Factors associated with critical-care healthcare workers' adherence to recommended barrier precautions during the Toronto severe acute respiratory syndrome outbreak.

OBJECTIVE: To assess factors associated with adherence to recommended barrier precautions among healthcare workers (HCWs) providing care to critically ill patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). SETTING: Fifteen acute care hospitals in Ontario, Canada. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort study. PATIENTS: All patients with SARS who required intubation during the Toronto SARS outbreak in 2003. PARTICIPANTS: HCWs who provided care to or entered the room of a SARS patient during the period from 24 hours before intubation until 4 hours after intubation. METHODS: Standardized interviews were conducted with eligible HCWs to assess their interactions with the SARS patient, their use of barrier precautions, their practices for removing personal protective equipment, and the infection control training they received. RESULTS: Of 879 eligible HCWs, 795 (90%) participated. In multivariate analysis, the following predictors of consistent adherence to recommended barrier precautions were identified: recognition of the patient as a SARS case (odds ratio [OR], 2.5 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 1.5-4.5); recent infection control training (OR for interactive training, 2.7 [95% CI, 1.7-4.4]; OR for passive training, 1.7 [95% CI, 1.0-3.0]), and working in a SARS unit (OR, 4.0 [95% CI, 1.8-8.9]) or intensive care unit (OR, 4.3 [95% CI, 2.0-9.0]). Two factors were associated with significantly lower rates of consistent adherence: the provision of care for patients with higher Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) II scores (OR for score APACHE II of 20 or greater, 0.4 [95% CI, 0.28-0.68]) and work on shifts that required more frequent room entry (OR for 6 or more entries per shift, 0.5 [95% CI, 0.32-0.86]). CONCLUSIONS: There were significant deficits in knowledge about self-protection that were partially corrected by education programs during the SARS outbreak. HCWs' adherence to self-protection guidelines was most closely associated with whether they provided care to patients who had received a definite diagnosis of SARS.     

Infection control for SARS in a tertiary paediatric centre in Hong Kong

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an emerging infectious disease. After the appearance of an index patient in Hong Kong in February 2003, SARS outbreaks occurred rapidly in hospitals and spread to the community. The aim of this retrospective study is to evaluate the effectiveness of a triage policy and risk-stratified infection control measures in preventing nosocomial SARS infection among paediatric healthcare workers (HCWs) at the Prince of Wales Hospital, a general hospital to which children with SARS are referred in Hong Kong. The acute paediatric wards were stratified into three areas: (1) ultra high-risk area, (2) high-risk area and (3) moderate-risk area according to different risk levels of nosocomial SARS transmission. The implementation of different levels of infection control precautions was guided by this risk stratification strategy. Between 13 March and 23 June, 38 patients with probable and suspected SARS, 90 patients with non-SARS pneumonia, and 510 patients without pneumonia were admitted into our unit. All probable SARS cases were isolated in negative-pressure rooms. Twenty-six HCWs worked in the ultra high-risk area caring for SARS patients and 88 HCWs managed non-SARS patients in other ward areas. None of the HCWs developed clinical features suggestive of SARS. In addition, there was no nosocomial spread of SARS-associated coronavirus to other patients or visitors during this period. In conclusion, stringent infection control precautions, appropriate triage and prompt isolation of potential SARS patients may have contributed to a lack of nosocomial spread and HCW acquisition of SARS in our unit.     

Impact of severe acute respiratory syndrome care on the general health status of healthcare workers in taiwan.

BACKGROUND: The impact of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was enormous, but few studies have focused on the infectious and general health status of healthcare workers (HCWs) who treated patients with SARS. DESIGN: We prospectively evaluated the general health status of HCWs during the SARS epidemic.The Medical Outcome Study Short-Form 36 Survey was given to all HCWs immediately after caring for patients with SARS and 4 weeks after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts. Tests for detection of SARS coronavirus antibody were performed for HCWs at these 2 time points and for control subjects during the SARS epidemic. SETTING: Tertiary care referral center in Taipei, Taiwan. SUBJECTS: Ninety SARS-care task force members (SARS HCWs) and 82 control subjects. RESULTS: All serum specimens tested negative for SARS antibody. Survey scores for SARS HCWs immediately after care were significantly lower than those for the control group (P<.05 by the t test) in 6 categories. Vitality, social functioning, and mental health immediately after care and vitality and mental health after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts were among the worst subscales. The social functioning, role emotional, and role physical subscales significantly improved after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts (P<.05, by paired t test). The length of contact time (mean number of contact-hours per day) with patients with SARS was associated with some subscales (role emotional, role physical, and mental health) to a mild extent. The total number of contact-hours with symptomatic patients with SARS was a borderline predictor (adjusted R2=0.069; P=.038) of mental health score. CONCLUSIONS: The impact of the SARS outbreak on SARS HCWs was significant in many dimensions of general health. The vitality and mental health status of SARS HCWs 1 month after self-quarantine and off-duty shifts remained inferior to those of the control group.     

