Do social attribution skills improve with age in children with high functioning autism spectrum disorders?

Age-related changes in social attribution skills were assessed using the “Triangles Playing Tricks” task in 7–17 year old high functioning children with ASDs (n = 41) and in typically developing (TD) children (n = 58) matched on age, IQ, and sex ratio. Children with ASDs gave responses that received lower intentionality and appropriateness ratings than did TD children in both the goal-directed and theory of mind (ToM) conditions. Results remained unchanged when the effects of verbal output (i.e., number of clause produced) and verbal IQ were included as covariates in the analyses. Whereas age was highly associated with ToM performance in the TD children, this relationship was not as strong among children with ASDs. These results indicate not only a diminished tendency among high functioning children with ASDs to attribute social meaning and intentionality to ambiguous visual displays of interactive forms but also an aberrant developmental trajectory. That is, children with ASDs may fall further behind their typically developing peers in social attribution abilities as they get older.     

The intentionality bias in schizophrenia

The tendency to over-interpret events of daily life as resulting from voluntary or intentional actions is one of the key aspects of schizophrenia with persecutory delusions. Here, we ask whether this characteristic may emerge from the abnormal activity of a basic cognitive process found in healthy adults and children: the intentionality bias, which refers to the implicit and automatic inclination to interpret human actions as intentional (Rosset, 2008, Cognition 108, 771–780). In our experiment, patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls were shown sentences describing human actions in various linguistic contexts, and were asked to indicate whether the action was intentional or not. The results indicated that people with schizophrenia exhibited a striking bias to over attribute intentionality regardless of linguistic context, contrary to healthy controls who did not exhibit such a general intentionality bias. Moreover, this study provides some insight into the cognitive mechanisms underlying this bias: an inability to inhibit the automatic attribution of intentionality.     

Judging intentionality in the context of ambiguous actions among autistic adults

BackgroundDiscerning intentional from unintentional actions is a key aspect of social cognition. Mental state attribution tasks show that autistic people are less accurate than neurotypicals in attributing an agent’s intention when there is clearly a right answer. Little is known about how autistic people judge the intentionality of ambiguous actions (i.e., actions that are neither clearly intentional nor clearly unintentional).AimsThis study sought to find out whether autistic individuals differ in their interpretation of ambiguous action compared to neurotypical controls.Methods and procedures20 autistic and 20 neurotypical adults completed an ambiguous action and theory of mind task. Autistic traits, verbal reasoning and non-verbal perceptual reasoning ability were measured.Outcomes and resultsResults show that intentionality endorsement scores for ambiguous but prototypically accidental actions were higher in autistic participants than controls. Theory of Mind (ToM) scores did not correlate with intentionality endorsement scores in either group therefore group differences could not be explained by ToM ability.Conclusion and implicationsAutistic participants had a tendency to over-attribute intention compared to neurotypicals, which could not be explained by ToM ability. Studying ambiguous action is important with respect to ecological validity, given that we often face ambiguous actions during social encounters.     

Early intersubjective skills and the understanding of intentionality in young children with Down syndrome

This study examined the relationship between early intersubjective skills (joint attention and affect sharing) and the development of the understanding of intentionality in 16 young children with Down syndrome (DS) and 16 developmentally matched children with other developmental disabilities (DD). The study of intentionality focuses on how children come to understand the goal-directed actions of others and is an important precursor to the development of more complex social cognitive skills, such as theory of mind. Joint attention and affect sharing were examined using the Early Social Communication Scales (Mundy et al., 1990, Seibert et al., 1982). Meltzoff's (1995) behavioral reenactment paradigm was used to examine the understanding of intentionality. For children with DS, higher rates of affect sharing were associated with poorer intention reading abilities. This pattern was not observed in children with other DD. These results suggest that the intersubjective strengths associated with DS may not support the development of intentionality-interpretation skills. Future research is needed to explore if children with DS have the joint attention behaviors needed to be intentional.     

