我国香烟生产消费的特点与增收香烟税

国际经验表明,增收香烟税是最有效的控烟手段之一。本文在肯定提高香烟税的必要性的基础上,总结了中国香烟生产和消费的特点,以及这些特点对于增收香烟税预期效果的影响,并针对这些问题提出相应的对策思路,以保证增收香烟税能够在最大程度上达到预期的效果。     

Moonshots,investment booms,and selection bias in the transmission of cultural traits

Biased information about the payoffs received by others can drive innovation, risk taking, and investment booms. We study this cultural phenomenon using a model based on two premises. The first is a tendency for large successes, and the actions that lead to them, to be more salient to onlookers than small successes or failures. The second premise is selection neglect—the failure of observers to adjust for biased observation. In our model, each firm in sequence chooses to adopt or to reject a project that has two possible payoffs, one positive and one negative. The probability of success is higher in the high state of the world than in the low state. Each firm observes the payoffs received by past adopters before making its decision, but there is a chance that an adopter’s outcome will be censored, especially if the payoff was negative. Failure to account for biased censorship causes firms to become overly optimistic, leading to irrational booms in adoption. Booms may eventually collapse, or may last forever. We describe these effects as a form of cultural evolution, with adoption or rejection viewed as traits transmitted between firms. Evolution here is driven not only by differential copying of successful traits, but also by cognitive reasoning about which traits are more likely to succeed—quantified using the Price Equation to decompose the effects of mutation pressure and evolutionary selection. This account provides an explanation for investment booms, merger and initial public offering waves, and waves of technological innovation.

We study how biases in social transmission of information about the actions and payoffs of others induce innovation and risk taking by firms. Our model is based on two premises. The first is the tendency for large successes, and the actions that led to them, to be more visible and salient to others than failures. For example, if 999 out of 1,000 small start-ups fail completely, and one grows to become as large and successful as Google, each of the failures, being small, is seldom noticed and remembered, whereas discussion of the huge success becomes ubiquitous. Successes tend to be more visible because they are associated with extensive continuing economic transactions, which garner attention, whereas failures tend to vanish.The second premise is the psychological phenomenon of selection neglect, the failure of observers to adjust for bias in the process that generates the data they observe.^* We apply these two premises to business initiatives, such as creating a start-up firm, undertaking a corporate “moonshot” or “sure bet” investment project, or making a large acquisition. We show that this evolutionary process can result in boom and bust dynamics, consistent with merger and initial public offering (IPO) waves, and sudden waves of innovative technological activity.In our setting, firms in sequence decide whether or not to undertake (adopt or reject) a risky project, based on observation of the actions and payoffs of previous firms. If the project is adopted, it yields one of two possible payoffs—a positive success payoff or a negative failure payoff. We assume biased censorship—a higher probability of observing successful projects and their outcomes than failed ones. Owing to selection neglect, a manager will have a biased assessment of the prospects of the project. We analyze how these factors shape boom/bust dynamics and long-term survival of different behaviors: adoption versus rejection of projects with different characteristics. We consider these dynamics in the context of cultural evolution of financial traits in a population of firms.The probability of project success is higher in the high state of the world than in the low state, such that the project is profitable in expectation only in the high state. Each firm observes payoff outcomes of predecessors, but there is some probability that any given adopter’s payoff is censored. If observers were rational, then in the long run, firms would adopt only if the state of the world were high. However, owing to selection neglect, later firms tend to become overly optimistic about the state of the world, so there can be a positive probability that all firms adopt in the low state. In this state, biased censorship can also exacerbate boom/bust dynamics, wherein a long string of adopts occurs before ultimate collapse.We view adoption or rejection of the risky project as a cultural trait transmitted between firms. We employ the Price Equation to decompose this trait’s evolution into a component due to natural selection and a component due to mutation. Surprisingly, despite the central role of selection bias in the evolution of project choice in the model, the predominant source of cultural change in our context is not natural selection, but, rather, mutation pressure. The importance of mutation during transmission differs sharply from cultural evolutionary models with biased imitation, in which there is only natural selection. This feature of our analysis highlights the role of cognitive reasoning in the cultural evolution of risk-taking behaviors.Our approach differs from a literature on entrepreneurship that assumes that entrepreneurs are exogenously overoptimistic. Beyond the conclusion of overadoption of projects, we derive implications about boom/bust dynamics and a variety of distinctive comparative statics predictions. More broadly, our analysis suggests that it is important to account for the psychology of attention and social interaction rather than solely of overconfidence.We are not the first to examine sequential social learning. For example, in the models of refs. 4 and 5, rational agents update their beliefs by observing the actions of predecessors. Owing to so-called information cascades, decisions are often mistaken, and social outcomes are fragile. The current paper differs from prior work by examining social learning from past payoffs as well as actions, the possibility of biased censorship of past observations, and imperfect rationality in the form of neglect of this selection bias. These features have distinctive consequences for boom–bust dynamics in investment choice.We are also not the first to examine selection bias and learning by firms. Denrell (6) also examines a setting in which observers neglect selection bias in the information they observe about firms. As in our model, failure is less likely to be observed than success. Denrell’s focus is on how this biases learning about the traits that are characteristic of the upper tail of successful firms, which he argues will disproportionately consist of variance-increasing strategies. So Denrell concludes that selection bias will cause the spread of risky and unreliable management practices.Our study differs in several ways. First, we focus on beliefs about the benefits of project adoption rather than about general managerial practices. Second, we allow for sequential choices and selection bias. In other words, we model explicitly how neglect of selection bias affects an arbitrary observer’s behavior, not just beliefs; and how the observer, in turn, becomes the target of observation for the next agent, and so forth. This allows us to study the implications of selection bias for the dynamics of investment booms and collapses. Third, our modeling allows us to analyze the evolutionary process by which behavioral traits are transmitted across agents in terms of selection and mutation pressure. Fourth, Denrell’s focus is on how differences in variance biases choices, whereas we analyze payoff asymmetry and show that greater moonshotness promotes project overadoption.Han et al. (7) examine a setting in which stock-market investors randomly meet to discuss their strategies, and the probability that an investor reports the investor’s return performance is increasing in return. An investor has an exogenous probability of copying another investor’s strategy that is increasing with reported return, if the investor receives a report. As a result, high-variance investing strategies spread through the population. Our focus here is on project choices by firms that update beliefs in a quasi-Bayesian fashion, based on sequential observation of a history of past payoffs by other firms. In contrast, in ref. 7, investors are randomly drawn to meet, and message receivers have an exogenous switching probability based upon the single observation during that meeting. Our study also differs in deriving boom/bust dynamics, comparative statics about moonshotness, and decomposition of outcomes into evolutionary components.     

