孤独症儿童对静态与动态面部表情识别的比较

目的比较孤独症儿童对静态和动态面部表情识别的差异。方法采用45名被试进行3(被试类型:ASD、ID、TD)×2(呈现方式:静态、动态)×3(面部表情:高兴、中性、愤怒)三因素重复测量实验,考察孤独症儿童、智力障碍儿童、正常儿童在呈现静态与动态表情时,对高兴、中性和生气表情的识别能力。结果在正确率层面,被试类型、呈现方式和表情类型的交互效应显著(F==2.02,P0.01),孤独症儿童在两种呈现方式下的表情识别率显著低于对照组被试。在反应时层面,被试类型、呈现方式和表情类型的交互效应显著(F==5.96,P0.01),孤独症儿童在两种呈现方式的表情反应时显著慢于对照组被试。结论孤独症儿童对积极表情的识别能力优于消极表情;孤独症儿童对静态表情的识别能力优于动态表情。     

孤独症儿童对静态和动态视向提示信息的加工

目的:探索在静态和动态呈现条件下孤独症儿童对视向提示信息加工的特征.方法:选取符合美国精神障碍诊断与统计手册第4版(DSM-Ⅳ)孤独症诊断标准的儿童和年龄性别匹配的正常对照儿童各10名.通过l张图片形成的静态视向提示和5张图片形成的动态视向提示,采用2(组别:孤独症儿童,正常儿童)×2(呈现方式:静态,动态)×2(提示性:有效提示,无效提示)的重复测量方差分析,比较两组儿童在不同呈现方式下的视向提示反应的正确率和反应时.结果:在静态条件下,孤独症儿童识别视向的正确率低于正常对照组儿童[(94.8±1.3)％vs.(99.5±1.3)％,P＜0.05],且反应时较长[(470.2±23.8) ms vs.(389.2±23.8) ms,P＜0.05];在动态条件下,有效提示的识别正确率高于无效提示[(98.8±0.5)％vs.(93.8±0.3)％,P＜0.05],且有效提示的反应时短于无效提示[(463.1±19.7) ms vs.(504.8 ±21.4) ms,P＜0.01],孤独症儿童的反应时长于正常对照组儿童[(544.6±28.4) ms vs.(423.3±28.4) ms,P＜0.05].结论:本研究发现提示孤独症儿童存在与正常儿童一样的视向注意转移,并无特异性视向注意损伤,孤独症儿童对动态视向信息加工可能较静态视向信息加工更敏感.     

孤独症儿童心理理论训练的个案研究

目的:考察孤独症儿童心理理论通过训练提高的可能性.方法:3名孤独症儿童接受了前测(心理理论能力评定:外表-真实任务,意外地点任务,意外内容任务)、训练和后测.结果:2名孤独症儿童的心理理论有提高,另1名没有提高.结论:不同孤独症儿童各自的发展起点不同,训练的效果不一样,对智力没有受损又具有语言能力的孤独症儿童而言.训练的影响更大.     

孤独症谱系障碍儿童健康同胞的社会交往能力

目的:探讨孤独症谱系障碍(ASD)儿童的健康同胞(ASD-Sibs)的社会交往能力特点，并探索ASD-Sibs是否存在更广泛的孤独症表型。方法:采用横断面研究方法，入组年龄组间匹配的5.5～18岁的符合美国精神障碍诊断与统计手册第5版(DSM-5)ASD诊断标准的儿童51例，ASD-Sibs 51例，以及非ASD-Sibs的正常儿童(TD)53例，采用社交反应量表(SRS)对所有被试的社会交往能力进行评定。结果:ASD-Sibs组和TD组SRS总分及社交知觉、认知、沟通、动机和孤独症行为方式5个因子分均低于ASD组(均P<0.001);ASD-Sibs组SRS总分、社交知觉及社交认知因子分均低于TD组(均P<0.05),两组间社交沟通、社交动机和孤独症行为方式因子分差异均无统计学意义(均P>0.05)。男性被试中，ASD-Sibs组与TD组SRS总分及各因子分差异均无统计学意义(均P>0.05),并均低于ASD组(均P<0.001)。结论:本研究显示孤独症谱系障碍儿童健康同胞的社会交往能力无异常，不支持其存在社会交往能力损害的更广泛孤独症表型的假说。     