Orbital prefrontal cortex volume correlates with social cognitive competence

Intentionality, or Theory of Mind, is the ability to explain and predict the behaviour of others by attributing to them intentions and mental states and is hypothesised to be one of several social cognitive mechanisms which have impacted upon brain size evolution. Though the brain activity associated with processing this type of information has been studied extensively, the neuroanatomical correlates of these abilities, e.g. whether subjects who perform better have greater volume of associated brain regions, remain to be investigated. Because social abilities of this type appear to have evolved relatively recently, and because the prefrontal cortex (PFC) was the last brain region to develop both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, we hypothesised a relationship between PFC volume and intentional competence. To test this, we estimated the volume of four regional prefrontal subfields in each cerebral hemisphere, in 40 healthy adult humans by applying stereological methods on T₁-weighted magnetic resonance images. Our results reveal a significant linear relationship between intentionality score and volume of orbital PFC (p = 0.01). Since this region is known to be involved in the processing of social information our findings support the hypothesis that brain size evolution is, at least in part, the result of social cognitive mechanisms supporting social cohesion.     

A neurobiological mapping of theory of mind

This paper attempts, based on a review of a wide range of clinical, biobehavioral and neuroanatomical studies, to account for the various theory of mind impairments observed in psychiatric and developmental disorders in a single neurobiological model. The proposed model is composed of a representational component subserved by posterior brain regions (temporal and parietal) and an application/execution component subserved by prefrontal regions. Information processed in posterior regions is relayed through a limbic–paralimbic system, which is essential for the implementation of theory of mind processes. In addition to its clinical implications, the proposed model accounts for (1) the ability to mentalize about both the self and others, (2) the nature of the anatomic connections of the various brain regions and their functional correlates, and (3) theories pertaining to the inferencing mechanisms used during mental representation/attribution.     

Attributing intentions to random motion engages the posterior superior temporal sulcus

The right posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is a neural region involved in assessing the goals and intentions underlying the motion of social agents. Recent research has identified visual cues, such as chasing, that trigger animacy detection and intention attribution. When readily available in a visual display, these cues reliably activate the pSTS. Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined if attributing intentions to random motion would likewise engage the pSTS. Participants viewed displays of four moving circles and were instructed to search for chasing or mirror-correlated motion. On chasing trials, one circle chased another circle, invoking the percept of an intentional agent; while on correlated motion trials, one circle’s motion was mirror reflected by another. On the remaining trials, all circles moved randomly. As expected, pSTS activation was greater when participants searched for chasing vs correlated motion when these cues were present in the displays. Of critical importance, pSTS activation was also greater when participants searched for chasing compared to mirror-correlated motion when the displays in both search conditions were statistically identical random motion. We conclude that pSTS activity associated with intention attribution can be invoked by top–down processes in the absence of reliable visual cues for intentionality.     

A Representational Similarity Analysis of Cognitive Control during Color-Word Stroop

Progress in understanding the neural bases of cognitive control has been supported by the paradigmatic color-word Stroop task, in which a target response (color name) must be selected over a more automatic, yet potentially incongruent, distractor response (word). For this paradigm, models have postulated complementary coding schemes: dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) is proposed to evaluate the demand for control via incongruency-related coding, whereas dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) is proposed to implement control via goal and target-related coding. Yet, mapping these theorized schemes to measured neural activity within this task has been challenging. Here, we tested for these coding schemes relatively directly, by decomposing an event-related color-word Stroop task via representational similarity analysis. Three neural coding models were fit to the similarity structure of multivoxel patterns of human fMRI activity, acquired from 65 healthy, young-adult males and females. Incongruency coding was predominant in DMFC, whereas both target and incongruency coding were present with indistinguishable strength in DLPFC. In contrast, distractor information was strongly encoded within early visual cortex. Further, these coding schemes were differentially related to behavior: individuals with stronger DLPFC (and lateral posterior parietal cortex) target coding, but weaker DMFC incongruency coding, exhibited less behavioral Stroop interference. These results highlight the utility of the representational similarity analysis framework for investigating neural mechanisms of cognitive control and point to several promising directions to extend the Stroop paradigm.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT How the human brain enables cognitive control — the ability to override behavioral habits to pursue internal goals — has been a major focus of neuroscience research. This ability has been frequently investigated by using the Stroop color-word naming task. With the Stroop as a test-bed, many theories have proposed specific neuroanatomical dissociations, in which medial and lateral frontal brain regions underlie cognitive control by encoding distinct types of information. Yet providing a direct confirmation of these claims has been challenging. Here, we demonstrate that representational similarity analysis, which estimates and models the similarity structure of brain activity patterns, can successfully establish the hypothesized functional dissociations within the Stroop task. Representational similarity analysis may provide a useful approach for investigating cognitive control mechanisms.     

