Smoke and mirrors: how Massachusetts diverted millions in tobacco tax revenues

OBJECTIVE: This study examines the politics of appropriating Question 1 tobacco tax revenues in the first budget year after Massachusetts voters passed the ballot initiative in 1992. The initiative increased the tobacco tax on cigarettes by 25 cents per pack and on smokeless tobacco by 25% of the wholesale price. METHODS: Data were collected from newspapers, letters, memoranda, budgets, press releases, legislative floor debates, government documents, legislative journals, personal interviews, and tobacco industry documents that were downloaded from the Tobacco Archives internet site. RESULTS: During the first budget year, programmes mentioned by the initiative that were not exclusively tobacco related accounted for 27% of total Question 1 expenditures, while 50% of the revenues were allocated for programmes that were neither mentioned by the initiative nor provided any tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Only 23% of Question 1 funds were appropriated for programmes that provided exclusively tobacco education, prevention, and cessation services. Question 1 revenues were also used to supplant funding for pre-existing programmes, which was explicitly prohibited by the initiative. The first budget year became the template for Question 1 appropriations in subsequent fiscal years. CONCLUSION: Politics did not end after voters passed Question 1. Public health advocates lacked a strategy and budget plan to influence the appropriation of Question 1 funds after the passage of this ballot initiative.     

Science, advocacy and health policy: lessons from the New Zealand tobacco wars

The New Zealand Smoke-Free Environments Act was passed in August 1990 and is a central component of a comprehensive tobacco control policy. The passage of the Act was preceded by a long campaign. The essential components of this campaign were: international scientific evidence and the estimates of tobacco-caused mortality in New Zealand; activists groups supported by established health charities and the health professions; a sympathetic Health Department bureaucracy; a committed and powerful Minister of Health; and a relatively weak industry. The legislation passed despite adverse timing, the absence of bipartisan political support, and the pressure of industry-supported sports lobby groups. The campaign provides a model for other health issues in New Zealand and lessons for the tobacco wars elsewhere.     

The tobacco industry, state politics, and tobacco education in California.

OBJECTIVES. Proposition 99 added 25 cents to the California state cigarette tax and mandated that 20% of the new revenues be spent on tobacco education and prevention programs. This paper examines the implementation of these programs and the tobacco industry's response to Proposition 99. METHODS. Political expenditure data for twelve tobacco firms and associations were gathered from California's Fair Political Practices Commission and secretary of state's Political Reform Division. Tobacco education expenditure data were collected from Governor's Budgets and the Department of Finance. RESULTS. Since Proposition 99 passed, tobacco industry political expenditures in California have risen 10-fold, from $790,050 in the 1985-1986 election to $7,615,091 in the 1991-1992 election. The tobacco industry is contributing more heavily to the California legislature than to Congress. A statistical analysis of data on campaign contributions indicates that California legislators' policy-making is influenced by campaign contributions from the tobacco industry. Since fiscal year 1989-1990, the state has ignored the voters' mandate and spent only 14.7% of the new revenues to tobacco education. Medical care programs received more money than permitted by the voters. CONCLUSIONS. The tobacco industry has become politically active in California following the passage of Proposition 99. One result may be that the state has underfunded tobacco education by $174.7 million through the 1993-1994 fiscal year. The estimated redirection of funds to medical care would essentially eliminate the tobacco education campaign by the year 2000.     

The new battleground: California's experience with smoke-free bars

OBJECTIVES: This study examined the tobacco industry's tactics in the political, grassroots, and media arenas in attempting to subvert California's smoke-free bar law, and the efforts of health advocates to uphold and promote the law by using the same 3 channels. METHODS: Interviews with key informants involved in the development and implementation of the smoke-free bar law were conducted. Information was gathered from bill analyses, internal memoranda, tobacco industry documents, media articles, and press releases. RESULTS: The tobacco industry worked both inside the legislature and through a public relations campaign to attempt to delay implementation of the law and to encourage noncompliance once the law was in effect. Health groups were able to uphold the law by framing the law as a health and worker safety issue. The health groups were less successful in pressing the state to implement the law. CONCLUSIONS: It is possible to enact and defend smoke-free bar laws, but doing so requires a substantial and sustained commitment by health advocates. The tobacco industry will fight this latest generation of clean indoor air laws even more aggressively than general workplace laws.     