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and healthcare workers

The recent outbreak of severe acute respiratory synt drome (SARS) was spread by international air travel, a direct result of globalization. The disease is caused by a novel coronavirus, transmitted from human to human by droplets or by direct contact. Healthcare workers (HCWs) were at high risk and accounted for a fifth of all cases globally. Risk factors for infection in HCWs included lack of awareness and preparedness when the disease first struck, poor institutional infection control measures, lack of training in infection control procedures, poor compliance with the use of personal protection equipment (PPE), exposure to high-risk procedures such as intubation and nebulization, and exposure to unsuspected SARS patients. Measures to prevent nosocomial infection included establishing isolation wards for triage, SARS patients, and step-down; training and monitoring hospital staff in infection-control procedures; active and passive screening of HCWs; enforcement of droplet and contact precautions; and compliance with the use of PPE.     

The 2003 SARS outbreak and its impact on infection control practices

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) emerged recently as a new infectious disease that was transmitted efficiently in the healthcare setting and particularly affected healthcare workers (HCWs), patients and visitors. The efficiency of transmission within healthcare facilities was recognised following significant hospital outbreaks of SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. The causative agent of SARS was identified as a novel coronavirus, the SARS coronavirus. This was largely spread by direct or indirect contact with large respiratory droplets, although airborne transmission has also been reported. High infection rates among HCWs led initially to the theory that SARS was highly contagious and the concept of 'super-spreading events'. Such events illustrated that lack of infection control (IC) measures or failure to comply with IC precautions could lead to large-scale hospital outbreaks. SARS was eventually contained by the stringent application of IC measures that limited exposure of HCWs to potentially infectious individuals. As the 'global village' becomes smaller and other microbial threats to health emerge, or re-emerge, there is an urgent need to develop a global strategy for infection control in hospitals. This paper provides an overview of the main IC practices employed during the 2003 SARS outbreak, including management measures, dedicated SARS hospitals, personal protective equipment, isolation, handwashing, environmental decontamination, education and training. The psychological and psychosocial impact on HCWs during the outbreak are also discussed. Requirements for IC programmes in the post-SARS period are proposed based on the major lessons learnt from the SARS outbreak.     

Using an integrated infection control strategy during outbreak control to minimize nosocomial infection of severe acute respiratory syndrome among healthcare workers

Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) while caring for SARS patients. Personal protective equipment and negative pressure isolation rooms (NPIRs) have not been completely successful in protecting HCWs. We introduced an innovative, integrated infection control strategy involving triaging patients using barriers, zones of risk, and extensive installation of alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing. This integrated infection control approach was implemented at a SARS designated hospital ('study hospital') where NPIRs were not available. The number of HCWs who contracted SARS in the study hospital was compared with the number of HCWs who contracted SARS in 86 Taiwan hospitals that did not use the integrated infection control strategy. Two HCWs contracted SARS in the study hospital (0.03 cases/bed) compared with 93 HCWs in the other hospitals (0.13 cases/bed) during the same three-week period. Our strategy appeared to be effective in reducing the incidence of HCWs contracting SARS. The advantages included rapid implementation without NPIRs, flexibility to transfer patients, and re-inforcement for HCWs to comply with infection control procedures, especially handwashing. The efficacy and low cost are major advantages, especially in countries with large populations at risk and fewer economic resources.     

Transmission of group A Streptococcus limited to healthcare workers with exposure in the operating room.

