The Communication Infrastructure as a Social Determinant of Health: Implications for Health Policymaking and Practice

Policy Points

• Persistent communication inequalities limit racial/ethnic minority access to life‐saving health information and make them more vulnerable to the effects of misinformation.
•  Establishing data collection systems that detect and track acute gaps in the supply and/or access of racial/ethnic minority groups to credible health information is long overdue.
• Public investments and support for minority‐serving media and community outlets are needed to close persistent gaps in access to credible health information.

     

Long COVID and Health Inequities: The Role of Primary Care

Policy Points

• An estimated 700,000 people in the United States have “long COVID,” that is, symptoms of COVID‐19 persisting beyond three weeks.
• COVID‐19 and its long‐term sequelae are strongly influenced by social determinants such as poverty and by structural inequalities such as racism and discrimination.
• Primary care providers are in a unique position to provide and coordinate care for vulnerable patients with long COVID.
• Policy measures should include strengthening primary care, optimizing data quality, and addressing the multiple nested domains of inequity.

The pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated health inequities in both acute coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) and its longer‐term sequelae. ¹ , ² , ³ , ⁴ Symptoms of COVID‐19 persist in approximately one in 10 patients. ⁵ Acute symptoms include shortness of breath, cough, myalgias, disturbances in the sense of taste and smell, fatigue, fever, chills, and, less commonly, rhinitis and gastrointestinal symptoms. By contrast, the term “long COVID,” coined by patients, refers to both postacute symptoms (lasting more than three weeks) and chronic symptoms (lasting more than 12 weeks). ⁶ Long COVID is a multisystem disease of unknown cause whose manifestations, while partially overlapping the acute presentation, vary widely among patients and are exacerbated by comorbidities and vulnerabilities (Box 1). It occurs in adults who were hospitalized and those who were not ⁶ , ⁷ , ⁸ and (more rarely) in children. ⁹ At the time of this writing, the United States had more than 17 million diagnosed cases of COVID‐19, ¹⁰ , ¹¹ which translates into approximately 1,700,000 people with long COVID. This does not include the likely underreporting of COVID‐19 cases, the proportion of which in one study ranged from one in three to one in 406. ¹² The implications for health services are substantial. Given the heterogeneity in definitions of long COVID and the lack of centralized registries of patients with the disease, those who might suffer from long‐term symptoms might mistakenly be recorded as recovered.Box 1Some of the Many Manifestations of Long COVID ⁶ , ¹³ , ¹⁴ , ¹⁵

Effects of the COVID‐19 Emergency and National Lockdown on Italian Citizens’ Economic Concerns,Government Trust,and Health Engagement: Evidence From a Two‐Wave Panel Study

Policy Points

• Preventive measures such as the national lockdown in Italy have been effective in slowing the spread of COVID‐19. However, they also had psychological and economic impacts on people’s lives, which should not be neglected as they may reduce citizens’ trust and compliance with future health mandates.
• Engaging citizens in their own health management and in the collaboration with health care professionals and authorities via the adoption of a collaborative approach to health policy development is fundamental to fostering such measures’ effectiveness.
• Psychosocial analysis of citizens’ concerns and emotional reactions to preventive policies is important in order to plan personalized health communication campaigns.

ContextBecause of the COVID‐19 pandemic, between February 23 and March 8, 2020, some areas of Italy were declared “red zones,” with citizens asked to stay home and avoid unnecessary interpersonal contacts. Such measures were then extended, between March 10 and May 4, 2020, to the whole country. However, compliance with such behaviors had an important impact on citizens’ personal, psychological, and economic well‐being. This could result in reduced trust in authorities and lowered compliance. Keeping citizens engaged in their own health and in preventive behaviors is thus a key strategy for the success of such measures. This paper presents the results from a study conducted in Italy to monitor levels of people’s health engagement, sentiment, trust in authorities, and perception of risk at two different time points.MethodsTwo independent samples (n = 968 and n = 1,004), weighted to be representative of the adult Italian population, were recruited in two waves corresponding to crucial moments of the Italian COVID‐19 epidemic: between February 28 and March 4 (beginning of “phase 1,” after the first regional lockdowns), and between May 12 and May 18 (beginning of “phase 2,” after the national lockdown was partially dismissed). Respondents were asked to complete an online survey with a series of both validated measures and ad hoc items. A series of t‐tests, general linear models, and contingency tables were carried out to assess if and how our measures changed over time in different social groups.FindingsAlthough sense of self and social responsibility increased between the two waves, and trust toward authorities remained substantially the same, trust in science, consumer sentiment, and health engagement decreased. Our results showed that while both the level of general concern for the emergency and the perceived risk of infection increased between the two waves, in the second wave our participants reported being more concerned for the economic consequences of the pandemic than the health risk.ConclusionsThe potentially disruptive psychological impact of lockdown may hamper citizens’ compliance with, and hence the effectiveness of, behavioral preventive measures. This suggests that preventive measures should be accompanied by collaborative educational plans aimed at promoting people’s health engagement by making citizens feel they are partners in the health preventive endeavor and involved in the development of health policies.     