The defeat of Philip Morris' 'California Uniform Tobacco Control Act'.

OBJECTIVES: This paper describes the strategies used by Philip Morris and other tobacco companies to promote a California initiative (Proposition 188) preempting local control of tobacco and those used by public health groups to defeat the initiative. METHODS: Interviews with key informants were conducted, and the written record was reviewed. RESULTS: Tobacco companies nearly succeeded in passing Proposition 188 by presenting it as a pro-health measure that would prevent children from obtaining cigarettes and provide protection against secondhand smoke. Public health groups defeated it by highlighting tobacco industry backing. A private charitable foundation also played an innovative role by financing a non-partisan public education campaign. CONCLUSIONS: Public health forces must be alert to sophisticated efforts by the tobacco industry to enact preemptive state legislation by making it look like tobacco control legislation. The coalition structure that emerged in the "No on 188" campaign represents an effective model for future tobacco control activities. The new role of charitable foundations defined in the Proposition 188 campaign can be used in other public health issues.     

Boards of Health as venues for clean indoor air policy making

OBJECTIVES: This study sought to determine the tobacco industry's strategies for opposing health board actions and to identify elements necessary for public health to prevail. METHODS: Newspaper articles, personal interviews, and tobacco industry documents released through litigation were reviewed. RESULTS: Twenty-five instances in which the tobacco industry opposed health board regulations were identified. It was shown that the tobacco industry uses 3 strategies against health boards: "accommodation" (tobacco industry public relations campaigns to accommodate smokers in public places), legislative intervention, and litigation. These strategies are often executed with the help of tobacco industry front groups or allies in the hospitality industry. CONCLUSIONS: Although many tobacco control advocates believe that passing health board regulations is easier than the legislative route, this is generally not the case. The industry will often attempt to involve the legislature in fighting the regulations, forcing advocates to fight a battle on 2 fronts. It is important for health boards to verify their authority over smoking restrictions and refrain from considering non-health factors (including industry claims of adverse economic impacts) so as to withstand court challenges.     

Breaking the alliance: Defeating the tobacco industry's allies and enacting youth access restrictions in Massachusetts

OBJECTIVES: We describe the tobacco industry's effort in Massachusetts to block the adoption of local regulations designed to reduce youth access to tobacco products. We also explain how state-funded tobacco control advocates overcame industry opposition. METHODS: We examined internal tobacco industry documents and records of local boards of health and conducted interviews with participants in local regulatory debates. RESULTS: The industry fought proposed regulations by working through a trade group, the New England Convenience Store Association. With industry direction and financing, the association's members argued against proposed regulations in local public hearings. However, these efforts failed because community-based advocates worked assiduously to cultivate support for the regulations among board of health members and local community organizations. CONCLUSIONS: Passage of youth access regulations by local boards of health in Massachusetts is attributed to ongoing state funding for local tobacco control initiatives, agreement on common policy goals among tobacco control advocates, and a strategy of persuading boards of health to adopt and enforce their own local regulations.     

Turning negative into positive: public health mass media campaigns and negative advertising

Literature suggests that 'negative advertising' is an effective way to encourage behavioral changes, but it has enjoyed limited use in public health media campaigns. However, as public health increasingly focuses on non-communicable disease prevention, negative advertising could be more widely applied. This analysis considers an illustrative case from tobacco control. Relying on internal tobacco industry documents, surveys and experimental data and drawing from political advocacy literature, we describe tobacco industry and public health research on the American Legacy Foundation's "truth" campaign, an example of effective negative advertising in the service of public health. The tobacco industry determined that the most effective advertisements run by Legacy's "truth" campaign were negative advertisements. Although the tobacco industry's own research suggested that these negative ads identified and effectively reframed the cigarette as a harmful consumer product rather than focusing solely on tobacco companies, Philip Morris accused Legacy of 'vilifying' it. Public health researchers have demonstrated the effectiveness of the "truth" campaign in reducing smoking initiation. Research on political advocacy demonstrating the value of negative advertising has rarely been used in the development of public health media campaigns, but negative advertising can effectively communicate certain public health messages and serve to counter corporate disease promotion.     

