How do health insurer market concentration and bargaining power with hospitals affect health insurance premiums?

The US health insurance industry is highly concentrated, and health insurance premiums are high and rising rapidly. Policymakers have focused on the possible link between the two, leading to ACA provisions to increase insurer competition. However, while market power may enable insurers to include higher profit margins in their premiums, it may also result in stronger bargaining leverage with hospitals to negotiate lower payment rates to partially offset these higher premiums. We empirically examine the relationship between employer-sponsored fully-insured health insurance premiums and the level of concentration in local insurer and hospital markets using the nationally-representative 2006–2011 KFF/HRET Employer Health Benefits Survey. We exploit a unique feature of employer-sponsored insurance, in which self-insured employers purchase only administrative services from managed care organizations, to disentangle these different effects on insurer concentration by constructing one concentration measure representing fully-insured plans’ transactions with employers and the other concentration measure representing insurers’ bargaining with hospitals. As expected, we find that premiums are indeed higher for plans sold in markets with higher levels of concentration relevant to insurer transactions with employers, lower for plans in markets with higher levels of insurer concentration relevant to insurer bargaining with hospitals, and higher for plans in markets with higher levels of hospital market concentration.     

Employer Health Insurance and Local Labor Market Conditions

Theory suggests that an employer's decisions about the amount of health insurance included in the compensation package may be influenced by the practices of other employers in the market. We test the role of local market conditions on decisions of small employers to offer insurance and their dollar contribution to premiums using data from two large national surveys of employers. These employers are more likely to offer insurance and to make greater contributions in communities with tighter labor markets, less concentrated labor purchasers, greater union penetration, and a greater share of workers in big business and a small share in regulated industries. However, our data do not support the notion that marginal tax rates affect employers' offer decision or contributions.     

Employer-sponsored health insurance and mandated benefit laws

Regulations for the content of private health plans, called mandated benefit laws, are widespread and growing in the United States, at both state and federal levels. Three aspects of these laws are examined: their current scope; some economic reasons for their existence; and the theory and empirical evidence for their effects in health insurance markets. A growing body of literature suggests that society is paying a high price for enhanced coverage via mandated benefits. These laws increase insurance premiums, cause declines in wages and other fringe benefits, and lead some employers and their workers to forgo health benefits altogether. The cost of mandated benefit laws falls disproportionately on workers in small firms.     

Did the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate increase premiums?

We investigate the impact of the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate on insurance premiums. The expansion of dependent coverage under the ACA allows young adults to remain on their parent's private health insurance plans until the age of 26. We find that the mandate has led to a 2.5–2.8 percent increase in premiums for health insurance plans that cover children, relative to single-coverage plans. We are able to conclude that employers did not pass on the entire premium increase to employees through higher required plan contributions.     

Why did employee health insurance contributions rise?

We explore the causes of the dramatic rise in employee contributions to health insurance over the past two decades. In 1982, 44% of those who were covered by their employer-provided health insurance had their costs fully financed by their employer, but by 1998 this had fallen to 28%. We discuss the theory of why employers might shift premiums to their employees, and empirically model the role of four factors suggested by the theory. We find that there was a large impact of falling tax rates, rising eligibility for insurance through the Medicaid system, rising medical costs, and increased managed care penetration. Overall, this set of factors can explain more than one-half of the rise in employee premiums over the 1982-1996 period.     

Regulating stop-loss coverage may be needed to deter self- insuring small employers from undermining market reforms

As implementation of the Affordable Care Act reshapes the US health insurance market, state policy makers should be prepared to revisit regulation of stop-loss coverage-a form of reinsurance-for small businesses. Aspects of the reform law could motivate small businesses to self-insure, rather than participate in state-regulated markets either inside or outside the new health insurance exchanges. If younger or healthier groups self-insure, premiums for insured plans might rise to an extent that could seriously impair the regulated market. States can influence small businesses to participate in the regulated market by making it more difficult or costly to obtain stop-loss coverage, which self-funded employers rely on to protect their businesses from catastrophic medical costs incurred by one or more insured workers. States can limit the comprehensiveness of stop-loss coverage, ban stop-loss coverage outright, or regulate it as they do primary coverage. But states need federal guidance about how to exercise this authority if they are to promote, or prevent the undermining of, important aspects of federal health care reform.     

Health Insurance Premium Increases for the 5 Largest School Districts in the United States, 2004–2008

Background

Local school districts are often one of the largest, if not the largest, employers in their respective communities. Like many large employers, school districts offer health insurance to their employees. There is a lack of information about the rate of health insurance premiums in US school districts relative to other employers.

Objective

To assess the change in the costs of healthcare insurance in the 5 largest public school districts in the United States, between 2004 and 2008, as representative of large public employers in the country.