Supernatural believers attribute more intentions to random movement than skeptics: An fMRI study

A host of research has attempted to explain why some believe in the supernatural and some do not. One suggested explanation for commonly held supernatural beliefs is that they are a by-product of theory of mind (ToM) processing. However, this does not explain why skeptics with intact ToM processes do not believe. We employed fMRI to investigate activation differences in ToM-related brain circuitries between supernatural believers (N = 12) and skeptics (N = 11) while they watched 2D animations of geometric objects moving intentionally or randomly and rated the intentionality of the animations. The ToM-related circuitries in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) were localized by contrasting intention-rating-related and control-rating-related brain activation. Compared with the skeptics, the supernatural believers rated the random movements as more intentional and had stronger activation of the ToM-related circuitries during the animation with random movement. The strength of the ToM-related activation covaried with the intentionality ratings. These findings provide evidence that differences in ToM-related activations are associated with supernatural believers’ tendency to interpret random phenomena in mental terms. Thus, differences in ToM processing may contribute to differences between believing and unbelieving.     

Social competence with an unfamiliar peer in children and adolescents with high functioning autism: Measurement and individual differences

Children and adolescents with high functioning autism (HFA) display heterogeneity in social competence, which may be particularly evident during interactions with unfamiliar peers. The goal of this study was to examine predictors of social competence variability during an unfamiliar peer interaction. Thirty-nine participants with HFA and 39 age-, gender- and IQ-matched comparison participants were observed during dyadic laboratory interactions and detailed behavioral coding revealed three social competence dimensions: social initiative, social reciprocity, and social self-monitoring. Participants with HFA displayed higher social initiative but lower reciprocity than comparison participants. For participants with HFA, theory of mind was positively associated with observed initiative. For COM participants, social anxiety was negatively associated with reciprocity. However, for HFA participants, there was a quadratic relation between parent-reported social anxiety and observed reciprocity, demonstrating that low and high levels of anxiety were associated with low reciprocity. Results demonstrated the utility of our behavioral coding scheme as a valid assessment of social competence for children and adolescents with and without HFA. The curvilinear association between social anxiety and reciprocity highlights the importance of examining nonlinear relations in individuals with HFA, and emphasizes that discrete profiles of social anxiety in individuals with HFA may necessitate different treatment options.     

Meaning,intention, and inference in primate vocal communication

Two core questions in the study of speech evolution are whether nonhuman primate signals should be conceived as referential, and what the role of social cognition is in primate communication. Current evidence suggests that the structure of primate vocalizations is largely innate and related to the affective/motivational state of the caller, with a probabilistic and underdetermined relationship between specific events and calls. Moreover, nonhuman primates do not appear to express or comprehend communicative or informative intent, which is in line with a lack of mental state attribution to others. We argue that nonhuman primate vocalizations as well as gestures should be best conceived as goal-directed, where signallers are sensitive to the relation between their signalling and receivers’ responses. Receivers in turn use signals to predict signaller behaviour. In combination with their ability to integrate information from multiple sources, this renders the system as a whole relatively powerful, despite the lack of higher-order intentionality on the side of sender or receiver.     

Two-levels of mental states attribution: from automaticity to voluntariness

In this paper, I introduce the hypothesis that there are two levels of mindreading. The first level refers to automatic-preconceptual phenomena that specify a primitive understanding of another person's mind. It is based on early-imitation, action and emotion recognition. The second level of mindreading is conceptual and voluntary. It is based on intentionality, empathy, and higher depths of reasoning. The activities in both levels are generated by internal simulative mechanisms. This hypothesis is based on human and nonhuman neuroscientific evidence.     

