Experimental infection of dogs with H6N1 avian influenza A virus

H6N1 avian influenza A viruses, which have spread across North America, Europe and Asia, have been shown to be infectious not only for birds but also for mammals. Because humans lack immunity to H6N1 avian influenza A viruses, the emergence of these viruses in humans would probably cause a pandemic. Replication of H6N1 avian influenza A viruses in dogs may facilitate their adaptation in humans because dogs are often in close contact with humans. However, the susceptibility of dogs to these viruses is unknown. To address this question, we infected beagles intranasally (i.n.) with an H6N1 avian influenza A virus that was isolated from a mallard. Inoculation of this virus into beagles resulted in the virus being detectable in the lung and seroconversion with no clinical signs except for a fever at 1 day post-inoculation (dpi). In addition, the virus was transiently shed from the nose and in the feces of the infected beagles. Our results suggest that dogs can be subclinically infected with H6N1 avian influenza A viruses, which, like H7N9, have low pathogenicity in birds and may serve as an intermediate host to transfer this virus to humans. Certain actions may be taken to prevent the potential transmission of these viruses, including the development of H6N1 avian influenza vaccines for prevention.     

禽流感与公共卫生

近年来，H5N1亚型高致病性禽流感在东南亚多个国家爆发，给养禽业带来沉重打击。H5N1亚型禽流感病毒还在越南、泰国、印尼、柬 埔寨和中国引起160多人感染，导致半数以上感染者死亡。禽流感这一重大禽类疫病，目前已成为公共卫生面临的最大威胁。本文对流感及流感病毒、H5N1亚型禽流感病毒跨越禽-哺乳动物种间屏障的分子机制进行了综述，并对今后禽流感的防治提出了建议。     

Transmission of influenza A/H5N1 viruses in mammals

Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans and cause severe respiratory disease and fatalities. Currently, these viruses are not efficiently transmitted from person to person, although limited human-to-human transmission may have occurred. Nevertheless, further adaptation of avian H5N1 influenza A viruses to humans and/or reassortment with human influenza A viruses may result in aerosol transmissible viruses with pandemic potential. Although the full range of factors that modulate the transmission and replication of influenza A viruses in humans are not yet known, we are beginning to understand some of the molecular changes that may allow H5N1 influenza A viruses to transmit via aerosols or respiratory droplets among mammals. A better understanding of the biological basis and genetic determinants that confer transmissibility to H5N1 influenza A viruses in mammals is important to enhance our pandemic preparedness.     

Molecular aspects of avian influenza (H5N1) viruses isolated from humans

In 1997, 18 human infections with H5N1 influenza type A were identified in Hong Kong and six of the patients died. There were concomitant outbreaks of H5N1 infections in poultry. The gene segments of the human H5N1 viruses were derived from avian influenza A viruses and not from circulating human influenza A viruses. In 1999 two cases of human infections caused by avian H9N2 virus were also identified in Hong Kong. These events established that avian influenza viruses can infect humans without passage through an intermediate host and without acquiring gene segments from human influenza viruses. The likely origin of the H5N1 viruses has been deduced from molecular analysis of these and other viruses isolated from the region. The gene sequences of the H5N1 viruses were analysed in order to identify the molecular basis for the ability of these avian viruses to infect humans.     

Emergence of amantadine-resistant avian influenza H5N1 virus in India

This study reports the genetic characterization of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus (subtype H5N1) isolated from poultry in West Bengal, India. We analyzed all the eight genome segments of two viruses isolated from chickens in January 2010 to understand their genetic relationship with other Indian H5N1 isolates and possible connection between different outbreaks. The hemagglutinin (HA) gene of the viruses showed multiple basic amino acids at the cleavage site, a marker for high virulence in chickens. Of greatest concern was that the viruses displayed amino acid substitution from serine-to-asparagine at position 31 of M2 ion channel protein suggesting emergence of amantadine-resistant mutants not previously reported in HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in India. Amino acid lysine at position 627 of the PB2 protein highlights the risk the viruses possess to mammals. In the phylogenetic trees, the viruses clustered within the lineage of avian isolates from India (2008-2009) and avian and human isolates from Bangladesh (2007-2009) in all the genes. Both these viruses were most closely related to the viruses from 2008 in West Bengal within the subclade 2.2.3 of H5N1 viruses.     