BACKGROUND: Nosocomial transmission of group A Streptococcus (GAS) has been well described. A recent report of an outbreak investigation suggested that transmission can be extensive and that standard infection control measures may not be adequate to prevent transmission from patients with severe, invasive disease to healthcare workers (HCWs). OBJECTIVE: A case of pharyngitis in an HCW caring for a patient with GAS pharyngitis and necrotizing fasciitis prompted an investigation of the extent and risk factors for nosocomial transmission of GAS. SETTING: A 509-bed, tertiary care center in Portland, Oregon with 631,100 patient visits (hospital and clinic) and 11,500 employees in the year 2003. METHODS: HCWs with exposure to the index patient ("contacts") were identified for streptococcal screening and culture and completion of a questionnaire regarding the location and duration of exposure, use of personal protective equipment, and symptoms of GAS infection. RESULTS: We identified 103 contacts of the index patient; 89 (86%) submitted oropharyngeal swabs for screening and culture. Only 3 (3.4%) of contacts had a culture that yielded GAS; emm typing results and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis patterns of GAS isolates from 2 HCWs were identical to those for the isolate from the index patient. Both HCWs were symptomatic, with febrile pharyngitis and reported prolonged contact with the open wound of the patient in the operating room. CONCLUSIONS: In this investigation, nosocomial transmission was not extensive, and standard precautions provided adequate protection for the majority of HCWs. Transmission was restricted to individuals with prolonged intraoperative exposure to open wounds. As a result, infection control policy for individuals was modified only for HCWs with exposure to GAS in the operating room.     

Factors promoting consistent adherence to safe needle precautions among hospital workers.

OBJECTIVE: To examine organizational factors and occupational characteristics associated with adherence to occupational safety guidelines recommending never recapping needles. DESIGN: Mail surveys were conducted with healthcare workers (HCWs) and infection control professionals (ICPs). SETTING: The surveys were conducted at all non-federal general hospitals in Iowa, except one tertiary-care hospital. Survey data were linked to annual survey data of the American Hospital Association (AHA). PARTICIPANTS: HCWs were sampled from statewide rosters of physicians, nurses, and laboratory workers in Iowa. Eligible HCWs worked in a setting and position in which they were likely to routinely handle needles. ICPs at all hospitals in the state were surveyed. RESULTS: Ninety-nine ICPs responded (79% response rate). AHA data were available for all variables from 84 (85%) of the hospitals. Analyses were based on 1,454 HCWs who identified one of these hospitals as their primary hospital (70% response rate). Analyses were conducted using multiple logistic regression. Positive predictors of consistent adherence included infection control personnel hours per full-time-equivalent employee (odds ratio [OR], 1.03), frequency of standard precautions education (OR, 1.11), facilities providing personal protective equipment (OR, 1.82), facilities using needleless intravenous systems (OR, 1.42), and management support for safety (OR, 1.05). Negative predictors were use of "blood and body fluid precautions" isolation category (OR, 0.74) and increased job demands (OR, 0.90). CONCLUSION: Healthcare organizations can improve staff safety by investing wisely in educational programs regarding approaches to minimize these risks, providing protective equipment, and eliminating the use of blood and body fluid precautions as an isolation policy.     

Resource consumption in the infection control management of pertussis exposure among healthcare workers in pediatrics.

OBJECTIVE: To assess consumption of resources in the infection control management of healthcare workers (HCWs) exposed to pertussis and to assess avoidability of exposure. SETTING: Tertiary care children's medical center. METHODS: Analysis of the extent of and reasons for HCW exposure to pertussis during contact with children with the disease, whether exposures were avoidable (because of the failure to recognize a case or to order or adhere to isolation precautions) or unavoidable (because the case was not recognizable or because another diagnosis was confirmed), and the cost of implementing exposure management. INTERVENTIONS: Interventions consisted of an investigation of every HCW encounter with any patient who was confirmed later to have pertussis from the time of hospital admission of the patient, use of azithromycin as postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) for exposed HCWs, performance of 21-day surveillance for cough illness, testing of symptomatic exposed HCWs for Bordetella pertussis, and enhanced preexposure education of HCWs. RESULTS: From September 2003 through April 2005, pertussis was confirmed in 28 patients (median age, 62 days); 24 patients were admitted. For 11 patients, pertussis was suspected, appropriate precautions were taken, and no HCW was exposed. Inadequate precautions for 17 patients led to 355 HCW exposures. The median number of HCWs exposed per exposing patient was 9 (range, 1-86 HCWs; first quartile mean, 2; fourth quartile mean, 61). Exposure was definitely avoidable for only 61 (17%) of 355 HCWs and was probably unavoidable for 294 HCWs (83%). The cost of 20-month infection control management of HCWs exposed to pertussis was $69,770. The entire cohort of HCWs involved in direct patient care at the facility could be immunized for approximately $60,000. CONCLUSIONS: Exposure of HCWs to pertussis during contact with children who have the disease is largely unavoidable, and management of this exposure is resource intensive. Universal preexposure vaccination of HCWs is a better utilization of resources than is case-based postexposure management.     