Action co-representation is tuned to other humans

The present study attempts to explore the process by which knowledge of another's intentional behavior in a joint-action scenario is represented through the action observation and execution network-also known as the common coding system. Participants (n = 18) were instructed to perform the complementary social Simon task under the implemented belief of interaction with either an unseen human (biological agent) or a computer program, where in fact, all response sequences from either "partner" were generated by computer. Results provide behavioral and neurophysiological evidence (P3 and S-LRP) that the believed intentionality of another person's actions is sufficient to facilitate a strong-enough agency-dependent social Simon effect to modulate action planning and anticipation. We suggest that the co-representation of human action may be an evolved biologically tuned default of the human motor system.     

Phénoménologie non intentionnelle et psychopathologie

The relations between phenomenology and psychopathology must be examined in an evolutionary perspective. Two distinct periods clearly stand out this way: a founding period and a contemporary period. The former period encompasses the works of E. Husserl, M. Heidegger and L. Binswanger. As for the contemporary period, it is characterized by a close connection and a convergence between the works of many phenomenologist psychiatrists and philosophers. This presentation will focus on the contemporary period and will aim at bringing to the fore a new trend in the relations between phenomenology and psychopathology, characterized by a closer, and thus more complex, reciprocity. Indeed, contemporary phenomenology takes into account and integrates the understanding of psychotic phenomena as far as to transform the sense of philosophy; it looks as if there were a break with the intentional phenomenology. According to Husserl, the consciousness is always consciousness of something, intentionality is a property of directedness towards an object. Not only do psychotic phenomena question the organisation of thinking, but also the constituent forms of experience, rooted in non intentional grounds. Three philosophers, Henri Maldiney, Marc Richir and Michel Henry, have renewed the non intentional approach of phenomenology. Recentering itself on the enigma of madness, philosophy makes it possible for psychiatry to reconsider mental illnesses which used to be dealt with only in terms of deficiencies. The reference to H. Maldiney will shed light on the human phenomenon seen at the crossing of the catastrophe and of the crisis. The issue of philosophical anthropology is then posed on the background, which is questioned and destabilized by the psychotic experience seen as an agonistic moment of derealisation and depersonalisation. The schizophrenic existence evades any constituent foundation of subjectivity and intentionality. The presentation of M. Richir's meditations will then lead us to redefine philosophy as a radical phenomenological epoche confronted with the abyss of the psychotic epoche. M. Richir re-enacts the Husserlian tradition, and in particular, the idea of genetic phenomenology, dealing with passive syntheses in which the body-of-flesh and the non intentional tonality come before the emergence of the consciousness. The last reference will be the work of M. Henry bases on philosophy of life and non intentional phenomenology; an opposed direction to Husserl will be taken by singling out pathos as an auto-affection of life. Pathos becomes the essential form of affect as condition for the actual existence, independent of intentionality. According to M. Henry, life never appears in the exteriority of the world, life's pure manifestation appears in its invisible interiority. The end-point of this phenomenology is the primitive suffering, thus the phenomenology of life concerns the qualitative aspects of psychopathological experiences bounded to a radical passivity. From the issue of psychosis, contemporary non intentional phenomenology carries out the theoretical, therapeutic and ethical consequences in the field of psychiatric research and practice.     

Index

The model of mind upon which Klein and Bion built their psychoanalytic theories profoundly limits an individual's access to the external world or other people. As a result, Klein and Bion posit the subject as imprisoned from the beginning of life in a solipsistic world of infantile phantasy. Such theories have paradoxically elevated the contents of the mind to a privileged status over perception, making what is in the mind even more “real” than the world as experienced, or relations with others. The mechanism of projective identification has been relied on to explain communication in the absence of a theory that permits anything we may today call “interaction.” Kleinian theory is contrasted with a relational orientation that emphasizes the primacy of immediate social relations in the constitution of the subject and as its source of freedom.     

Mental state attribution in schizophrenia: What distinguishes patients with “poor” from patients with “fair” mentalising skills?

