Reimbursement models to tackle market failures for antimicrobials: Approaches taken in France,Germany, Sweden,the United Kingdom,and the United States |
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Authors: | Dzintars Gotham Lorenzo Moja Maarten van der Heijden Sarah Paulin Ingrid Smith Peter Beyer |
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Institution: | 1. Independent Researcher, London, UK;2. Department of Coordination and Partnership on AMR, AMR Division, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211, Geneva, Switzerland;3. Department of Health Products Policy and Standards, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211, Geneva, Switzerland;4. Research and Development Department, Haukeland University Hospital, Bergen, Norway |
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Abstract: | IntroductionThe pipeline of new antibacterials remains limited. Reasons include low research investments, limited commercial prospects, and scientific challenges. To complement existing initiatives such as research grants, governments are exploring policy options for providing new market incentives to drug developers.Materials and methodsReimbursement interventions for antibacterials in France, Germany, Sweden, US, and UK were reviewed and analysed by the authors.ResultsIn France, Germany, and the US, implemented interventions centre on providing exceptions in cost-containment mechanisms to allow higher prices for certain antibacterials. In the US, also, certain antibacterials are granted additional years of protection from generic competition (exclusivity) and faster regulatory review. The UK is piloting a model that will negotiate contracts with manufacturers to pay a fixed annual fee for ongoing supply of as many units as needed. Sweden is piloting a model that will offer manufacturers of selected antibacterials contracts that would guarantee a minimum annual revenue. A similar model of guaranteed minimal annual revenues is under consideration in the US (PASTEUR Act).ConclusionsThe UK and Sweden are piloting entirely novel procurement and reimbursement models. Existing interventions in the US, France, and Germany represent important, but relatively minor interventions. More countries should explore the use of novel models and international coordination will be important for ‘pull’ incentives to be effective. If adopted, the PASTEUR legislation in the US would constitute a significant ‘pull’ incentive. |
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Keywords: | Antibacterials Antibiotics Antimicrobials Antimicrobial resistance Health economics Pharmaceutical development Pharmaceutical policy |
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