An outbreak of scabies in a teaching hospital: lessons learned.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate an outbreak of scabies in an inner-city teaching hospital, identify pathways of transmission, institute effective control measures to end the outbreak, and prevent future occurrences. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation, case-control study, and chart review. SETTING: Large tertiary acute-care hospital. RESULTS: A patient with unrecognized Norwegian (crusted) scabies was admitted to the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) service of a 940-bed acute-care hospital. Over 4 months, 773 healthcare workers (HCWs) and 204 patients were exposed to scabies. Of the exposed HCWs, 147 (19%) worked on the AIDS service. Risk factors for being infested with scabies among HCWs included working on the AIDS service (odds ratio [OR], 5.3; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 2.17-13.15) and being a nurse, physical therapist, or HCW with extensive physical contact with infected patients (OR, 4.5; CI95, 1.26-17.45). Aggressive infection control precautions beyond Centers for Disease Control and Prevention barrier and isolation recommendations were instituted, including the following: (1) early identification of infected patients; (2) prophylactic treatment with topical applications for all exposed HCWs; (3) use of two treatments 1 week apart for all cases of Norwegian scabies; (4) maintaining isolation for 8 days and barrier precautions for 24 hours after completing second treatment for a diagnosis of Norwegian scabies; and (5) oral ivermectin for treatment of patients who failed conventional therapy. CONCLUSIONS: HCWs with the most patient contact are at highest risk of acquiring scabies. Because HCWs who used traditionally accepted barriers while caring for patients with Norwegian scabies continued to develop scabies, we found additional measures were required in the acute-care hospital. HCWs with skin exposure to patients with scabies should receive prophylactic treatment. We recommend (1) using heightened barrier precautions for care of patients with scabies and (2) extending the isolation period for 8 days or 24 hours after the second treatment with a scabicide for those patients with Norwegian scabies. Oral ivermectin was well tolerated for treating patients and HCWs who failed conventional treatment. Finally, we developed a surveillance system that provides a "barometric measure" of the infection rate in the community. If scabies increases in the community, a tiered triage system is activated to protect against transmission among HCWs or hospital patients.     

Research gaps in protecting healthcare workers from SARS and other respiratory pathogens: an interdisciplinary, multi-stakeholder, evidence-based approach

OBJECTIVE: To identify priorities for further research in protecting healthcare workers (HCWs) from severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and other respiratory pathogens by summarizing the basic science of infectious bioaerosols and the efficacy of facial protective equipment; the organizational, environmental, and individual factors that influence the success of infection control and occupational health programs; and factors identified by HCWs as important. METHOD: An extensive literature review was conducted and 15 focus groups held, mostly with frontline HCWs in Toronto. Critical gaps in knowledge were identified and prioritized. RESULTS: Highest priority was given to organizational factors that create a climate of safety. Other priority areas included understanding aerosolization risks and practical measures to control bioaerosols at the source. CONCLUSIONS: Further research is warranted to improve safety climate in health care and, specifically, to provide greater protection against respiratory pathogens.     

SARS transmission among hospital workers in Hong Kong

Despite infection control measures, breakthrough transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred for many hospital workers in Hong Kong. We conducted a case-control study of 72 hospital workers with SARS and 144 matched controls. Inconsistent use of goggles, gowns, gloves, and caps was associated with a higher risk for SARS infection (unadjusted odds ratio 2.42 to 20.54, p < 0.05). The likelihood of SARS infection was strongly associated with the amount of personal protection equipment perceived to be inadequate, having <2 hours of infection control training, and not understanding infection control procedures. No significant differences existed between the case and control groups in the proportion of workers who performed high-risk procedures, reported minor protection equipment problems, or had social contact with SARS-infected persons. Perceived inadequacy of personal protection equipment supply, infection control training <2 hours, and inconsistent use of personal protection equipment when in contact with SARS patients were significant independent risk factors for SARS infection.     