Pandemic threat posed by avian influenza A viruses

Influenza pandemics, defined as global outbreaks of the disease due to viruses with new antigenic subtypes, have exacted high death tolls from human populations. The last two pandemics were caused by hybrid viruses, or reassortants, that harbored a combination of avian and human viral genes. Avian influenza viruses are therefore key contributors to the emergence of human influenza pandemics. In 1997, an H5N1 influenza virus was directly transmitted from birds in live poultry markets in Hong Kong to humans. Eighteen people were infected in this outbreak, six of whom died. This avian virus exhibited high virulence in both avian and mammalian species, causing systemic infection in both chickens and mice. Subsequently, another avian virus with the H9N2 subtype was directly transmitted from birds to humans in Hong Kong. Interestingly, the genes encoding the internal proteins of the H9N2 virus are genetically highly related to those of the H5N1 virus, suggesting a unique property of these gene products. The identification of avian viruses in humans underscores the potential of these and similar strains to produce devastating influenza outbreaks in major population centers. Although highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses had been identified before the 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, their devastating effects had been confined to poultry. With the Hong Kong outbreak, it became clear that the virulence potential of these viruses extended to humans.     

Evolution of avian influenza viruses H5N1 (1997-2004) in southern and south-eastern Asia

Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype are widespread and have become endemic in poultry in southern and southeastern Asia. An unprecedented epizootic was caused by these viruses in 8 countries in the winter of 2003 to 2004. This fact along with more frequent human cases of the infection with unusually high mortality rates in Vietnam and Thailand raises concern that these H5N1 events may lead to a new influenza A virus pandemic. This review summarizes the results of studies dealing with the ecology and evolution of avian influenza H5N1 viruses in southern and southeastern Asia since 1997. The pathogenesis of the infection in human beings and laboratory animals and possible determinants of the high pathogenicity of H5N1 viruses in mammals are considered. A scheme for designing modified H5N1 vaccines using the latest advances in reverse genetics of influenza viruses is given.     

Genetic characterization of H5N1 influenza A viruses isolated from zoo tigers in Thailand

The H5N1 avian influenza virus outbreak among zoo tigers in mid-October 2004, with 45 animals dead, indicated that the avian influenza virus could cause lethal infection in a large mammalian species apart from humans. In this outbreak investigation, six H5N1 isolates were identified and two isolates (A/Tiger/Thailand/CU-T3/04 and A/Tiger/Thailand/CU-T7/04) were selected for whole genome analysis. Phylogenetic analysis of the 8 gene segments showed that the viruses clustered within the lineage of H5N1 avian isolates from Thailand and Vietnam. The hemagglutinin (HA) gene of the viruses displayed polybasic amino acids at the cleavage site, identical to those of the 2004 H5N1 isolates, which by definition are highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). In addition, sequence analyses revealed that the viruses isolated from tigers harbored few genetic changes compared with the viruses having infected chicken, humans, tigers and a leopard isolated from the early 2004 H5N1 outbreaks. Sequence analyses also showed that the tiger H5N1 isolated in October 2004 was more closely related to the chicken H5N1 isolated in July than that from January. Interestingly, all the 6 tiger H5N1 isolates contained a lysine substitution at position 627 of the PB2 protein similar to the human, but distinct from the original avian isolates.     

Genetic characterization of low pathogenic H5N1 and co-circulating avian influenza viruses in wild mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) in Belgium, 2008