Strange bedfellows: the history of collaboration between the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry

OBJECTIVES: This article examines the historical relationship between the tobacco industry and the Massachusetts Restaurant Association, a nonprofit trade association aligned with the food and beverage industry. METHODS: The study analyzed data from Web-based tobacco industry documents, public relations materials, news articles, testimony from public hearings, requests for injunctions, court decisions, economic impact studies, handbooks, and private correspondence. RESULTS: Tobacco industry documents that became public after various state lawsuits reveal that a long history of collaboration exists between the Massachusetts Restaurant Association and the tobacco industry. For more than 20 years, their joint efforts have focused primarily on the battle to defeat state and local laws that would restrict smoking in public places, particularly in beverage and food service establishments. The resources of the tobacco industry, combined with the association's grassroots mobilization of its membership, have fueled their opposition to many state and local smoke-free restaurant, bar, and workplace laws in Massachusetts. CONCLUSIONS: The universal opposition of the Massachusetts Restaurant Association to smoking bans in food and beverage establishments is a reflection of its historic relationship with the tobacco industry.     

Failure to defend a successful state tobacco control program: policy lessons from Florida

OBJECTIVES: This investigation sought to define policy and political factors related to the undermining of Florida's successful Tobacco Pilot Program in 1999. METHODS: Data were gathered from interviews with public health lobbyists, tobacco control advocates, and state officials; news reports; and public documents. RESULTS: As a result of a recent legal settlement with Florida, the tobacco industry agreed to fund a youth anti-smoking pilot program. The program combined community-based interventions and advertisements. In less than 1 year, the teen smoking prevalence rate dropped from 23.3% to 20.9%. The program also enjoyed high public visibility and strong public support. Nevertheless, in 1999, the state legislature cut the program's funding from $70.5 million to $38.7 million, and the Bush administration dismantled the program's administrative structure. Voluntary health agencies failed to publicly hold specific legislators and the governor responsible for the cuts. CONCLUSIONS: The legislature and administration succeeded in dismantling this highly visible and successful tobacco control program because pro-health forces limited their activities to behind-the-scenes lobbying and were unwilling to confront the politicians who made these decisions in a public forum.     

Tobacco industry efforts to keep cigarettes affordable: a case study from Hungary

OBJECTIVE: To review strategies of multinational tobacco companies aimed at keeping tobacco products affordable to smokers in Hungary and to provide background information on the Hungarian request for the delayed introduction of minimum European Union tobacco excise duty levels. METHOD: Review of internal tobacco industry documents available on the World Wide Web, downloaded between 26 July 2001 and 31 October 2002. CONCLUSIONS: Appropriate pricing strategies and lobbying for low tobacco tax policies were used by the tobacco industry in Hungary to keep cigarettes affordable to the public. During the 1990s and in the early 2000s transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) were still able to prevent substantial cigarette price rises, which would have been desirable for more effective control of Hungarian tobacco use. Strategies used by TTCs included the creation of new partnerships, use of supportive MPs, communication around tobacco tax issues and also the successful management of the differences in approaches used by individual companies regarding taxation of tobacco products. These resulted in the adoption of governmental policy aimed at delaying the introduction of the EU directive on the minimum tax levels of retail prices of cigarettes.     

The tobacco industry's internal documents and smoking prevention in Spain

A 1998 agreement between several states in the USA and the tobacco industry made millions of pages of internal documents available to the public. Many of these documents contain information that the industry would have preferred to keep confidential. Systematic review of these internal documents constitutes a valuable resource for international tobacco control, since they are available on the Internet and can be accessed from anywhere in the world. These documents provide relevant and useful information to antismoking activists and researchers. To facilitate their use, the present article presents the electronic archives of the tobacco industry's documents, describes methods for conducting searches, and identifies the documents with information on the industry's tactics for manipulating Spanish politics and society for its own commercial interests during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.     