Measures to control an outbreak of pertussis in a neonatal intermediate care nursery after exposure to a healthcare worker.

BACKGROUND: Hospitalized premature infants are particularly vulnerable to morbidity and mortality from pertussis. Effective prevention and investigative and control measures are not well described. OBJECTIVE: To identify the source of nosocomial pertussis in a 2-month-old premature infant in a neonatal intermediate care nursery (ICN) and to critically review the investigation and outbreak control measures. SETTING: An ICN and a neonatal intensive care unit. METHODS: We queried healthcare workers (HCWs) and family members about cough illness and contacted potentially exposed patients to determine whether they had symptoms of pertussis. Culture and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for Bordetella pertussis were performed by the hospital laboratory with specimens collected from symptomatic patients and HCWs. Levels of pertussis toxin immunoglobulin G antibodies were measured in HCWs with cough of at least 14 days' duration at a public health laboratory. Extensive control measures were instituted. RESULTS: Four ICN HCWs met the clinical case definition for presence of pertussis. Serologic test results were positive for 3 of the HCWs. The primary case patient was a 36-year-old HCW with a cough illness of 3-weeks' duration that was accompanied by paroxysms, whoop, posttussive emesis, and pneumothorax. Among the 4 affected HCWs, the duration of cough illness prior to identification of the infant index patient ranged from 11 to 25 days. Outbreak control measures included isolation of the infant case patient, furlough and treatment of symptomatic HCWs, administration of chemoprophylaxis to contacts, and surveillance for additional cases. Seventy-two infant patients and 72 HCWs were exposed and were given antibiotic prophylaxis. One additional case of pertussis, confirmed by PCR and culture, occurred in a resident physician who declined prophylaxis; she had cared for the index patient but had no contact with symptomatic HCWs. CONCLUSION: HCWs or patients may serve as the source of pertussis in nosocomial outbreaks, which can result in substantial morbidity and outlay of resources for control measures. Our review suggested that a diagnosis of pertussis should be an early consideration for HCWs with cough illness. Targeted pertussis immunization of HCWs, employee health policies that provide for testing and furlough of HCWs with prolonged cough, and monitoring of HCWs for compliance with infection control measures could reduce the morbidity and costs associated with pertussis outbreaks. These measures will require evaluation of their effectiveness.     

Taiwan's traffic control bundle and the elimination of nosocomial severe acute respiratory syndrome among healthcare workers

The traffic control bundle consists of procedures designed to help prevent epidemic nosocomial infection. We retrospectively studied the serial infection control measures to determine factors most effective in preventing nosocomial infections of healthcare workers (HCWs) during the 2003 Taiwanese severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Fever screening stations, triage of fever patients, separating SARS patients from other patients, separation of entrances and passageways between patients and HCWs, and increasing hand-washing facilities all demonstrated a protective effect for HCWs (univariate analysis; P<0.05). By multiple logistic regression: (i) checkpoint alcohol dispensers for glove-on hand rubbing between zones of risk, and (ii) fever screening at the fever screen station outside the emergency department, were the significant methods effectively minimising nosocomial SARS infection of HCWs (P<0.05). The traffic control bundle should be implemented in future epidemics as a tool to achieve strict infection control measures.     

我市医务人员严重急性呼吸综合征医院感染流行原因调查与对策

目的 调查某市医务人员感染严重急性呼吸综合征(severe acute respiratory syndrome，SARS)的途径及危险因素。方法 对直接参加过抢救和间接接触SARS患而被感染的医务人员采取统一填表、座谈、走访、电话采访等方式进行调查。结果 调查三所医院感染SARS的医务人员共88人，占全市发病医务人员总人数的87．13％。导致医务人员易感的原因是：对疾病缺乏认识，防范意识不强；管理网络不健全；患隐瞒流行病史；隔离环境及防护用品达不到要求等。结论 重视医院感染管理及对医务人员的医院感染知识培训，强化消毒隔离和自我保护意识，是控制医院感染流行及保护医务人员的有力措施。     

