“If the Big Fish are Doing It Then Why Not Me Down Here?”: Informal Fee Payments and Reproductive Health Care Provider Motivation in Kenya

Informal fees are payments made by patients to their health care provider that are over and above the official cost of services. Payments may be motivated by a combination of factors such as low supervision, weak sanctions, and inadequate provider salaries. The practice of soliciting informal fees from patients may result in restricted access to medical care and reduced care-seeking behavior among vulnerable populations. The objective of this study is to examine nuanced health care provider perspectives on informal fee payments solicited from reproductive health patients in Kenya. We conducted in-depth semistructured interviews in 2015–2016 among a sample of 20 public and private-sector Kenyan health care workers. Interviews were coded and analyzed using an iterative thematic approach. More than half of participants reported that solicitation of informal fees is common practice in health care facilities. Providers reported low public-sector wages were a primary driver of informal fee solicitation coupled with collusion among senior staff. Additionally, patients may be unaware that they are being asked to pay more than the official cost of services. Strategies for reducing this behavior include more adequate and timely remuneration within the public sector, educating patient populations of free or low-cost services, and evidence-based methods to increase provider motivation.     

Informal patient payments in maternity hospitals in Kiev,Ukraine

Maternity care in Ukraine is a government priority. However, it has not undergone substantial changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similar to the entire health care sector in Ukraine, maternity care suffers from inefficient funding, which results in low quality and poor access to services. The objective of this paper is to explore the practice of informal payments for maternity care in Ukraine, specifically in cases of childbirth in Kiev maternity hospitals. The paper provides an ethnographic study on the consumers' and providers' experiences with informal payments. The results suggest that informal payments for childbirth are an established practice in Kiev maternity hospitals. The bargaining process between the pregnant woman (incl. her partner) and the obstetrician is an important part of the predelivery arrangement, including the informal payment. To deal with informal payments in Kiev maternity hospitals, there is a need for the following: (i) regulation of the “quasi‐official” patient payments at the health care facility level; and (ii) improvement of professional ethics through staff training. These strategies should be coupled with improved governance of the health care sector in general, and maternity care in particular in order to attain international quality standards and adequate access to facilities. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Informal payments in public hospitals in Greece

Informal payments are an ingrained social institution in Greece. In some cases, they are also part of corruption in the health area, which includes a variety of other forms. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this paper is to measure and analyze the size and nature of informal payments in the Greek public hospitals, concentrating on payments made to health personnel to facilitate access to services and preferred providers. METHODS: We used a randomized countrywide sample of 1616 households, amounting to 4738 individuals. The survey methodology was telephone interviews with a questionnaire supported by the software of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing. RESULTS: Out of the total number of those reporting treatment in public hospitals (N=336), 36% reported at least one informal payment to a doctor. Of these, 42% reported it was given because of the fear of receiving sub-standard care (if they did not pay) and another 20% claimed that the doctor demanded such a payment. None of the socio-economic characteristics of the family were related to the size of extra (informal) payments. The probability of extra payments is 72% higher for patients aiming to "jump the queue", compared to those admitted through normal procedures. Also, surgical cases had a 137% higher probability for extra payments compared to non-surgical patients. CONCLUSIONS: A very high percentage of informal payments are made in order to gain access to public hospitals and to receive a higher quality of services. Despite near universal coverage of the population by public health insurance, informal payments are widespread and a major source of inequity and inefficiency in the Greek health care system.     

Informal payments for health care in the Former Soviet Union: some evidence from Kazakstan

An important feature of the health care system of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and Eastern Europe is the presence of informal or under-the-table payments. It is generally accepted that these represent a significant contribution to the income of medical staff. Discussions with medical practitioners suggest that for certain specialities in certain hospitals a doctor might obtain many times his official income. Yet little empirical work has been done in this area. Informal payments can be divided into those paid to health care providers and those that go directly to practitioners. They can be further divided into monetary and non-monetary. The complexity of these payments make obtaining estimates using quantitative survey techniques difficult. Estimates on contributions to the costs of medicines in Kazakstan suggest that they may add 30% to national health care expenditure. Payments to staff are likely to add substantially to this figure, although few reliable statistics exist. Research in this area is important since informal payment is likely to impact on equity in access to medical care and the efficiency of provision. The impact of attempts to reform systems using Western ideas could be reduced unless account is taken of the effect and size of the informal payment system.     