PurposeAlthough many patients with schizophrenia are impaired in mental states attribution abilities, a significant number perform within normal or near-normal ranges in mental state attribution tasks. No studies have analysed cognitive or behavioural differences between patients with – to some extent – preserved mental state attribution skills and those with poor mentalising abilities.Material and methodsTo examine characteristics of “poor” and “fair” mentalisers, 58 patients with schizophrenia performed a mental state attribution task, a test of general intelligence, and two executive functioning tests. “Poor” and “fair” mentalising skills were defined according to a median-split procedure; the median score in the patient group was also within two standard deviations of the control group. In addition, patients’ social behavioural skills and psychopathological profiles were rated.ResultsPatients performing within normal or near normal ranges on the mental state attribution task had fewer social behavioural abnormalities than patients with poor mentalising abilities (even when controlled for intelligence), but did not differ in executive functioning. Fair mental state performers showed less disorganisation and excitement symptoms than poor performers. The degree of disorganisation mediated the influence of mental state attribution on social behavioural skills.ConclusionsSchizophrenia patients with (partially) preserved mentalising skills have fewer behavioural problems in the social domain than patients with poor mentalising abilities. Conceptual disorganisation mediates the prediction of social behavioural skills through mentalising skills, suggesting that disorganised patients may require special attention regarding social-cognitive skills training.     

The influence of manifest strabismus and stereoscopic vision on non-verbal abilities of visually impaired children

This research was conducted in order to examine the influence of manifest strabismus and stereoscopic vision on non-verbal abilities of visually impaired children aged between 7 and 15. The sample included 55 visually impaired children from the 1st to the 6th grade of elementary schools for visually impaired children in Belgrade. RANDOT stereotest and polaroid glasses were used for the examination of stereoscopic vision, while Cover test and Hirschberg's pupils reflex test were used for the evaluation of strabismus. In the area of non-verbal abilities was evaluated visual discrimination, visuomotor integration, constructive praxia, visual memory, strategy formation, non-verbal reasoning and the representational dimension of drawings. Subtests of ACADIA test of developmental abilities were used for the evaluation of non-verbal abilities (Atkinson et al., 1972). Statistically significant relations between strabismus and constructive praxia (p = 0.009), visual memory (p = 0.037), strategy formation (0.040) and the quality of drawings were determined by the results analysis. According to our findings, children with divergent strabismus achieve the best results. Children with stereoscopic vision generally achieve better results in all the examined areas of non-verbal abilities, and statistically significant relations were determined in the areas of visuomotor coordination (0.002), constructive praxia (0.026) and non-verbal reasoning (0.015), which are directly connected to visuospatial abilities. Children with convergent strabismus achieve significantly lower results in the areas of constructive praxia, visual memory, strategy formation and representational dimension of drawings, and children with the lack of stereoscopic vision - in the areas of visuomotor integration, constructive praxia and non-verbal reasoning.     

Rapid Extraction of the Spatial Distribution of Physical Saliency and Semantic Informativeness from Natural Scenes in the Human Brain

Physically salient objects are thought to attract attention in natural scenes. However, research has shown that meaning maps, which capture the spatial distribution of semantically informative scene features, trump physical saliency in predicting the pattern of eye moments in natural scene viewing. Meaning maps even predict the fastest eye movements, suggesting that the brain extracts the spatial distribution of potentially meaningful scene regions very rapidly. To test this hypothesis, we applied representational similarity analysis to ERP data. The ERPs were obtained from human participants (N = 32, male and female) who viewed a series of 50 different natural scenes while performing a modified 1-back task. For each scene, we obtained a physical saliency map from a computational model and a meaning map from crowd-sourced ratings. We then used representational similarity analysis to assess the extent to which the representational geometry of physical saliency maps and meaning maps can predict the representational geometry of the neural response (the ERP scalp distribution) at each moment in time following scene onset. We found that a link between physical saliency and the ERPs emerged first (∼78 ms after stimulus onset), with a link to semantic informativeness emerging soon afterward (∼87 ms after stimulus onset). These findings are in line with previous evidence indicating that saliency is computed rapidly, while also indicating that information related to the spatial distribution of semantically informative scene elements is computed shortly thereafter, early enough to potentially exert an influence on eye movements.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Attention may be attracted by physically salient objects, such as flashing lights, but humans must also be able to direct their attention to meaningful parts of scenes. Understanding how we direct attention to meaningful scene regions will be important for developing treatments for disorders of attention and for designing roadways, cockpits, and computer user interfaces. Information about saliency appears to be extracted rapidly by the brain, but little is known about the mechanisms that determine the locations of meaningful information. To address this gap, we showed people photographs of real-world scenes and measured brain activity. We found that information related to the locations of meaningful scene elements was extracted rapidly, shortly after the emergence of saliency-related information.     