Allocating a COVID‐19 Vaccine: Balancing National and International Responsibilities

Policy Points

• In this paper we propose a middle‐ground policy for the distribution of an effective COVID‐19 vaccine, between a cosmopolitan approach that rejects entirely nation‐state priority and unbridled vaccine nationalism that disregards obligations to promote an equitable global allocation of an effective vaccine over time.
• Features of the COVAX partnership, a collaboration among the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), and the World Health Organization (WHO) to develop and distribute COVID‐19 vaccines make it an appropriate framework for a middle‐ground policy.

More than 100 vaccine candidates are now in development to prevent infection from SARS‐CoV2 or serious disease from COVID‐19; many have entered clinical trials; and several are in or ready for Phase III efficacy testing. Two mRNA vaccines have been found to be more than 90% effective based on interim data analysis. The identification and development of vaccine candidates has been an extremely fast process, because of the urgent need for a vaccine to control the pandemic. In addition, when effective vaccines are identified, logistical challenges must be faced, as it will take time to produce enough to cover the world''s population. At least for the first couple of years, the demand will be much higher than the supply, and not everyone who needs a vaccine will get one. Because low‐income countries are likely to lose out in the scramble to get access to the vaccine, there have been calls for global solidarity. For example, the Group of 20 (G20), consisting of countries with the largest economies, issued the following statement: “We will expand manufacturing capacity to meet the increasing needs for medical supplies and ensure these are made widely available, at an affordable price, on an equitable basis, where they are most needed and as quickly as possible.” ¹ But there are worries that these are only empty promises. Even though the G20 statement emphasizes an equitable distribution of medical supplies, it does not actually commit funds to the poorest countries for supplies, including a global distribution of an effective vaccine; it recommends only capacity building and technical assistance and commits only to “mobilize” funds.

We are gravely concerned with the serious risks posed to all countries, particularly developing and least developed countries, and notably in Africa and small island states, where health systems and economies may be less able to cope with the challenge, as well as the particular risk faced by refugees and displaced persons. We consider that consolidating Africa''s health defense is a key for the resilience of global health. We will strengthen capacity building and technical assistance, especially to at‐risk communities. We stand ready to mobilize development and humanitarian financing. ¹

In the race to develop an effective vaccine, many experts have called for a more coordinated global approach, in which individual countries agree to abandon their national interest in securing vaccines for their own populations and hand over the responsibility to distribute the vaccine globally based on need. A group of bioethicists proposed what they term the “Fair Priority Model,” advocating vaccine distribution in three phases. ² The first phase would be devoted to reducing premature deaths and irreversible direct and indirect health impacts; the second to reducing serious economic and social deprivations; and the third to reducing community transmission. They argue that all countries should go through the three phases “approximately simultaneously.” In this model, the distribution principles are based strictly on medical and economic criteria that identify the effects of the vaccine and wealthy countries would not receive the vaccine earlier just because they have the resources to buy it.Another influential approach, proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO), similarly envisages a distribution scheme in which the vaccines are distributed to countries based on the number of high‐risk groups in each country. A country should first obtain enough vaccine to cover frontline health care workers, covering 3% of the highest‐risk individuals first and then continue with other high‐risk groups such as the elderly and people with comorbidities, until 20% of each country''s population has been covered.Both the Fair Priority Model and the WHO proposal seem to disregard the relevance of national borders; that is, all countries should receive a supply of vaccines simultaneously in accordance with country‐independent criteria. Here we argue that both these approaches are untenable and that national governments have both a right and a duty to secure access to a COVID‐19 vaccine for their citizens first. Accordingly, we propose a middle‐ground policy perspective based on two premises: (1) a “cosmopolitan” approach that rejects entirely nation‐state priority is not only unrealistic but also fails to recognize that countries have a legitimate responsibility to give priority to their own citizens and residents; and (2) unbridled vaccine nationalism, without an adequately funded effort to ensure the equitable global allocation of an effective vaccine over time, is unethical and likely to be counterproductive.We present three interdependent arguments for our position. First, we believe that a prioritization framework should include a distribution scheme that can be implemented, rather than one that simply proposes general principles of distribution. Second, any viable prioritization scheme needs to start with nation‐states’ responsibility to secure the health of their populations. Third, appropriate weight needs to be given to national obligations of international assistance for low‐income countries to mobilize resources for health. We argue that the COVAX partnership provides a framework that approximates the right balance between national responsibilities for health and international commitments to global justice.     