学龄前孤独症谱系儿童对人物面部表情的识别特征

目的:测试学龄前孤独症儿童对人物静态面部表情的识别能力和特点。方法:使用自制人物面部开心、吃惊、害怕、生气、讨厌、伤心、中性七种表情图,对13例4～8岁孤独症男童和23例3～5岁正常对照组男童进行了测试分析,两组儿童在发展年龄上作了匹配(3.66±0.44岁)。结果:两组儿童在识别七种表情照片的正确率上无显著性差异(P>0.05);各表情类别识认比较,孤独症组识别伤心、害怕、讨厌及吃惊表情正确率高于对照儿童(P<0.05);孤独症组识别表情的正确率依次是:开心>伤心>生气>害怕>讨厌>吃惊>中性;而对照组则为:开心>生气>伤心>害怕>中性>讨厌>吃惊。结论:孤独症儿童对七种面部表情的命名性识别与正常儿童无明显差异,但识别基本面部表情的模式与正常儿童有所不同。     

高功能孤独症儿童执行功能和心理推理能力特点及临床症状

目的:探讨高功能孤独症儿童执行功能和心理推理能力的神经心理特征及其与儿童孤独症-核心症状的关系。方法:对韦氏儿童智力量表、瑞文标准推理测试,智商≥70分、符合美国精神障碍诊断与统计手册第4版诊断标准的20名高功能孤独症儿童,及年龄、性别匹配的22名正常儿童进行执行功能(复杂图形记忆任务、Stroop色字命名任务、数字字母连线任务、数字广度任务、汉诺塔任务、言语流畅性任务)和心理推理能力(表征变化任务、错误信念任务)测查,比较两组差异;并对孤独症儿童进行孤独症诊断观察量表(ADOS)测查,将孤独症诊断观察量表评分与两组执行功能和心理推理能力差异进行相关分析。结果:高功能孤独症儿童复杂图形记忆任务中即时细节记忆[(5.2±5.7)vs.(10.8±6.5)]、延时细节记忆[(5.1±6.1)vs.(11.3±6.4)]、言语流畅性任务正确数[(15.6±6.9)vs.(21.1±5.2)]、Stroop色字命名任务第1试耗时[(24.8±17.3)s vs.(16.3±4.1)s]和第4试耗时[(61.0±33.3)svs.(41.3±11.2)s]、汉诺塔完成情况[(5/15)vs.(16/6)]和错误步骤数[(3.7±2.2)vs.(0.8±0.9)]、表征变化任务中自我信念正确数/错误数[(15/5)vs.(22/0)]和错误信念任务正确数/错误数[(13/7)vs.(22/0)]的测试成绩均低于正常对照儿童(P0.05)。相关分析显示,复杂图形记忆任务成绩、言语流畅性任务成绩与孤独症诊断观察量表中言语交流、社会交往部分项目得分呈负相关(r=-0.45～-0.73,P0.05),Stroop色字命名任务、汉诺塔任务、表征变化任务、错误信念任务成绩与ADOS得分呈正相关(r=0.44～0.57,P0.05)。结论:高功能孤独症儿童可能存在执行功能及心理推理能力的缺陷;执行功能与儿童孤独症三大核心症状均相关,心理推理能力与儿童孤独症社会交往障碍、刻板行为和局限性兴趣相关。     

4～7岁孤独症儿童的心理旋转能力及方向认知的研究

目的探索孤独症儿童与正常儿童在心理旋转能力上的差异及心理旋转能力的机制。方法 15名4～7岁孤独症儿童与30名2～7岁正常儿童为对照组,分成低龄组(n=16)和高龄组(n=14)。接受韦氏幼儿智力测验、方向认知任务和心理旋转任务。结果①正常低龄组与孤独症组智力测验得分相当,对方向的认识无论是有生命物体组还是无生命物体组得分高于孤独症组(P=0.012,0.043,0.023);②两组的心理旋转任务总分、有生命物体组与无生命物体组得分差异性不显著;③两组在4个心理旋转方向上的表现相当;④正常高龄组表现优于其他两组。结论孤独症儿童对方向认知能力及心理旋转能力均落后于同龄正常儿童,与物体有无生命无关。方向认知能力可能是心理旋转能力发展的基本能力之一。     