As part of a long-term wild bird monitoring programme, five different low pathogenic (LP) avian influenza viruses (AIVs) were isolated from wild mallards (subtypes H1N1, H4N6, H5N1, H5N3, and H10N7). A LP H5N1 and two co-circulating (same location, same time period) viruses were selected for full genome sequencing. An H1N1 (A/Anas platyrhynchos/Belgium/09-762/2008) and an H5N1 virus (A/Anas platyrhynchos/Belgium/09-762-P1/2008) were isolated on the same day in November 2008, then an H5N3 virus (A/Anas platyrhynchos/09-884/2008) 5 days later in December 2008. All genes of these co-circulating viruses shared common ancestors with recent (2001 to 2007) European wild waterfowl influenza viruses. The H5N1 virus shares genome segments with both the H1N1 (PB1, NA, M) and the H5N3 (PB2, HA) viruses, and all three viruses share the same NS sequence. A double infection with two different PA segments from H5N1 and from H5N3 could be observed for the H1N1 sample. The observed gene constellations resulted from multiple reassortment events between viruses circulating in wild birds in Eurasia. Several internal gene segments from these 2008 viruses and the N3 sequence from the H5N3 show homology with sequences from 2003 H7 outbreaks in Italy (LP) and the Netherlands (highly pathogenic). These data contribute to the growing sequence evidence of the dynamic nature of the avian influenza natural reservoir in Eurasia, and underline the importance of monitoring AIV in wild birds. Genetic information of potential hazard to commercial poultry continues to circulate in this reservoir, including H5 and H7 subtype viruses and genes related to previous AIV outbreaks.     

Novel reassortant influenza viruses between pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and other influenza viruses pose a risk to public health

Influenza A virus (IAV) is characterized by eight single-stranded, negative sense RNA segments, which allows for gene reassortment among different IAV subtypes when they co-infect a single host cell simultaneously. Genetic reassortment is an important way to favor the evolution of influenza virus. Novel reassortant virus may pose a pandemic among humans. In history, three human pandemic influenza viruses were caused by genetic reassortment between avian, human and swine influenza viruses. Since 2009, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (pdm/09 H1N1) influenza virus composed of two swine influenza virus genes highlighted the genetic reassortment again. Due to wide host species and high transmission of the pdm/09 H1N1 influenza virus, many different avian, human or swine influenza virus subtypes may reassert with it to generate novel reassortant viruses, which may result in a next pandemic among humans. So, it is necessary to understand the potential threat of current reassortant viruses between the pdm/09 H1N1 and other influenza viruses to public health. This study summarized the status of the reassortant viruses between the pdm/09 H1N1 and other influenza viruses of different species origins in natural and experimental conditions. The aim of this summarization is to facilitate us to further understand the potential threats of novel reassortant influenza viruses to public health and to make effective prevention and control strategies for these pathogens.     

Characterization of a highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus isolated from ducks in Eastern China in 2011

This study describes the characterization of seven H5N1 avian influenza viruses from domestic ducks in Eastern China in 2011. Phylogenetic analysis showed these viruses were closely related to an H5N1 virus circulating in wild birds in Hong Kong. Some characteristics of these viruses were similar to those of an H5N1 strain that circulated in China and Vietnam (2003-2004). The virulence of three isolates was examined in chickens and mice, and they were found to be highly pathogenic in chickens but showed low pathogenicity in mice. These results suggest that continued H5N1 surveillance in poultry should be used as an early warning system for avian influenza outbreaks.     

Molecular characterization of the glycoprotein genes of H5N1 influenza A viruses isolated in Israel and the Gaza Strip during 2006 outbreaks

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza A viruses (AIV) have caused outbreaks among domestic poultry and wild aquatic birds in many Asian, European, and African countries since 1997. In March 2006 an avian H5N1 influenza A virus was isolated from poultry in Israel. In the present study we molecularly characterized the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) genes of eleven H5N1 viruses isolated from domestic poultry in Israel and Gaza in March–April 2006. Phylogenetic analysis of the HA and NA genes showed that the Israeli and Gazian viruses were closely related to viruses isolated in Egypt in 2006.     

The emergence of novel swine influenza viruses in North America

Since 1997, novel viruses of three different subtypes and five different genotypes have emerged as agents of influenza among pigs in North America. The appearance of these viruses is remarkable because there were no substantial changes in the overall epidemiology of swine influenza in the United States and Canada for over 60 years prior to this time. Viruses of the classical H1N1 lineage were virtually the exclusive cause of swine influenza from the time of their initial isolation in 1930 through 1998. Antigenic drift variants of these H1N1 viruses were isolated in 1991-1998, but a much more dramatic antigenic shift occurred with the emergence of H3N2 viruses in 1997-1998. In particular, H3N2 viruses with genes derived from human, swine and avian viruses have become a major cause of swine influenza in North America. In addition, H1N2 viruses that resulted from reassortment between the triple reassortant H3N2 viruses and classical H1N1 swine viruses have been isolated subsequently from pigs in at least six states. Finally, avian H4N6 viruses crossed the species barrier to infect pigs in Canada in 1999. Fortunately, these H4N6 viruses have not been isolated beyond their initial farm of origin. If these viruses spread more widely, they will represent another antigenic shift for our swine population, and could pose a threat to the world's human population. Research on these novel viruses may offer important clues to the genetic basis for interspecies transmission of influenza viruses.     