Methods

Data for this study were drawn exclusively from a survey sent to the 5 largest public school districts in the United States. The survey requested responses on 3 data elements for each benefit plan offered from 2004 through 2008; these included enrollment, employee costs, and employer costs.

Results

The premium growth for the 5 largest school districts has slowed down and is consistent with other purchasers—Kaiser/Health Research & Educational Trust and the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program. The average increase in health insurance premium for the schools was 5.9% in 2008, and the average annual growth rate over the study period was 7.5%. For family coverage, these schools provide the most generous employer contribution (80.8%) compared with the employer contribution reported by other employers (73.5%) for 2008.

Conclusions

Often the largest employers in their communities, school districts demonstrate a commitment to provide choice of benefits and affordability for employees and their families. Despite constraints typical of public employers, the 5 largest school districts in the United States have decelerated in premium growth consistent with other purchasers, albeit at a slower pace.Local school districts are one of the largest employers in the United States, employing roughly 8 million employees in 2008.1 Locally, they are often one of the largest (if not the largest) employers in the communities they serve. Like many large employers, school districts offer an array of benefits to their employees, including health insurance. Employee benefits comprise 34.3% of total compensation for public-sector employees,2 with health insurance representing 10.9% of total compensation.2     

Community rating: an idea whose time has come (again)

The 20-year movement away from community rating of health insurance premiums in favor of experience rating has produced extreme inequities in the availability and affordability of health insurance coverage in the U.S. Current rating practices also have contributed to a rapid shift among employers to self-insure, thus allowing them to rewrite their benefit plans. By returning to a community rating system, the nation would eliminate many of these current market distortions.     

Getting to know the customer: employer strategy for provider organizations

Employers are again facing double-digit increases in health insurance premiums, while a weaker labor market makes cost-shifting and other cost containment activities more feasible for employers. In this market, providers must better understand employers' demands and develop a strategy to reach out to employers.     

Premium Variation in the Individual Health Insurance Market

Recent proposals to decrease the number of uninsured in the U.S. indicate that the individual health insurance market's role may increase. Amid fears of possible risk-segmentation in individual insurance, there exists limited information of the functioning of such markets. This paper examines the relationship between expected medical expense and actual paid premiums for households with individual insurance in the 1996–1997 Community Tracking Study's Household Survey. We find that premiums vary less than proportionately with expected expense and vary only with certain risk characteristics. We also explore how the relationship between risk and premiums is affected by local regulations and market characteristics. We find that premiums vary significantly less strongly with risk for persons insured by HMOs and in markets dominated by managed care insurers.     

Rearranging the deck chairs

In their efforts to make insurance premiums more affordable, employers and health plans are promoting consumer-directed health care as a consumer-friendly alternative that will cut costs and improve quality. In my view, consumer-directed care reflects health care providers' failure to deliver value and unrealistically assumes that consumers can make sound, cost-effective medical decisions. It also evades the fundamental question of how society defines the limits and obligations of health insurance, and it could stall meaningful action to hold all stakeholders accountable for an equitable, high-quality, and affordable system.     

Is there evidence that recent consolidation in the health insurance industry has adversely affected premiums?

James Robinson suggests that recent consolidation in the insurance market has been a cause of higher health insurance prices (premiums). Although the recent consolidation among health insurers and rising premiums are indisputable, it is unlikely that consolidation has had any adverse effect on premiums nationwide, and Robinson provides no data that suggest otherwise. Specifically, he does not present data showing an increase in concentration in any relevant market during the past few years, let alone any resulting increase in premiums. Health insurance consolidation in certain local markets could adversely affect premiums, but it seems clear that it is not a major national antitrust issue.     

To offer or not to offer: the role of price in employers' health insurance decisions

OBJECTIVE: To estimate the effect of changes in price on employers' decisions to offer health insurance. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: A 1993 survey of 22,347 private employers in ten states was used. STUDY DESIGN: Probit regression was used to estimate the probability of offering insurance as a function of the price and employer characteristics. For employers who did not offer insurance, a price cannot be directly observed. We estimated price for nonofferors using reported quotes received by recent shoppers and a selection model to correct for differences between recent shoppers and nonshoppers. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Changes in price affect decisions to offer insurance; however, even a 40 percent reduction in premiums would lead to only a 2 to 3 percentage point increase in the share of employers offering insurance. Employers of low-wage workers are substantially less likely to offer health insurance than other employers. CONCLUSIONS: Policies to reduce the number of uninsured that focus on increasing the supply of employment-based insurance are unlikely to have the intended effect unless coupled with policies to help low-wage workers afford insurance.     

Bargaining health benefits in the workplace: an inside view

Before contract negotiations in 1999, the author served on an "issue-based" health benefits committee of faculty union representatives and university administrators. Although the committee solicited estimates from health insurers regarding the impact of higher copayments on monthly premiums, in subsequent negotiations, the projected cost savings did not lead to changes in coverage or copayments. The explanations offered are (1) national or regional employers may be reluctant to raise employees' health benefit copayments when labor markets are tight; (2) collective bargaining, particularly when other, nonmonetary issues are being bargained, may lead to results different from those from a strictly competitive model; and (3) employers with market power in the product market may shift these highest costs to consumers through higher prices.     