广东省传染性非典型肺炎预防控制策略探讨

目的 探讨广东省传染性非典型肺炎(SARS)的预防控制策略和效果。方法 分析广东省SARS疫情和制定预防控制措施。结果 2002年11月16日至200B年5月30日，全省共发生SARS病例1511例，死亡57例，累计发病率1．98／10万。全省21个市中有15个市报告病例，病例主要集中在珠江三角洲地区，其中广州市占86．04％。发病以医务人员为主，占22．90％；病例主要集中在20～39岁，占50．95％；出现明显的医院或家庭聚集性。采取预防控制的策略及效果：加强党政的正确领导，各有关部门密切配合，正确把握舆论导向等组织策略；加强技术指导，重视疫情监测报告，采取综合性预防控制措施(加强医院感染控制、早发现和就地隔离治疗病人、小范围隔离观察密切接触者、强调室内通风、注意个人卫生、增强体质)，加强调查研究和科研攻关，发动全社会共同参与等技术策略。预防控制策略实施后，全省日均发病数从2月份的25．6例下降到5月份的0．3例；医务人员所占比例由1月及以前的30．8％下降到5月份未有医务人员感染；未出现住宅小区或学校聚集性暴发的情况。结论 广东省首次出现SARS暴发流行，通过采取一系列行之有效的组织和技术策略后，广东省SARS疫情初步得到有效控制。各级党政的高度重视和正确领导是做好SARS防治工作强有力的保证。加强SARS防治工作的技术指导，重视疫情监测报告，切实落实有效的综合性预防控制措施，尤其是加强医院感染控制是防制措施的关键。     

Asymptomatic SARS coronavirus infection among healthcare workers, Singapore

We conducted a study among healthcare workers (HCWs) exposed to patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) before infection control measures were instituted. Of all exposed HCWs, 7.5% had asymptomatic SARS-positive cases. Asymptomatic SARS was associated with lower SARS antibody titers and higher use of masks when compared to pneumonic SARS.     

Cluster of severe acute respiratory syndrome cases among protected health-care workers--Toronto,Canada, April 2003

Infections among health-care workers (HCWs) have been a common feature of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) since its emergence. The majority of these infections have occurred in locations where infection-control precautions either had not been instituted or had been instituted but were not followed. Recommended infection-control precautions include the use of negative-pressure isolation rooms where available; N95 or higher level of respiratory protection; gloves, gowns, and eye protection; and careful hand hygiene. This report summarizes a cluster of SARS cases among HCWs in a hospital that occurred despite apparent compliance with recommended infection-control precautions.     

医护人员预防SARS医院内感染的个人防护措施效果评价

目的 评价医务人员预防SARS医院内感染个人防护措施的效果,验证SARS的传播途径。方法 在广东省10家收治SARS患者的主要医院进行了成组设计的病例对照研究,对象为常规参加SARS诊治工作且直接抢救重患者的医护人员,共257人,其中病例组77例,对照组180人。采用统一调查表了解调查对象接触SARS患者程度、个人防护情况、卫生习惯、预防服药等方面情况。单因素分析采用X2检验、多因素分析利用非条件logistic回归分析。并用趋势X2检验分析个人防护措施的剂量反应关系和联合使用效果。结果 单因素分析结果显示,一直戴12层及以上口罩、穿隔离衣、用鞋套、戴手套、必要时戴眼罩、消毒洗手、漱口液漱口、用滴鼻滴眼液保护鼻眼黏膜、及时洗澡换衣、“不在病区吃饭/饮水/抽烟”、服oseltamivir phosphate等均有保护作用(P<0.05)。非条件logistic多因素回归分析有显著意义的有戴口罩(OR=0.78,95％CI:0.60～0.99)、戴眼罩(OR=0.20,95％CI:0.10～0.41)和穿鞋套(OR=0.58,95％CI:0.39～0.86)。并且趋势分析显示口罩及口罩类型、穿隔离衣、用鞋套、戴手套、必要时戴眼罩、漱口液漱口、用滴鼻滴眼液保护鼻眼黏膜和及时洗澡换衣等措施存在剂量效应关系。无防护参与SARS患者抢救的医护人员的罹患率高达61.5％(16/26),保护率随防