Replication of avian influenza A viruses in mammals.

The recent appearance of an avian influenza A virus in seals suggests that viruses are transmitted from birds to mammals in nature. To examine this possibility, avian viruses of different antigenic subtypes were evaluated for their ability to replicate in three mammals-pigs, ferrets, and cats. In each of these mammals, avian strains replicated to high titers in the respiratory tract (10(5) to 10(7) 50% egg infective doses per ml of nasal wash), with peak titers at 2 to 4 days post-inoculation, similar to the pattern of human and other mammalian viruses in these animals. Most avian strains were recovered for 5 to 9 days post-inoculation. One avian H1N1 virus initially replicated poorly in pigs, but was adapted to this host and even transmitted to other pigs. Replication of the avian viruses occurred in the respiratory tracts of mammals, whereas, in birds, they replicate in the intestinal tract as well. The infected mammals had no significant disease signs and produced low levels of humoral antibodies; however, challenge experiments in ferrets indicated that they were immune. These studies suggest that influenza A viruses currently circulating in avian species represent a source of viruses capable of infecting mammals, thereby contributing to the influenza A antigenic pool from which new pandemic strains may originate.     

Analysis of the PB2 gene reveals that Indian H5N1 influenza virus belongs to a mixed-migratory bird sub-lineage possessing the amino acid lysine at position 627 of the PB2 protein

Summary Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus were reported for the first time in India during February 2006. Herein, we have sequenced and analyzed the PB2 genes of five influenza virus isolates obtained from three affected states (Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra) in India during the outbreaks. In the phylogenetic analysis, the Indian isolates were grouped in the mixed-migratory bird sub-lineage of the Eurasian lineage. From the phylogenetic tree, it is evident that viruses were probably introduced to India from China via Europe because they share a direct ancestral relationship with the Indian isolates. The virus might have spread through migratory waterfowls that survived the HPAI H5N1 infection. These viruses were able to replicate in cultured cells of avian and mammalian hosts and posses lysine at position 627 of the PB2 protein, indicating that they might be able to cross the host barrier to infect mammals.     

Generation and evaluation of an H9N1 influenza vaccine derived by reverse genetics that allows utilization of a DIVA strategy for control of H9N2 avian influenza

H9N2 avian influenza viruses have circulated widely in domestic poultry around the world, and their outbreaks have resulted in heavy morbidity and mortality. In addition, H9N2 avian influenza viruses were transmitted directly from birds to humans in Hong Kong and mainland China during 1998 and 2003, which prompted the public health authorities to seek protective strategies to control H9N2 influenza viruses. In this study, we attempted to develop a DIVA (differentiating infected and vaccinated animals) strategy for H9N2 avian influenza viruses. This strategy does not interfere with serological monitoring and allows effective control of H9N2 avian influenza. We generated a reassortant H9N1 influenza vaccine strain by reverse genetics and employed an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) with a truncated N1 antigen expressed in E. coli to differentiate between vaccinated and naturally infected animals. Immunization of BALB/c mice with the inactivated reassortant H9N1 vaccine conferred protection against lethal challenge with H9N2 viruses. Meanwhile, the ELISA can be used to distinguish between vaccination and natural infection quickly and easily. Therefore, this study has opened up a new avenue for the control of H9N2 avian influenza.     