INFORMAL PAYMENTS AND HEALTH WORKER EFFORT: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY FROM TANZANIA

Informal payments—payments made from patients to health personnel in excess of official fees—are widespread in low‐income countries. It is not obvious how such payments affect health worker effort. On the one hand, one could argue that because informal payments resemble formal pay for performance schemes, they will incite higher effort in the health sector. On the other hand, health personnel may strategically adjust their base effort downwards to maximise patients' willingness to pay informally for extra services. To explore the relationship between informal payments and health worker effort, we use a unique data set from Tanzania with over 2000 observations on the performance of 156 health workers. Patient data on informal payments are used to assess the likelihood that a particular health worker accepts informal payment. We find that health workers who likely accept payments do not exert higher average effort. They do however have a higher variability in the effort they exert to different patients. These health workers are also less sensitive to the medical condition of the patient. A likely explanation for these findings is that health workers engage in rent seeking and lower baseline effort to induce patients to pay. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Paying informally in the Albanian health care sector: a two-tiered stochastic frontier model

Informal payments are deeply ingrained in the health care sector of most Central, Eastern and Southern European countries. Evidence suggests that the price paid informally to medical staff is negotiated either directly or indirectly between patients and medical staff. The aim of this paper is to measure the imperfect information that exists on the amount that has to be paid informally to medical staff. We measure the extent to which patients pay more than the amount medical staff expect informally and the extent to which medical staff request less than patients are willing to pay informally. A two-tiered stochastic frontier model is developed to estimate indicators of patients’ and medical staff’s imperfect information on informal payments and the effects on the amount the other party is minimally expecting or maximally willing to pay informally. The estimates are based on informal payments to medical staff in the inpatient health care sector in Albania. We use data from the Albania Living Standards Measurement Survey 2002 and 2005. The pooled samples include 707 individuals who have visited inpatient health care services in these 2?years. Our results show that medical staff has less information on the patients’ maximum willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical staff’s minimum expected amount. These estimates do not depend on categories of illnesses but on certain socio-demographic characteristics.     

Fee-for-service or donation? Hungarian perspectives on informal payment for health care

Informal payments are known to be widespread in the post-communist health care systems of Central and Eastern Europe. However, their role and nature remains contentious with the debate characterized by much polemic. This paper aims to make sense of this debate by reviewing and summarizing the main arguments of the theoretical debate in Hungary. The review examines the possible causes of informal payment, the motivation of the actors involved and the impact of informal payment on system performance, focusing on efficiency and equity. The lines of arguments are summarized in two contrasting hypotheses, which envisage informal payment as either a donation or a fee-for-service. Evidence pertaining to the scale of informal payments and the motivation of patients are reviewed, but found to be inconclusive to verify the hypotheses. Although focused on Hungary, accounts from other countries facing informal payments show similar threads of discussion and dilemmas. These theories should be tested further using evidence from existing studies and new empirical research, since the validity of the gratitude payment concept is a central dilemma of effective policy making in the area. To orient future research, a possible agenda is outlined, which links evidence to be obtained to the defining features of gratitude payments.     

Informal payment for health care and the theory of 'INXIT'

Informal payments are known to be widespread in the post-communist health care systems of Central and Eastern Europe. However, their role and nature remains contentious, with the debate characterized by much polemic. This paper steps back from this debate to examine the theoretical basis for understanding the persistence of informal payments. The authors develop a cognitive behavioural model of informal payment, which draws on the theory of government failure and extends Hirschman's theory of 'exit, voice, loyalty', the behavioural responses to 'decline in firms, organizations and states'. It is argued that informal payment represents another possible behavioural reaction: 'inxit', which becomes important when the channels of exit and voice are blocked. The theory is applied to explain informal payments in Hungary, but can be shown to be relevant to other countries facing similar issues. The paper examines the proposed policies to tackle informal payments, and on the basis of the theory of 'inxit' it advocates that solutions should contain an appropriate balance between exit and voice to optimize the chances of maintaining a good standard of public services.     

Informal payments in the health sector: a case study from Turkey

The practice of making informal payments in the health sector is common in a number of countries. It has become an important policy issue around the world. These payments can jeopardize governments' attempts to improve equity and access to care and policies targeted to the poor. It is widely believed that a considerable amount of out-of-pocket payment in the health sector in Turkey is informal. To examine this issue, we used a questionnaire adopted from a wider international study. We concluded that informal payments in Turkey are significant and have important implications for health care reform.     

Informal out-of-pocket payments experience and individuals’ willingness-to-pay for healthcare services in Greece

BackgroundInformal out-of-pocket payments to healthcare providers are not uncommon in the Greek health system. We explore individuals’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) to secure zero out-of-pocket full coverage for healthcare services and medications and we estimate the impact of past informal payments and individuals’ opinion about the legalization of informal payments on WTP.MethodsWe conducted a survey of 2841 participants from November 2016 to February 2017. We obtained information on WTP using the contingent valuation method. A two-part regression model was used to estimate the association between WTP, informal payments, and respondents’ opinion about legalizing such payments.ResultsAbout 80% of the respondents were willing to pay an average of €95 per month to obtain free access to full healthcare coverage and medications. About 65% of the respondents were involved in an informal payment at least once during the past four months with an average payment of €247. Higher informal payments and supportive opinions towards the legalization of informal payments increased the likelihood of WTP and were also positively associated with increased WTP amounts overall (p < 0.001).ConclusionsThis survey reveals that individuals’ WTP is critically affected by previous experiences and attitudes towards informal payments. Our results imply that the potential introduction of official fees might not suffice to limit informal payments and suggest the need for stricter regulatory policies.     

