A short history of biological warfare

Biological weapons have been used in war from the start of recorded history. This article reviews the history of the subject, including the outbreak of the Black Death and the use of smallpox against American Indians. The new science of microbiology was misused from soon after its start and, despite the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Japanese experimented extensively on prisoners in China. The Allies carried out extensive research during the Second World War, notably the United Kingdom into anthrax on Gruinard Island and the United States into a variety of agents. Despite the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a major programme continued in the former Soviet Union (leading to an accidental outbreak of anthrax). Most recently Iraq was revealed as having an extensive programme, with weaponization of large amounts of various agents, and several terrorists groups have attempted to use biological agents as weapons. Modern developments in biotechnology could lead to even more serious developments, and effective preventive measures, including strengthening of the BWC, are imperative.     

Verification of the biological weapons convention: what is needed?

The lack of transparency and verification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is one factor behind the current weakening of the ban on biological weapons. Despite recent setbacks, governments need to fill the verification gap so that violations of the BWC can be detected and deterred. Continued talks on a strong verification mechanism for the BWC should aim for an open verification regime and one that is flexible enough to adapt to new technical and political circumstances. Effective monitoring of compliance with the BWC will require concerted effort by governments and civil society.     

Which bio-weapons might be used by terrorists against the United Kingdom?

The properties of potential biological weapon agents for bioterrorism include a consistent effect at low dosage and short incubation period in a population of low immunity, being difficult to treat, able to be produced in bulk, stable in storage and readily disseminated. Possible agents include smallpox, haemorrhagic fever viruses, anthrax, tularaemia and plague. The example of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) demonstrates the possible consequences of an act of bioterrorism, but also the necessary global response. There is scepticism about the practicability of surveillance schemes and the global elimination of biological weapons though the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention remains urgent.     

Proliferation of biological weapons: challenges and responses

The threat posed by the proliferation of biological weapons (BW) confronts all strata of our society, from the individual, the nation, or the region to the truly international. The history of state-run offensive BW programmes and the attacks in the United States with powdered anthrax demonstrate that existing measures fall short of addressing this threat. This article examines the current regime and the concerns that confront it in order to suggest possible responses across the social strata that may mitigate future proliferation of BW.     

Closing loopholes in the Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti-material agents.     

Closing loopholes in the biological weapons convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti‐material agents.     

美国生物防御能力建设的特点与启示

生物武器、生物恐怖和新发传染病是当今国际社会面临的重大安全问题。美国高度重视生物防御能力建设,将生物防御能力建设纳入国家安全战略,不断提升其国家生物防御能力水平。本文简要分析了美国生物防御能力建设的主要特点,包括明确的生物防御战略、充分的预防预警准备、有效的后果处置能力、强大的科技支撑体系等,希望能对我国及其他发展中国家的生物防御能力建设有所启示。     

Operation Desert Shield: medical aspects of weapons of mass destruction.

Our concern over possible use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces in the Middle East has increased because Iraq has violated the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, attempted to acquire nuclear capability and delivery systems, and is reported to be developing biological weapons. The Army Medical Department has had no experience, since World War I, in the management and treatment of mass casualties contaminated by chemical agents, and has never treated casualties resulting from the use of nuclear or biological weapons used against our soldiers. Management and diagnosis of casualties will be complicated by their possible exposure to a mixture of chemical warfare and biological warfare agents. Triage is an essential aspect in the management of mass casualties since the number of injured patients will exceed the maximum medical capability to treat each patient on arrival. All levels of medical support must be prepared to protect themselves, their equipment and supplies, and their patients from contamination. In contaminated operations on the integrated battlefield, it will be of utmost importance to incorporate flexibility and innovation to match the medical and tactical situation.     

The Nuclear Threat: When it Hurts to Think

On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice gave its Advisory Opinion on the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons, in response to a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. This paper considers the status of Trident, now the United Kingdom's only nuclear weapon system, in the light of the Opinion. While it cannot be concluded definitively that the threat or use of Trident is illegal, at the very least the legality of the programme is brought into considerable doubt. The continued deployment of Trident raises important legal and military issues, which must be addressed urgently.     

The United States and biological warfare: secrets from the early cold war and Korea.

The United States and Biological Warfare is about accusations that the United States resorted to bacteriological warfare at a time of great military stress during the Korean War. In December 1951, the then US Secretary of Defense ordered early readiness for offensive use of biological weapons. Soon afterwards, the North Korean and Chinese armies accused the United States of starting a large-scale biological warfare experiment in Korea. The US State Department denied the accusation. Both parties to the dispute maintain their positions today. The authors spent 20 years researching the accusations in North America, Europe and Japan. They were the first foreigners to be given access to Chinese classified documents. The reader is also introduced to the concept of 'plausible denial', an official US policy which allowed responsible governmental representatives to deny knowledge of certain events. The authors hope that their work will contribute to the understanding of a time when modern war expanded into a new type of violence.     