Restricted infectivity of a human-Lineage H3N2 influenza A virus in pigs is hemagglutinin and neuraminidase gene dependent

Influenza A viruses cause pandemics at sporadic intervals. Pandemic viruses can potentially be introduced into the human population through in toto transfer of an avian influenza virus or through reassortment between avian and human strains. Pigs are believed to play a central role in the creation of pandemic viruses through reassortment because of their susceptibility to infection with both avian and human influenza viruses. However, we recently found that a human-lineage H3N2 influenza virus was highly restricted in its ability to infect pigs after intranasal inoculation. We hypothesized that this restricted infectivity phenotype was controlled by the hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). To test this, we infected pigs with reverse genetics-created HA plus NA reassortant viruses. Specifically, introduction of the HA and NA genes of a contemporary H3N2 swine virus into the genetic background of the wholly human virus resulted in a significant increase in virus shedding and pathogenicity. These data indicate that the HA/NA can play important roles in controlling human influenza virus infectivity in pigs. The results further support the premise that a barrier exists to human influenza virus infection in pigs, which may limit the role of pigs in pandemic virus creation through reassortment of human and avian influenza viruses.     

Heterogeneity of neuraminidase genetic information in an H1N2 reassortant influenza virus [X-7 (F1)]

Summary The sites of replication of influenza A viruses in ferrets and pigs were studied. The majority of the swine, equine, and avian influenza A viruses tested were recovered from the intestinal tract of ferrets as well as from the respiratory tract; most of the human influenza viruses studied were recovered only from the respiratory tract. In contrast with ferrets, only Hong Kong/1/68 (H 3 N 2) influenza virus was recovered from the intestinal tract of pigs. Despite the large biological variability found in ferrets and in pigs, the results do establish that the majority of influenza viruses have the potential to replicate in the intestinal tissues of some mammals. Additionally, the study suggests that there are differences among the influenza A viruses in tissue tropism in different mammals. Both viral and host genetic factors determine the tissue tropism of influenza viruses in mammals.     

Isolation of influenza A(H3N2)v virus from pigs and characterization of its biological properties in pigs and mice

Recently, a novel reassortant virus, influenza A(H3N2)v [A(H3N2)v], was identified as the causative pathogen in 307 human cases of influenza in the United States. A(H3N2)v contains the matrix gene from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus, while its other genes originate from H3N2 viruses with triple-reassorted internal genes. In this study, we isolated three A(H3N2)v viruses from commercial pigs in Korea that showed similarities with published human A(H3N2)v viruses in eight segment sequence alignments. After genetic characterization, the pathogenicity of one of these viruses was assessed in pigs and mice. Infection of pigs with this novel virus resulted in mild interstitial pneumonia with marked oronasal shedding of viral RNA for about 14 days. In mice, the virus replicated efficiently in the lungs; viral RNA was detected up to 9 days post-inoculation. However, the virus did not cause severe disease or death in mice, despite the administration of a high infectious dose (10^5.2 TCID₅₀). This study demonstrates that A(H3N2)v causes a high morbidity rate with low virulence; however, global monitoring of A(H3N2)v outbreaks in mammals will be needed to determine whether this novel subtype will shift to a highly pathogenic virus.     

Characterization of the amantadine-resistant H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza variants isolated from quails in Southern China

Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza viruses have spread in poultry and wild birds in Asia, Europe, and Africa since 2003. To evaluate the role of quails in the evolution of influenza A virus, we characterized three H5N1 viruses isolated from quails (QA viruses) in southern China. Phylogenetic analysis indicated that three QA viruses derived from the A/goose/Guangdong/1/96-like lineage and most closely related to HA clade 4 A/chicken/Hong Kong/31.4/02-like viruses. Molecular analysis suggested that QA viruses and clade 4 H5N1 viruses carried consistent residue signatures, such as the characteristic M2 Ser31Asn amantadine-resistance mutation, implying a common origin of these viruses. As revealed by viral pathogenicity tests, these QA viruses could replicate in intranasally infected mice, but were not lethal to them, showing low pathogenicity in mammals. However, they killed all intravenously inoculated chickens, showing high pathogenicity in poultry. Results from amantadine sensitivity tests of wild-type QA viruses and their reverse genetic viruses demonstrated that all QA viruses were resistant to amantadine, and the M2 Ser31Asn mutation was determined as the most likely cause of the increased amantadine-resistance of H5N1 QA viruses. Our study confirmed experimentally that the amino acid at residue 31 in the M2 protein plays a major role in determining the amantadine-resistance phenotype of H5N1 influenza viruses. Our findings provide further evidence that quails may play important roles in the evolution of influenza A viruses, which raises concerns over possible transmissions of H5N1 viruses among poultry, wild birds, and humans.