The smoke you don't see: uncovering tobacco industry scientific strategies aimed against environmental tobacco smoke policies

OBJECTIVES: This review details the tobacco industry's scientific campaign aimed against policies addressing environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and efforts to undermine US regulatory agencies from approximately 1988 to 1993. METHODS: The public availability of more than 40 million internal, once-secret tobacco company documents allowed an unedited and historical look at tobacco industry strategies. RESULTS: The analysis showed that the tobacco industry went to great lengths to battle the ETS issue worldwide by camouflaging its involvement and creating an impression of legitimate, unbiased scientific research. CONCLUSIONS: There is a need for further international monitoring of industry-produced science and for significant improvements in tobacco document accessibility.     

Development of a low-budget tobacco prevention media campaign.

Utah joined the ranks of other states that have passed a tobacco tax to fund a tobacco control program, including a media campaign. However, unlike other states working with multimillion dollar campaigns, $250,000 was allocated toward an anti-tobacco media campaign. Formative research guided the strategic development of the media campaign.     

Who supports tobacco excise taxes? Factors associated with towns' and individuals' support in Massachusetts.

OBJECTIVES: The authors examined factors related to public support for cigarette taxes: smoking behavior, attitudes about other tobacco control policies, and sociodemographic factors. METHODS: The authors regressed referendum voting outcomes on sociodemographic characteristics of Massachusetts' 351 towns. Logistic regressions on the surveys of Massachusetts adults (N = 14,000+) showed support for hypothetical tax increases to be related to respondents' smoking status, support for other tobacco control policies, and sociodemographic characteristics. RESULTS: Average educational attainment, probably acting as a proxy for nonsmoking prevalence, strongly predicted town-level support for Massachusetts' 1992 cigarette tax referendum. Survey respondents' support for hypothetical further increases was strongest if tax proceeds were earmarked for tobacco control or health purposes and if the individual was a nonsmoker and favored other tobacco control policies. For an earmarked tax, support was stronger among younger persons, females, persons with higher education, racial/ethnic minorities, and smokers with children. CONCLUSIONS: The high nationwide proportion of nonsmokers means that tobacco tax proposals can obtain strong voter support, but only if tax revenues are clearly earmarked for tobacco control and similar uses. Individual- and town-level characteristics can identify likely concentrations of support. Because attitudes toward tobacco control are only partly linked to smoking status, education campaigns may make a difference.     

The relevance and prospects of advancing tobacco control in Indonesia

Using published data about consumption, economic aspects, and legislation, this paper analyzes tobacco control in Indonesia, a major consumer and producer of tobacco products. Given its large population and smoking prevalence, Indonesia ranks fifth among countries with the highest tobacco consumption globally. Over 62% of Indonesian adult males smoke regularly, contributing to a growing burden of non-communicable diseases and enormous demands on the health care system. Tobacco control policies, however, have remained low on the political and public health agenda for many years. One reason was the contribution of tobacco to government revenues and employment, particularly in the industrial sector. But tobacco's importance in employment has fallen significantly since the 1970s from 38% of total manufacturing employment compared with 5.6% today. Widespread use of tobacco since the 1970s and the concomitant burden of non-communicable diseases have given rise to a more balanced view of the costs and benefits of tobacco production over the last decade. The first tobacco control regulation passed in 1999, succeeded by amendments in 2000 and 2003. Today, few restrictions exist on tobacco industry conduct, advertising, and promotion in Indonesia. We examine the relevance and prospects of advancing in Indonesia four cost-effective tobacco control strategies: price and tax measures, advertising bans, clean air legislation, and public education. We conclude with several suggestions for action for the public health community.     