孤独症谱系商儿童版-中文版的效度和信度

目的:检验孤独症谱系商(AQ)儿童版-中文版的效度信度。方法:对符合美国精神障碍诊断与统计手册第4版(DSM-IV)孤独症诊断标准的门诊101例4～11岁孤独症儿童和124例年龄相匹配的正常儿童进行AQ儿童版-中文版评定。以两组间AQ儿童版-中文版总分及因子分比较确定区分效度;以DSM-IV诊断为金标准,以ROC方法确定界限分及灵敏度、特异度; 10例孤独症儿童和10例正常儿童的两位家长同时单独填写AQ儿童版-中文版以检验评分者信度; 10例孤独症儿童和10例正常儿童家长于首次评定2周后再次进行AQ儿童版-中文版评定,以检测重测信度;以Cronbach a系数检验内部一致性。结果:孤独症组AQ儿童版-中文版总分及各分量表分均高于正常对照组[如总分:(94. 2±15. 6)vs.(54. 4±13. 2),P 0. 001]; ROC曲线下面积为0. 98 (P 0. 01),界限分取73时,量表的灵敏度为0. 96,特异度为0. 90;量表总分评分者信度ICC和重测信度ICC分别为0. 80 (P 0. 001)和0. 92 (P 0. 001);量表内部一致性检验Cronbach a系数为0. 94 (P 0. 01),5个分量表的Cronbach a系数为0. 69～0. 89 (均P 0. 01)。结论:AQ儿童版-中文版的效度、信度较好,灵敏度、特异度较高,可用于儿童孤独症的临床筛查。     

应对方式在孤独症儿童父母的抑郁与家庭功能间的中介作用

目的:比较孤独症儿童的家庭功能与健康儿童家庭的差异,并探讨应对方式在孤独症儿童的父母心理健康与家庭功能的中介作用。方法:选取2017年7月-2018年5月被深圳市某公立医院心理科确诊的孤独症儿童的父母114人与深圳市某幼儿园健康正常儿童父母106人,采用抑郁自评量表(SDS)、焦虑自评量表(SAS)、简易应对方式问卷(SCSQ)和家庭功能量表(FAD)进行测量,并采用结构方程模型探究变量之间关系。结果:①孤独症组的家庭功能总分和各维度上得分均高于健康组家庭(P0.05);②在孤独症家庭中,家庭功能问题和父母抑郁、焦虑呈正相关(r=0.370,0.448;P0.01),与积极应对呈负相关(r=-0.433,P0.01);③焦虑对孤独症家庭的家庭功能有直接影响(Estimate=0.251,SE=0.102,95%CI[0.050,0.452],P0.05),抑郁通过积极应对方式影响孤独症家庭功能的间接效应显著(Estimate=0.127,SE=0.102,95%CI[0.016,0.239],P0.05)。结论:孤独症儿童的家庭功能水平低于普通家庭,积极应对在孤独症儿童父母的抑郁与家庭功能间起中介作用。     

孤独症儿童睡眠障碍对照研究

目的比较孤独症儿童与正常儿童睡眠障碍发生情况。方法对140例确诊的孤独症儿童和82例正常儿童,用自编睡眠及一般情况问卷进行调查。结果在140名孤独症儿童中,共有102名儿童目前或既往存在睡眠障碍,其中,男孩85人,女孩17人,孤独症儿童睡眠障碍的终生患病率为72.86%,男孩终生患病率(72.03%)和女孩终生患病率(77.27%)差异无统计学意义(χ2=1.912,P=0.384)。在82名正常儿童中,共有14名儿童目前或既往存在睡眠障碍,其中,男孩10人,女孩4人,正常儿童睡眠障碍的终生患病率为17.07%,男孩终生患病率(16.67%)和女孩终生患病率(18.19%)差异无统计学意义(χ2=0.080,P=0.117)。孤独症儿童的睡眠障碍发病率明显高于正常儿童,差异无统计学意义(χ2=32.407,P=0.000)。结论孤独症儿童睡眠障碍发生多于正常儿童,睡眠障碍是孤独症儿童主要症状之一。     

视力残疾学生对他人愿望、情绪以及错误信念的理解

目的：研究视力残疾学生心理理论的能力。方法：以测验故事为测量工具，对93名视力残疾学生理解别人不同心理成分的能力进行评价。结果：视力残疾学生能理解别人的愿望，理解别人在不同情景、愿望下所产生的情绪，并能依据别人的愿望推测别人可能发生的行为。但是，只有37．6％的视力残疾学生能理解不同情形下别人所持有的虚假信念，25．8％的视力残疾学生能理解由错误信念所导致的认知性情绪；先天盲与其他视力残疾学生在理解别人心理的能力上差异不显著。结论：视力残疾学生理解别人不同心理成分的能力不同：微弱的视力对视力残疾学生心理理论能力的影响不大。     