物价变动对会计的影响及其对策——基于食品行业上市公司利润的影响分析

近年来,我国物价大幅度波动,影响了我国市场经济和企业发展的稳定性,同时对会计理论和实务造成较大冲击,进而对企业利润和财务报表产生了较大影响。本研究以双汇集团2007—2011年的财务报表数据为基础,将数据根据CPI值整理折算后进行比较分析,并通过相关性分析、因子分析、定性与定量分析相结合的分析方法来研究物价变动对企业利润产生的影响及原因。最后,根据分析结果,就如何消除物价变动对企业利润的影响,提出相应的建议和建设性对策。     

床边备用气管切开包不同包装材料的性价比分析研究

目的对比分析床边备用气管切开包不同包装材料的性价比,寻求性价比高的灭菌包装材料及包装方法。方法对气管切开包选用两组不同包装材料及包装方法：对照组为纸塑袋包装,实验组为无纺布包装（发放时加自封袋）。相同的灭菌方式,对比分析各自的使用成本和包装性能。结果两组包装材料的单次使用成本：对照组为3．35元,实验组为4．15元;但实验组在床边备用期间包装质量的合格率明显高于对照组,两组比较差异有显著意义（P〈0．05）。结论针对床边备用气管切开包其储存条件的不确定性,正确、合理地选择灭菌包装材料及包装方法极为重要;只有确保灭菌物品的包装质量及其连续稳定性,才能更好地保证灭菌质量、控制医院感染、维护医疗护理安全。     

Complex partial seizures and schizophrenia

The classical clinical features of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) and schizophrenia are described, the confusion about diagnosis in certain instances is illustrated with clinical case reports, and the significance of the relationship between TLE and schizophrenia is examined.     

Cost accounting methodologies in price setting of acute inpatient services in Hungary

On the basis of documentary analysis and interviews with decision makers, this paper discusses the cost accounting methodologies used for price setting of inpatient services in the Hungarian health care system focusing on sector of acute inpatient care, which is financed through the Hungarian adaptation of Diagnosis Related Groups since 1993. Hungary has a quite sophisticated DRG system, which had a deep impact on the efficiency of the acute inpatient care sector. Nevertheless, the system requires continuous maintenance, where the cooperation of hospitals, as well as the minimisation of political influence are critical success factors.     

Behavioral and psychophysiological correlates of the coronary-prone personality: New data and unanswered questions

Young male subjects, labeled Type A or Type B by means of the Bortner Scale and the Jenkins Activity Survey, first estimated the passage of five different intervals of time under one of three levels of distraction and then solved math and spelling problems. Autonomic nervous system activity was monitored while they performed these tasks. Results showed that Type A's under-estimated the passage of the longest time interval relative to Type B's, and had slower reaction times to the most difficult math problems. No physiological differences between Type A's and B's were found.