Drivers behind widespread informal payments in the Romanian public health care system: From tolerance to corruption to socio‐economic and spatial patterns

In order to explain informal payments in public health care services in Romania, this paper evaluates the relationship between extra payments or valuable gifts (apart from official fees) and the level of tolerance to corruption, as well as the socio‐economic and spatial patterns across those individuals offering informal payments. To evaluate this, a survey undertaken in 2013 is reported. Using logistic regression analysis, the findings are that patients with a high tolerance to corruption, high socio‐economic risk (those divorced, separated, or with other form of marital status, and those not working), and located in rural or less affluent areas are more likely to offer (apart from official fees) extra payments or valuable gifts for health care services. The paper concludes by discussing the health policy implications.     

Informal payments in government health facilities in Albania: results of a qualitative study

As governments seek to expand access to quality health care services, policy makers in many countries are confronting the problem of informal payments to medical personnel. The aim of this study was to help health planners in Albania understand informal payments occurring in government health facilities. Researchers used in-depth interviews and focus groups with 131 general public and provider informants in three districts. The results suggest that factors promoting informal payments in Albania include perceived low salaries of health staff; a belief that good health is worth any price; the desire to get better service; the fear of being denied treatment; and the tradition of giving a gift to express gratitude. Members of the general public also believe informal payments create uncertainties and anxiety during the care-seeking process, while providers perceive that informal payments harm their professional reputation, induce unnecessary medical interventions, and create discontinuity of care. The study showed that focusing on the most harmful effects and targeting the most vulnerable populations may be one way to gain consensus for policy reform. Understanding citizens' and caregivers' viewpoints is an important step in designing regulatory and bureaucratic interventions.     

Under-the-counter payments for health care: evidence from Bulgaria

Against a background of falling revenues and increasing expectations, health care systems in central and eastern Europe are facing increasing budgetary gaps. There is extensive anecdotal evidence that these gaps are being filled by informal or 'under-the-table' payments. These are important because of their implications for estimates of future funding requirements, for equity, and for the possible perverse incentives they introduce for those providing and managing health services. There is, however, relatively little information on either their scale or how they are perceived in these countries. We report the results of a small survey from Bulgaria that begins to address these issues. Data were collected by means of an interviewer-administered household survey in which those who had used state-provided health services in the preceding 2 years were identified. The survey took place throughout Bulgaria in 1994. One thousand people were approached and 706 (70.6%) provided information suitable for analysis; 42.9% had paid for services that were officially free. Payments had been for a wide range of services and to differing groups, including medical, nursing and ancillary staff. Payments to individuals during consultations were between 3% and 14% of average monthly income but the average cost of an operation was 83% of mean monthly income. There were large differences in the amounts paid by individuals. Most people were in favour of both official user fees and health care reform, except among the old, the poor, and those in poor health. Despite certain limitations, this study gives some indication of the scale of informal payments in Bulgaria. Several possibilities exist to address them. Contrary to what is often argued, there seems to be a popular willingness for them to be converted into formal co-payments. Before this can be done, there is a need for more research on the impact that this would have on equity and affordability.     

Beliefs about informal payments in Albania

Informal payments for health care are a growing concern in Albania and other transitional economy countries. Recent international studies have shown that informal payments can have negative effects on health care access, equity and health status by causing people to forgo or delay seeking care, or sell assets to pay for care. Many countries are putting in place reforms meant to reduce informal payments. In order to be successful, such policies need to consider people's attitudes and beliefs about the practice. This study collected data from 222 citizens in Albania regarding intentions, past behaviours, attitudes and beliefs about informal payments. Comparing people who intend to make informal payments with people who do not intend to make payments, the study found differences in attitudes as well as beliefs about the consequences of making informal payments, in perceptions about what others think and in control beliefs, but no difference in moral beliefs or demographic characteristics. People who intend to make informal payments the next time they seek care are more likely to believe they will get faster and better quality care than non-intenders, but also think they must pay to receive any care at all. People who do not intend to make informal payments are more likely to report that they have connections with medical personnel, which may be substituting for informal payments. The study has implications for educational campaigns accompanying policy reforms. Campaigns which focus on anti-corruption messages are unlikely to be effective, as moral beliefs do not appear to influence intention.     