Simulants, stimulants and diseases: the evolution of the United States biological warfare programme, 1945-60.

Details about the US biological programme have largely been based on information in the open literature. More revealing aspects of the programme are now available through documents released under the Freedom of Information Act. Annual reports of the activities of the US Army Chemical Corps from 1945 to 1959 have revealed significant increases in activity in biological warfare research. The Corps research activity progressed from work on anthrax in 1941, through anti-crop agents in the mid-1940s, to a wider range of animal, plant and human diseases by 1960. A number of disease organisms were investigated sufficiently to permit some standardisation and manufacture of munitions.     

Contamination and compensation: Gruinard as a 'menace to the mainland'

The decades-long contamination of Gruinard Island by anthrax is now a well-known part of the history of biological weapons (BW) development, as well as that of military encroachments in the Scottish Highlands and Islands (and the authorities' rather less persistent efforts at damage limitation). Some accounts have included the related episode, reportedly well-remembered by local people, of anthrax contamination on the mainland close to Gruinard. This occurred in 1942--43, when BW experiments were conducted on the island as part of the war effort by scientists from Porton Down under the auspices of the British government. After much top-level discussion, payments were made to the owners of animals that had died as a result of the contamination. The episode had a bearing on discussions about the future of the island and on subsequent policy with regard to the siting, conduct and secrecy of BW experiments.     

War and peace ‐ reconsidered

The decades-long contamination of Gruinard Island by anthrax is now a well-known part of the history of biological weapons (BW) development, as well as that of military encroachments in the Scottish Highlands and Islands (and the authorities' rather less persistent efforts at damage limitation). Some accounts have included the related episode, reportedly well-remembered by local people, of anthrax contamination on the mainland close to Gruinard. This occurred in 1942-43, when BW experiments were conducted on the island as part of the war effort by scientists from Porton Down under the auspices of the British government. After much top-level discussion, payments were made to the owners of animals that had died as a result of the contamination. The episode had a bearing on discussions about the future of the island and on subsequent policy with regard to the siting, conduct and secrecy of BW experiments.     

The Maralinga Rehabilitation Project: final report

Maralinga, South Australia was an important site in the United Kingdom nuclear weapons test programme. Seven bombs were exploded and a series of 'safety' tests carried out; the latter in particular disseminated appreciable amounts of uranium and plutonium over a wide area. A programme to clean up the test site over several years was instituted, with in-situ vitrification as a principal measure. The final report on the programme has now been published. However, both the programme and the Report are seriously flawed; this article provides criticisms of both.     

Preamble to the proposal for a United Nations second assembly

Maralinga, South Australia was an important site in the United Kingdom nuclear weapons test programme. Seven bombs were exploded and a series of ‘safety’ tests carried out; the latter in particular disseminated appreciable amounts of uranium and plutonium over a wide area. A programme to clean up the test site over several years was instituted, with in-situ vitrification as a principal measure. The final report on the programme has now been published. However, both the programme and the Report are seriously flawed; this article provides criticisms of both.     

从2013年《禁止生物武器公约》专家组会看当前生物军控的形势

《禁止生物武器公约》2013年专家组会于2013年8月12日至16日在瑞士日内瓦举行。该文通过综合分析会议的主要研讨内容及结果,对当前生物军控的形势进行了分析,同时对如何加强生物军控履约工作提出了几点思考。     

Vertical nuclear proliferation

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.     

生物恐怖威胁特点及医学防御对策

2001年发生于美国的炭疽芽孢邮件事件引起了人们对生物战剂恐怖威胁的关注，也对生物恐怖剂的医学防范和流行病学的科学认识提出了挑战，因此，公共健康和医学工作者迫切需要了解生物恐怖袭击引起损害的预防和治疗措施。本文介绍了生物恐怖的概念、特点、恐怖活动可能使用的生物战剂清单，以及炭疽杆菌、鼠疫耶尔森菌、天花病毒、出血热病毒、肉毒毒素等A类生物战剂的致病特征以及医学防护对策。     

Biological warfare: the threat in historical perspective

The story of work on biological warfare in the twentieth century is briefly reviewed and the history of the British programme analyzed, largely from documents now available in the Public Records Office. The position of the United Kingdom in relation to other military and political issues has varied, as has its overall attitude from time to time. In the 1930s a defensive stance was linked to the health effects of conventional war. During and after the Second World War the objective was to obtain a biological bomb before actual or potential enemies, but later the emphasis returned to a more defensive stance, with attempts to assess the hazard over wide areas. Any evaluation of the effects of new developments in genetics should take the changing nature of these past assessments into account.     

Some recent papers

Abstract

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending £1 billion on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about £20 billion on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear counter-measures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.