10例孤独症儿童心理推测能力的测试分析

目的：探讨孤独症儿童的心理推测能力。方法：本研究使用自编的测验故事为测量工具考察了学龄孤独症儿童的心理推测能力。结果：孤独症儿童能理解他人的生理性和社会性愿望，并能依据他人的愿望预测他人的行为；基本能理解他人的积极性和消极性情绪；但他们在理解他人的虚假信念时则表现出明显的困难，并且不能理解他人由虚假信念所导致的认知性情绪。结论：依据孤独症儿童在理解他人虚假信念上的表现，提示孤独症儿童在理解他人虚假信念的能力上只存在着量上的差异而非质上的差异。     

Multiple cognitive capabilities/deficits in children with an autism spectrum disorder: "weak" central coherence and its relationship to theory of mind and executive control

This study examined the validity of "weak" central coherence (CC) in the context of multiple cognitive capabilities/deficits in autism. Children with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and matched typically developing children were administered tasks tapping visuospatial coherence, false-belief understanding and aspects of executive control. Significant group differences were found in all three cognitive domains. Evidence of local processing on coherence tasks was widespread in the ASD group, but difficulties in attributing false beliefs and in components of executive functioning were present in fewer of the children with ASD. This cognitive profile was generally similar for younger and older children with ASD. Furthermore, weak CC was unrelated to false-belief understanding, but aspects of coherence (related to integration) were associated with aspects of executive control. Few associations were found between cognitive variables and indices of autistic symptomatology. Implications for CC theory are discussed.     

Making sense of theory of mind and paranoia: the psychometric properties and reasoning requirements of a false belief sequencing task

INTRODUCTION. This study used Item-Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a false belief picture sequencing task. Consistent with the mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia, we anticipated that performance on this deductive theory of mind (ToM) task would not be associated with the presence of persecutory delusions but would be related to other clinical, cognitive, and demographic factors. METHOD. A large (N=237) and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed 2 ToM tasks: the false belief sequencing task and a ToM stories task that was used to assess the validity of the false belief sequencing task as a measure of ToM. RESULTS. A unidimensional IRT model was found to fit the data well. Latent ToM ability as measured by the false belief sequencing task was negatively related with age and positively with IQ. In contrast to the ToM stories measure, there was no association between clinical diagnosis or symptoms and false belief picture sequencing after controlling for age and IQ. CONCLUSIONS. In line with mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia (Corcoran, 2010 ), performance on this deductive nonverbal ToM task is not related to the presence of paranoid symptoms. This measure is best suited for assessing ToM functioning where participants' performance falls just short of the average latent ToM ability. Furthermore, it is sensitive to the effects of increasing age and decreasing IQ.     

Deception and false belief in paranoia: Modelling Theory of Mind stories

Background. This study used Item Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a Theory of Mind (ToM) stories task. The study also aimed to determine whether the ability to understand states of false belief in others and the ability to understand another's intention to deceive are separable skills, and to establish which is more sensitive to the presence of paranoia.

Method. A large and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed a ToM stories task measuring false belief and deception at first and second order.

Results. A three-factor IRT model was found to best fit the data, consisting of first- and second-order deception factors and a single false-belief factor. The first-order deception and false-belief factors had good measurement properties at low trait levels, appropriate for samples with reduced ToM ability. First-order deception and false beliefs were both sensitive to paranoid ideation with IQ predicting performance on false belief items.

Conclusions. Separable abilities were found to underlie performance on verbal ToM tasks. However, paranoia was associated with impaired performance on both false belief and deception understanding with clear impairment at the simplest level of mental state attribution.     

