Mobile physician order entry

Because both computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems and mobile technologies such as handheld devices have the potential to greatly impact the industry's future, IT vendors, hospitals, and clinicians are simply merging them into a logical convergence--"CPOE on a handheld"--with an expectation of full functionality on all platforms: computer workstations, rolling laptops, tablet PCs, and handheld devices. For these trends to succeed together, however, this expectation must be revised to establish a distinct category--mobile physician order entry (MPOE)--that is different from CPOE in form, function, and implementation.     

Advertising and generic market entry

The effect of purely persuasive advertising on generic market entry and social welfare is analysed. An incumbent has the possibility to invest in advertising which affects the prescribing physician's perceived relative qualities of the brand-name and the generic version of the drug. Advertising creates product differentiation and can induce generic market entry which is deterred without differentiation due to strong Bertrand competition. However, over-investment in advertising can deter generic market entry under certain conditions and reduces welfare as compared to accommodated market entry.     

Alternative technologies and avoiding entry

Specialized equipment, changes to procedures, non-entry by design, and customized/creative approaches can eliminate or reduce the frequency of the need to enter confined spaces. Consider the new safety hazards that may be created, but always remember: The safest entry is no entry at all!     

Data entry on the run

An ambulance service in Louisiana equips medics with pen-tablet computers to speed collection of accurate and complete information.     

Reference pricing with endogenous generic entry

Reference pricing intends to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures by increasing demand elasticity and stimulating generic competition. We develop a novel model where a brand-name producer competes in prices with several generics producers in a market with brand-biased and brand-neutral consumers. Comparing with coinsurance, we show that reference pricing, contrary to policy makers’ intentions, discourages generic entry, as it induces the brand-name producer to price more aggressively. Thus, the net effect of reference pricing on drug prices is ambiguous, implying that reference pricing can be counterproductive in reducing expenditures. However, under price regulation, we show that reference pricing may stimulate generic entry, since a binding price cap weakens the aggressive price response by the brand-name producer. This may explain mixed empirical results on the competitive effects of reference pricing. Finally, we show that reference pricing may be welfare improving when accounting for brand preferences despite its adverse effects on entry and prices.     

A computerized dietary order entry system

The Dietary Order Entry System is a computerized system which instantaneously communicates orders/messages from the patient care units to the floor diet offices. The system also produces up-to-date management reports such as diet lists and diet census at pre-determined times and on demand. Dietary and nursing personnel believe it is an extremely beneficial system in terms of both increased accuracy of data and time savings in transmission of information. We believe that improved patient care will result from this improved method of diet ordering.