The effect of HMOs on premiums in employment-based health plans.

This study documents the effect of HMOs on premiums in employment-based health plans. We analyzed a survey of Minnesota employers conducted in 1986. Among 922 usable observations, 239 firms offered HMOs in addition to fee-for-service (FFS) health plans. We estimated an equation for the probability of offering an HMO, followed by equations for HMO enrollment share, and HMO and FFS premiums. The weighted average HMO and FFS premium in firms that offer HMOs was compared to the premium of FFS-only firms. We found that offering an HMO raises the average premium for family coverage health insurance by $25.14 per month and for single coverage by $3.68 per month. This effect was smaller for firms in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. HMOs may be viewed as a progressive and innovative health care benefit, but they are likely to increase firms' health insurance premiums.     

Public and private health insurance premiums: how do they affect the health insurance status of low-income childless adults?

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) will substantially increase public health insurance eligibility and alter the costs of insurance coverage. Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data from the period 2000-2008, we examine the effects of public and private health insurance premiums on the insurance status of low-income childless adults, a population substantially affected by the ACA. Results show higher public premiums to be associated with a decrease in the probability of having public insurance and an increase in the probability of being uninsured, while increased private premiums decrease the probability of having private insurance. Eligibility for premium assistance programs and increased subsidy levels are associated with lower rates of uninsurance. The magnitudes of the effects are quite modest and provide important implications for insurance expansions for childless adults under the ACA.     

Employer Health Insurance Offerings and Employee Enrollment Decisions

Objective. To determine how the characteristics of the health benefits offered by employers affect worker insurance coverage decisions.
Data Sources. The 1996–1997 and the 1998–1999 rounds of the nationally representative Community Tracking Study Household Survey.
Study Design. We use multinomial logistic regression to analyze the choice between own-employer coverage, alternative source coverage, and no coverage among employees offered health insurance by their employer. The key explanatory variables are the types of health plans offered and the net premium offered. The models include controls for personal, health plan, and job characteristics.
Principal Findings. When an employer offers only a health maintenance organization married employees are more likely to decline coverage from their employer and take-up another offer (odds ratio (OR)=1.27, p <.001), while singles are more likely to accept the coverage offered by their employer and less likely to be uninsured (OR=0.650, p <.001). Higher net premiums increase the odds of declining the coverage offered by an employer and remaining uninsured for both married (OR=1.023, p <.01) and single (OR=1.035, p <.001) workers.
Conclusions. The type of health plan coverage an employer offers affects whether its employees take-up insurance, but has a smaller effect on overall coverage rates for workers and their families because of the availability of alternative sources of coverage. Relative to offering only a non-HMO plan, employers offering only an HMO may reduce take-up among those with alternative sources of coverage, but increase take-up among those who would otherwise go uninsured. By modeling the possibility of take-up through the health insurance offers from the employer of the spouse, the decline in coverage rates from higher net premiums is less than previous estimates.     

The number of Americans without health insurance rose in 2001 and continued to rise in 2002.

Data from the Census Bureau and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicate that the number of uninsured Americans rose in 2001and in the first quarter of 2002. The main reason insurance coverage fell was a drop-off in employer-sponsored insurance for workers and their dependents. This reduction was triggered by rising unemployment levels and rising health insurance premiums, which made it more difficult for employers to offer insurance or for workers to afford it. The downturn in private coverage was partially offset by increased enrollment in Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). About two million mor e children and one million more adults would have been uninsured had it not been for the growth in these programs. Funding for the public programs is, however, threatened by budget shortfalls affecting most states, which administer these programs. Many states have cut their Medicaid programs and are planning further cutbacks. Increasing federal assistance to states and their Medicaid programs could help protect insurance coverage for low-income people during the current economic slowdown. Future SCHIP enrollment could drop sharply because of a shortage of federal funds, and Congress could take steps to bolster SCHIP funding.     

The parental leave debate: implications for policy relevant research.

Legislative activity regarding parental and family medical leave has been intense, with heated debate, in both national and state political arenas. Proponents of legislation report that policy is needed because of women's increasing rate of labor force participation and the concomitant shortage of substitute infant care. Benefits of policy are presumed to include women's health and parent-child bonding. However, no direct empirical evidence exists to support these assumptions. Opponents of legislation say that the cost of policy is burdensome to employers. However, the General Accounting Office reports that the only measurable net costs to employers associated with the federal bill will be to cover the leave takers' health insurance premiums. This literature review examines the above issues and identifies a policy relevant research agenda, crucial to the development of rational and humane policy.