False belief understanding in maltreated children

False belief understanding was investigated in maltreated (N = 203), low socioeconomic status (SES) nonmaltreated (N = 143), and middle SES nonmaltreated (N = 172) 3- to 8-year-old children. Contrasts among the three groups provided an opportunity to examine the impact of family contextual influences on theory of mind development. Specifically, child maltreatment served as an "experiment of nature" in order to elucidate theory of mind abilities. Two false belief tasks and language assessments were administered. Among children with a verbal mental age of 49 months or greater, maltreatment was related to delays in the development of theory of mind, beyond the influence of chronological age and SES. The occurrence of maltreatment during the toddler period, onset during the toddler years, and physical abuse were features of maltreatment associated with delay in the development of theory of mind. Findings are discussed in terms of the influence of harsh caregiving on the development of theory of mind. Implications for the understanding of normal developmental processes are highlighted.     

The relationship of theory of mind and executive functions to symptom type and severity in children with autism

Although neurocognitive impairments in theory of mind and in executive functions have both been hypothesized to play a causal role in autism, there has been little research investigating the explanatory power of these impairments with regard to autistic symptomatology. The present study examined the degree to which individual differences in theory of mind and executive functions could explain variations in the severity of autism symptoms. Participants included 31 verbal, school-aged children with autism who were administered a battery of tests assessing the understanding of mental states (knowledge and false belief) and executive control skills (working memory, combined working memory and inhibitory control, and planning) and who were behaviorally evaluated for autism severity in the three core symptom domains. Whereas theory of mind and executive control abilities explained the significant variance beyond that accounted for by language level in communication symptoms, neither explained the significant variance in reciprocal social interaction or repetitive behaviors symptoms. These findings are discussed in terms of a proposed distinction between higher level, cognitive-linguistic aspects of theory of mind and related executive control skills, and more fundamental social-perceptual processes involved in the apprehension of mental state information conveyed through eyes, faces, and voices, which may be more closely linked to autistic deficits in social reciprocity.     

Young children's representational theory of mind in understanding masked facial expression

In this study, development of young children's understandings of masked facial expression was examined from the perspective of the development of "theory of mind". In Experiment 1, short stories in which one character masks facial expressions to make another character have false beliefs were presented to 3-, 4-, and 6-year-old. They were asked questions to assess their judgements on various mental states (desire, belief, and intention) of story characters. And, to assess children's "representational theory of mind", they performed a "Smaties Task". The results showed that recognition of masked facial expression was developed from 3 to 4 years. Scores on "Smaties Task" was also improved during the same period. An additional analysis showed that the major determinant of to determine the understanding of masked facial expression was not the age but the possession of "representational theory of mind". In Experiment 2 more sophisticated but similar type of procedures were presented to 3- and 4-year-old children. Results replicated the results in Experiment 1 and the understanding of the intention of characters was also found to develop from 3 to 4 years.     

孤独症患儿家长心理健康状况调查

目的：了解孤独症患儿家长心理健康状况及其相关因素。方法：采用症状自评量表（SCL-90）、艾森克人格问卷（EPQ）、抑郁自评量表（SDS）和焦虑自评量表（SAS），对63名孤独症患儿家长进行了评估。结果：显示孤独症患儿父母的SDS、SAS和SCL-90的量表总均分以及各分量表分与正常儿童父母相比均有显著性差异。孤独症患儿的家庭在养育类型、家庭收入、父亲照顾的时间上都低于正常儿童的家庭。孤独症父母的P和N量表分高于对照组．而E和L量表分低于对照组。结论：有必要重视并关注孤独症患儿家长的心理健康，预防减少心理问题。     

Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning

For a long time, a controversy has been proposed that whether the process of theory of mind is a result of domain-specific or domain-general changes (Wellman in The handbook of childhood cognitive development. Blackwell Publication, New Jersey, 2011). This event-related potential study explored the neural time course of domain-general and domain-specific components in belief reasoning. Fourteen participants completed location transfer false belief (FB), true belief (TB), false sign (FS) and true sign (TS) tasks, in which two pictures told a story related to a dog that ran from a green into a red box. In the TB and FB tasks, a boy saw or did not see the transfer of the dog, respectively. In the FS and TS tasks, an arrow that pointed to the green box either altered its direction to the red box or did not alter following the transfer of the dog. Participants then inferred where the boy thought of, or the arrow indicated the location of the dog. FB and TB reasoning elicited lower N2 amplitudes than FS and TS reasoning, which is associated with domain-general components, the detection, and classification. The late slow wave (LSW) for FB was more positive at frontal, central, and parietal sites than FS because of the domain-specific component involved in FB reasoning. However, the LSW was less positive for TB than for FB but did not differ from the TS condition, which implies that mental representation might not be involved in TB reasoning.