Understanding informal payments in health care: motivation of health workers in Tanzania

Background  

There is growing evidence that informal payments for health care are fairly common in many low- and middle-income countries. Informal payments are reported to have a negative consequence on equity and quality of care; it has been suggested, however, that they may contribute to health worker motivation and retention. Given the significance of motivation and retention issues in human resources for health, a better understanding of the relationships between the two phenomena is needed. This study attempts to assess whether and in what ways informal payments occur in Kibaha, Tanzania. Moreover, it aims to assess how informal earnings might help boost health worker motivation and retention.     

Informal payments for health care in transition economies

There is considerable evidence that unofficial payments are deeply embedded in the markets for health care in transition countries. Numerous surveys indicate that these payments provide a significant but possibly distorting contribution to health care financing. Unofficial payments can be characterised into three groups: cost contributions, including supplies and salaries, misuse of market position and payments for additional services. There is evidence from across the region on the presence of payment in each category although it is often difficult to distinguish between payment types. Regulatory policy must address a number of issues. Imposing penalties may help to reduce some payments but if the system is simply unable to provide services, such sanctions will drive workers into the private sector. There appears to be some support for formalising payments in order to reduce unofficial charges although the impact must be monitored and the danger is that formal fees add to the burden of payment. Regulation might also attempt to increase the amount of competition, provide information on good performing facilities and develop the legal basis of patient rights. Ultimately, unless governments address the endemic nature of payments across all sectors, policy interventions are unlikely to be fully effective.     

Informal payments and the financing of health care in developing and transition countries

Informal, under-the-table payments to public health care providers are increasingly viewed as a critically important source of health care financing in developing and transition countries. With minimal funding levels and limited accountability, publicly financed and delivered care falls prey to illegal payments, which require payments that can exceed 100 percent of a country's median income. Methods to address the abuse include establishing official fees, combined with improved oversight and accountability for public health care providers, and a role for communities in holding providers accountable.     

The inequity of informal payments for health care: the case of Hungary

As in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, informal payments have been a characteristic feature of the Hungarian health care system both during and since the demise of Soviet type socialist rule. Although informal payments continue to be so characteristic in the region, little empirical evidence exists on their scope or working. As far as equity is concerned, it has sometimes been suggested that physicians play a 'Robin Hood' role and subsidise the poor at the expense of the rich. With the aid of an interview survey of a representative sample of the Hungarian population, we examine the distribution of the burden of informal payments across income groups. Results indicate that informal payments are a highly regressive way of funding health care, with Kakwani progressivity indices of -0.38, -0.39, -0.35 and -0.36 for GP, outpatient specialist, hospital, and total care, respectively. The finding that people with lower income pay proportionally more for public health care through informal payments underlines the emptiness of the 'Robin Hood' claims and the need for reform.     

Informal economic activities of public health workers in Uganda: implications for quality and accessibility of care.

This paper reports the results of a study in Uganda of the 'informal' economic activities of health workers, defined as those which earn incomes but fall outside official duties and earnings. The study was carried out in 10 sub-hospital health facilities of varying size and intended role and used a variety of quantitative and qualitative methods. The paper focuses on those activities which are carried out inside public health facilities and which directly affect quality and accessibility of care. The main strategies in this category were the leakage of drug supply, the informal charging of patients and the mismanagement of revenues raised from the formal charging of patients. Few of the drugs supplied to health units were prescribed and issued in those sites. Most health workers who have the opportunity to do so, levy informal charges. Where formal charges are collected, high levels of leakage occur both at the point of collection and at higher levels of the system. The implications of this situation for the quality and accessibility of services in public health facilities were assessed. Utilisation levels are less than those expected of the smallest rural units and this workload is managed by a handful of the expected staff complement who are available for a fraction of the working week. Even given these few patients, drugs available after leakage were sufficient to cover less than half of those attending in most facilities. Evidence on staff motivation was mixed and better motivation was associated with better performance only in a minority of units. Informal charging was associated with better performance regarding hours worked by health workers and utilisation rates. Drug leakage was associated with worse performance with respect to both of these and unsurprisingly, with drug availability. Short term strategies to effect marginal performance improvements may focus on the substitution of strategies based inside health units (such as informal charging) for those based outside (facilitated by drug leakage). In the long term, only substantially higher funding of the sector can be expected to facilitate major change, but alone will be insufficient. Investment strategies supported by appropriate policy development has to be informed by understanding and monitoring of the 'informal' dimension of health sector activity.     

Informal payments and intra-household allocation of resources for health care in Albania

Background  

Informal payments for health care services can impose financial hardship on households. Many studies have found that the position within the household can influence the decision on how much is spent on each household member. This study analyses the intra-household differences in spending on informal payments for health care services by comparing the resources allocated between household heads, spouses and children.