Dissociation of cognitive from affective components of theory of mind in schizophrenia

Patients suffering from schizophrenia show impaired emotional and social behavior, such as misinterpretation of social situations and lack of theory of mind. However, there is conflicting evidence regarding their ability to perform on theory of mind tasks. Based on previous findings with patients suffering from prefrontal damage, the present study suggests that the behavioral deficit of schizophrenic patients may be due to impaired 'affective theory of mind' abilities, rather than to a general impairment in theory of mind. To test this hypothesis we assessed the ability of 22 schizophrenic patients and 55 age-matched healthy controls, to judge first and second order affective vs. cognitive mental state attribution, based on eye gaze. The relationships between negative and positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and affective and cognitive theory of mind were also assessed. Results indicated that while healthy controls made fewer errors on affective as compared to cognitive theory of mind conditions, schizophrenic patients showed a less prominent trend. Although the pattern of reaction time did not differ significantly between groups, the patients made significantly more errors in the affective conditions, as compared to controls. Furthermore, correlation analysis indicated that impaired affective theory of mind in these patients correlated with their level of negative symptoms. These results indicate that individuals with high level of negative symptoms of schizophrenia may demonstrate selective impairment in their ability to attribute affective mental states. These findings offer new insight into the affective facets of social behavior that may underlie the profound behavioral disturbances observed in schizophrenia.     

The current mind-brain theories in analytical philosophy of mind and their epistemic significance for psychiatry

This article begins with an orientational survey of the historical evolution of analytical philosophy of mind (APM) which was formulated in the last 40 years as "philosophy of mind" in the Anglo-Saxon scientific-cultural world and which, in the meantime, dominates to a great extent contemporary German philosophy. Then there follows a discussion of the currently most popular mind-brain theories in philosophy. In comparison to the more marginal dualist variants (interactionism, epiphenomenalism, parallelism), it is mainly the monistic positions of non-reductive, reductive and eliminative materialism and the materialist functionalism underlying it, which determines analytical philosophy of mind and its influence on psychopathology and psychiatry. Under the additional influence of modern brain research methods, particularly neuroimaging, it is progressively developing into a subdiscipline of neuroscience, a complex and increasingly more firmly established scientific discipline which comprises the totality of all sciences dealing with neuronal functions, including the close epistemic associations of APM and neuroimaging. This is the effective epistemic central idea determining the theory of the neuronal network which, in the form of a connectionist psychopathology, is intended to make possible a fundamentally new access to the comprehension of psychiatric forms of illness. In this respect it is evident, however, that the perception of the naturality of the mind as the fundamental thesis of APM and thus of connectionism cannot be followed through, since, up to now, neither from the phenomenality of the mind (especially the quality of senses, "Qualia") nor from intentionality of the mind (i. e. the ability to act intentionally, free from the constraint of the causality of nature and thus in self-responsible fashion) has proved it possible to reconstruct a generally accepted naturalist theory. Furthermore, it has not been possible to reformulate it in an exclusively physical, i. e. non-phenomenological concept and terminology which is, above all, free from the intentionality idiom. The consequence of this, however, is that a connectionist psychopathology can only represent a subpersonal, i. e., subhuman area and that in order to establish a personal psychopathology, naturalistic unreduced theories of experience-qualities and intentional acts of completeness are absolutely essential. The neuroscientific-connectionist paradigm of psychopathology must therefore - at least for the present - be supplement by the paradigm of a non-natural (e. g. phenomenological-hermeneutic) psychopathology. This result can only encourage the relinquishing of epistemically one-sided materialist and other monistic mind-brain theories of APM in favour of an epistemically open pragmatic interactionist dualism as the scientific position which best represents the current state of knowledge.