Promoting Tobacco-Free School Policies Through a Statewide Media Campaign

Background:  Comprehensive, enforced tobacco-free school (TFS) policies lead to significant reductions in youth tobacco use. North Carolina is the first state in the United States to develop a statewide mass media campaign to promote the adoption of and compliance with TFS policies.
Methods:  In order to guide campaign development, researchers conducted a literature review as well as interviews with 45 TFS-policy experts, stakeholders, and North Carolina legislators. The experts included state and national TFS researchers and advocates, and the majority of stakeholders were North Carolina school administrators and personnel selected because of their personal knowledge of and experience with TFS policy. Interviewees provided information on messages they believed would be most salient to highlight in the media campaign and the best type of people to appear in ads.
Results:  Recommended themes included (1) a positive message about TFS becoming the norm in the state, (2) experiences of school districts that had successfully passed TFS policies, (3) the importance of adult role modeling, and (4) personal stories from youth about the importance of TFS policy. Recommended people to appear in ads included youth and adults with a personal connection to and experience with TFS policy. Using these recommended themes and people, the TFS media campaign began in the fall of 2006. In the 8 months following the campaign launch, 9 additional school districts adopted TFS policies, increasing the total from 78 to 87 (out of 115) by June 2007. In July 2007, the North Carolina legislature passed legislation mandating that all school districts adopt TFS policies by August 2008.
Conclusions:  Media campaigns can serve as part of a comprehensive strategy to advance TFS policies. Other states should consider these results in designing and evaluating a media campaign to promote adoption of and compliance with TFS policies.     

Tobacco industry efforts at discrediting scientific knowledge of environmental tobacco smoke: a review of internal industry documents

STUDY OBJECTIVE: Using tobacco industry internal documents to investigate the use of tobacco industry consulting scientists to discredit scientific knowledge of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS). DESIGN: Basic and advanced searches were performed on the Philip Morris, Tobacco Institute, R J Reynolds, Brown and Williamson, Lorillard, and the Council for Tobacco Research document web sites, with a concentration on the years 1985-1995. Guildford depository files located on the Canadian Council on Tobacco Control website were also searched. The documents were found in searches undertaken between 1 March and 30 June 2000. MAIN RESULTS: The industry built up networks of scientists sympathetic to its position that ETS is an insignificant health risk. Industry lawyers had a large role in determining what science would be pursued. The industry funded independent organisations to produce research that appeared separate from the industry and would boost its credibility. Industry organised symposiums were used to publish non-peer reviewed research. Unfavourable research conducted or proposed by industry scientists was prevented from becoming public. CONCLUSIONS: Industry documents illustrate a deliberate strategy to use scientific consultants to discredit the science on ETS.     

Simulated effect of tobacco tax variation on population health in California

OBJECTIVES: This study simulated the effects of tobacco excise tax increases on population health. METHODS: Five simulations were used to estimate health outcomes associated with tobacco tax policies: (1) the effects of price on smoking prevalence; (2) the effects of tobacco use on years of potential life lost; (3) the effect of tobacco use on quality of life (morbidity); (4) the integration of prevalence, mortality, and morbidity into a model of quality adjusted life years (QALYs); and (5) the development of confidence intervals around these estimates. Effects were estimated for 1 year after the tax's initiation and 75 years into the future. RESULTS: In California, a $0.50 tax increase and price elasticity of -0.40 would result in about 8389 QALYs (95% confidence interval [CI] = 4629, 12,113) saved the first year. Greater benefits would accrue each year until a steady state was reached after 75 years, when 52,136 QALYs (95% CI = 38,297, 66,262) would accrue each year. Higher taxes would produce even greater health benefits. CONCLUSIONS: A tobacco excise tax may be among a few policy options that will enhance a population's health status while making revenues available to government.     

Tobacco industry surveillance of public health groups: the case of STAT (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco) and INFACT (Infant Formula Action Coalition)

OBJECTIVES: The goal of this study was to describe how the tobacco industry collects information about public health groups. METHODS: Publicly available internal tobacco industry documents were reviewed and analyzed using a chronological case study approach. RESULTS: The industry engaged in aggressive intelligence gathering, used intermediaries to obtain materials under false pretenses, sent public relations spies to the organizations' meetings, and covertly taped strategy sessions. Other industry strategies included publicly minimizing the effects of boycotts, painting health advocates as "extreme," identifying and exploiting disagreements, and planning to "redirect the funding" of tobacco control organizations to other purposes. CONCLUSIONS: Public health advocates often make light of tobacco industry observers, but industry surveillance may be real, intense, and covert and may obstruct public health initiatives.