Callahanian Bioethics

For someone with an outsized influence on a field he helped to create, Dan Callahan was anything but overbearing. Physically compact, thin, and wiry in older age, he spoke at the rapid speed of his mind. Soon after I met him—when I was on the cusp of what would become a year‐long residency at The Hastings Center—I found myself seated in his decidedly quaint living room. Dan told a story that evening, one of many that has stuck in my head. It seemed to encapsulate his moral mindset and, in a way, his broader vision for bioethics. I am sure he has told the story many times to many people, but here it is as I recall it.     

Bioethics Education

Bioethics education now takes place outside universities as well as within them. How should clinicians, ethics committee members, and policymakers be taught the ethics they need, and how may their progress best be evaluated?     

Conservationism and Bioethics

The lead article in this issue of the Hastings Center Report (July‐August 2017) explores the ideas underpinning the Precision Medicine Initiative, the effort announced by President Obama in 2015 to promote the development of treatments adjusted to genetic and other variations. Authors Maya Sabatello and Paul Appelbaum hold that the effort works by appealing to a sense of collective identity and shared commitment—an understanding that they call the “PMI nation.” But what are the moral implications of this idea? Sabatello and Appelbaum's question about the impact of an imagined community is an unusual way of exploring a set of values questions. In the second article, Johann Brännmark defends what is, at least in bioethics, an unusual philosophical framework for moral values. Brännmark starts by calling attention to large, never‐quite‐solved problems with the field's going way of understanding personhood and autonomy, and then argues that the body of tradition, law, and international governance known as the human‐rights framework offers a solution to those problems. And a supplement to this issue offers a set of essays on a topic outside the usual range for bioethics: the prospect of “de‐extinction”—that is, of using genetic and reproductive technologies to construct simulacra of extinct animals that might eventually be introduced into the wild.      

Bioethics and Addiction

Bioethicists have sometimes regarded the opioid epidemic as a problem with obvious answers and thus no need for the field's conceptual analysis. Yet, as three essays in the July-August 2020 issue of the Hastings Center Report demonstrate, the opioid crisis contains a knot of distinctions and puzzles to be sorted out. Travis N. Rieder examines, for example, what is fundamentally driving the crisis—access to the drugs or large societal problems such as poverty and joblessness. The role of choice in addiction, the effects of moral condemnation on approaches to addiction, and what treatment should look like are among the puzzles Hanna Pickard explores, while Daniel S. Goldberg focuses on the common and harmful conflation of the public health problems of substance misuse and pain. These philosophical and bioethical questions point in widely different directions, lying both inside and outside bioethics. They point toward systemic societal factors that determine health and well-being yet have seemed outside bioethics' largely clinical boundaries. And they point toward a deeper look at the very idea of autonomy—an examination of a topic clearly within bioethics yet occurring at the fringes of its usual constructs.     

Bioethics and history

Standard bioethics textbooks present the field to students and non-experts as a form of "applied ethics." This ahistoric and rationalistic presentation is similar to that used in philosophy of science textbooks until three decades ago. Thomas Kuhn famously critiqued this self-conception of the philosophy of science, persuading the field that it would become deeper, richer, and more philosophical, if it integrated the history of science, especially the history of scientific change, into its self-conception. This essay urges a similar reconceptualization for bioethics, arguing that the analysis of moral change ought to be integral to bioethics (and to ethics generally). It proceeds by suggesting the sterility of the ahistoric, rationalist applied ethics model of bioethics embraced by standard bioethics textbooks. It also suggests the fecundity of alternative conceptions of the bioethics that focus on the history of successful and failed attempts to negotiate moral change, and the history of multifaceted relations between moral philosophy and practical ethics.     

Theology and Bioethics

Theologians are often criticized for having little distinctive or important to say on bioethical issues. Such a critique overlooks, however, the protective dispositive, and directive ways in which faith can inform reason.     

Bioethics as care work

German philosopher Martin Heidegger argued that humans are defined by care. The term he used, “Sorge,” picks out a wide range of caring relations, including sorrow, worry, the making of arrangements, and even fending for another. Since coming to The Hastings Center, I've been struck by the genuine care definitive of its scholars’ relationship to their work. Care about newborns, the elderly, and nonhuman animals. Care about doctors, nurses, and health care institutions. Care expressed in the panoply of ways biomedical knowledge and practices inform our havings, doings, and beings in the world. Perhaps in its better moments, bioethics just is care work. But care work is hard and messy.