一种抗CPS控制层欺骗攻击的算法

信息物理系统(CPS)在原本的工控系统中加入了计算单元，使攻击者能够通过对该网络进行攻击。本文考虑攻击者通过恶意篡改信道中传输的传感器测量数据，使计算单元无法根据测量值对物理环境做出正确决策。通过改进针对CPS控制层欺骗攻击的卡尔曼滤波器算法，使改进后的算法对多种类型的欺骗攻击都有较好的检测性能，并能在一定程度上恢复被篡改的数据。本文使用改进算法对田纳西伊斯曼过程中反应釜内的压强测量值进行攻击检测，并与原算法进行比较，通过实验可以验证改进后算法对偏差型和几何型攻击的检测和恢复效果明显优于原算法。

An Algorithm Against Deception Attacks on CPS Control Layer

CPSs incorporate computation units into the original industrial control systems, which also enable attackers to launch attacks through the communication channels. This paper considers the problem that attackers maliciously tamper sensor measurements in the channels such that the computation unit cannot make right decisions based on these measurements. In order to detect such deception attacks on CPS control layer, an improved Kalman filter algorithm is proposed, which has a relatively better performance on detecting various deception attacks, and can recover the tampered data to some extent. The improved algorithm is utilized to detect the measurements of the reactor pressure in the Tennessee Eastman process. Besides, the results are also compared with those of the original algorithm. It shows through the experiments that the improved algorithm is superior to the original one in the detection and recover on bias and geometric attacks.