colombia has improved since the implementation of the 1993 health reforms (Law 100), universal coverage has not yet been accomplished. There is still a segment of the population under the low‐income (subsidized) health insurance policy or without health insurance altogether. The purpose of this research was to identify preferences and behavior regarding health insurance among the subsidized rural population in La Guajira, Colombia, and to understand why that population remains under the subsidized health insurance policy. The field experiment gathered information from 400 households regarding their socioeconomic situation, health conditions, and preferences for health insurance characteristics. Results suggest that the surveyed population gives priority to expanded family coverage, physician and hospital choice, and access to specialists, rather than to attributes associated with co‐payments or premiums. That indicates that people value healthcare benefits and family coverage more than health insurance expenses, and policy makers could use these preferences to enroll subsidized population into the contributory regime. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Free choice of health plan combined with risk‐adjusted capitation payments: are switchers and new enrolees good risks?

It is well established in the literature that the young and healthy are more inclined to switch health plan, given the opportunity. In countries where risk-adjusted capitation payments are used to create a level playing field for the competing health plans, as is the case in The Netherlands, it is important to determine whether plans could exploit such selective switching to gain unfair advantage. This study analyses whether various risk-adjustment models are capable of compensating adequately for selective switching in the Dutch sickness fund sector. Data concern information on health care expenditures, demographics and indicators of chronic diseases for 10 million members from 21 funds. Results indicate that switchers in 2000-2001 had expenditures that were around 40% below average in 1994-2002, confirming that movers are 'good' risks in absolute terms. However, after taking into account that these people are younger and healthier, the risk-adjusted payments for them nearly equalled actual expenditures. This holds for both people who in fact switched from one fund to another, and for those who were forced by regulation to leave the private insurance sector and who had to choose a sickness fund. Importantly, models using only demographics could not achieve this.     

Assessment of cost sharing in the Pima County Marketplace

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established health insurance marketplaces to allow consumers to make educated decisions about their health care coverage. During the first open enrollment period in 2013, the federally facilitated marketplace in Pima County, Arizona listed 119 plans, making it one of the most competitive markets in the country. This study compares these plans based on differences in consumer cost sharing, including deductibles, co-pays and premiums. Consumer costs were reviewed using specific cases including a normal delivery pregnancy, the management of Type II Diabetes, and the utilization of specialty drugs to treat Hepatitis C. Total cost of care was calculated as the cost of managing the condition or event plus the cost of monthly premiums, evaluated as a single individual age 27. Evaluating a plan on premium alone is not sufficient as cost sharing can dramatically raise the cost of care. A rating system and better cost transparency tools could provider easier access to pertinent information for consumers.     

Risk sharing as a supplement to imperfect capitation: a tradeoff between selection and efficiency

This paper describes forms of risk sharing between insurers and the regulator in a competitive individual health insurance market with imperfectly risk-adjusted capitation payments. Risk sharing implies a reduction of an insurer's incentives for selection as well as for efficiency. In a theoretical analysis, we show how the optimal extent of risk sharing may depend on the weights the regulator assigns to these effects. Some countries employ outlier or proportional risk sharing as a supplement to demographic capitation payments. Our empirical results strongly suggest that other forms of risk sharing yield better tradeoffs between selection and efficiency.     

Payments for health care and its effect on catastrophe and impoverishment: Experience from the transition to Universal Coverage in Thailand

Equitable health financing was embodied in the reform strategies of Thailand's health care system when the country moved towards implementing the Universal Coverage (UC) policy in 2001. This study aimed to measure the pattern of household out-of-pocket payments for health care and to examine the financial catastrophe and impoverishment due to such payments during the transitional period (pre- and post-Universal Coverage policy implementation) in Thailand. This study used the nationally representative Socioeconomic Surveys in 2000 (pre-UC), 2002, and 2004 (post-UC), which contained data from 24747, 34758 and 34843 individual households, respectively. The proportion of out-of-pocket payments for health care as a share of household living standards among Thai households shows a decreasing pattern during the observed period. Moreover, the incidence and intensity of catastrophic payments for health care decline from the pre-UC to post-UC period. The distribution of incidence and the intensity of catastrophic payments for health care across quintiles also indicate that the lower quintile group (1st and 2nd quintiles) incurs lower catastrophic health care payments compared to the higher quintile group. The UC policy is also effective in preventing impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments for health care since both the poverty headcount and poverty gap decline from the pre-UC to post-UC period.This study provides important evidence that the UC policy implementation is a valuable social protection and safety net strategy that contributes to the prevention of financial catastrophe and impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments for health care. In conclusion, the UC policy in Thailand achieves one of the goals of improving the health system through equitable health care financing by reducing financial catastrophe and impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments for health care.     

Trends in the golden state: small-group premiums rise sharply while actuarial values for individual coverage plummet

Using multiple databases, this paper examines recent trends in the affordability and comprehensiveness of small-group and individual health insurance markets in California. Both became less affordable over the study period. In 2006, a single person age 32-52 earning the median income who purchased individual insurance spent on average 16 percent of income on premiums and out-of-pocket medical expenses. For individual insurance, the share of medical expenses paid by insurance as opposed to patients declined from 2002 to 2006. In the small-group market, premiums rose more than 50 percent from 2003 to 2006, but the proportion of claims paid by insurers for a standardized population remained constant.     

IS THE MEDICAL LOSS RATIO A GOOD TARGET MEASURE FOR REGULATION IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET FOR HEALTH INSURANCE?

Effective January 1, 2011, individual market health insurers must meet a minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) of 80%. This law aims to encourage ‘productive’ forms of competition by increasing the proportion of premium dollars spent on clinical benefits. To date, very little is known about the performance of firms in the individual health insurance market, including how MLRs are related to insurer and market characteristics. The MLR comprises one component of the price–cost margin, a traditional gauge of market power; the other component is percent of premiums spent on administrative expenses. We use data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (2001–2009) to evaluate whether the MLR is a good target measure for regulation by comparing the two components of the price–cost margin between markets that are more competitive versus those that are not, accounting for firm and market characteristics. We find that insurers with monopoly power have lower MLRs. Moreover, we find no evidence suggesting that insurers' administrative expenses are lower in more concentrated insurance markets. Thus, our results are largely consistent with the interpretation that the MLR could serve as a target measure of market power in regulating the individual market for health insurance but with notable limited ability to capture product and firm heterogeneity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of public employers in a changing health care market

Public employers provide health insurance coverage to nearly 16 percent of all U.S. workers. Their reactions to rapidly rising premiums can have an important effect on local markets for health insurance because of their size, their visibility, and their reflection of public policy. However, public employers are constrained in their responses by tight budgets set by elected officials and statutes regarding due process, public input, and public accountability. As insurance markets consolidate and premiums continue to increase, public employers face tough choices regarding employee benefits.