Medicare Advantage for Most

Policy Points

• Fixing the ACA requires real cost containment in addition to better subsidies.
• Private Medicare (Medicare Advantage) plans are uniquely empowered to control costs and deliver good care.
• Medicare Advantage plans should serve as the public option on the ACA Marketplace.
• Medicare Advantage plans can also be deployed to voluntarily raise minimum employer‐sponsored benefits and contain their costs.

Covid‐19 highlights one of the major problems with America''s hybrid arrangement for financing health care. While the Affordable Care Act (ACA) improved financial access and reduced racial disparities in coverage, ¹ , ² it has proved inadequate in the face of the pandemic''s disruption of employer‐sponsored insurance (ESI). The number of uninsured persons, almost 30 million in 2019, jumped by 5 million or more in spring 2020. ³ , ⁴ The ACA also cannot do much to control private health care spending. As deductibles and coinsurance rise, tens of millions of insured Americans face a growing share of rising total costs. In 2018, an estimated 42% of those with individual insurance and 28% of those with ESI met the Commonwealth Fund''s definition of underinsurance. ⁵ Decreasing coverage, climbing costs, and the mounting public anxiety about both may well reenergize serious health reform. When the legislative standoff that has blocked improvements to the ACA ends, reform should not only improve enrollment and benefits but actually make care affordable, that is, both adequately subsidize decent coverage and control the total cost of care. Fortunately, the foundation has been laid for ambitious reform without major disruptions.Although the ACA established a framework for achieving near‐universal coverage, premium subsidies have not been adequate, and counterattacks by Republicans have dented the structure. Linda Blumberg and her colleagues at the Urban Institute proposed a package of fixes for the ACA, ⁶ many of which have been incorporated into both HR 1425, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Enhancement Act, and President‐elect Joe Biden''s campaign proposals. ⁷ The ACA''s expansion of Medicaid eligibility has proven very effective in the 34 states that are participating. ⁸ With sophisticated ballot campaigns for Medicaid expansion in 10 holdout states—some of which have already succeeded—and full federal funding for states newly expanding Medicaid, millions more people would be cut from the uninsurance rolls. ⁹ , ¹⁰ To make the ACA''s Marketplace coverage decent and premiums affordable, Blumberg and colleagues propose increasing the ACA''s premium tax credits so that no household would pay a premium of more than 8.5% of their income for the benchmark plan and increasing that benchmark from covering 70% to covering 80% of expected claims. They would also restore tax penalties for the individual mandate and add a federal reinsurance program, autoenrollment, and a public option.The incremental federal outlays for these fixes would be relatively modest. Blumberg and colleagues estimate that these enhancements (Scenario 4) would have increased 2020 federal outlays by $45.6 billion. ¹¹ The Congressional Budget Office''s projection for HR 1425 is slightly higher, nearly six hundred billion over 10 years. ¹² As Sherry Glied pointed out, “What is impressive is how far these relatively modest proposals could take us . . . bring[ing] the national uninsurance rate among non‐elderly legal residents of the US down to 3.1 percent, counting those eligible for Medicaid as effectively insured.” ¹³ Controlling health care spending is a tougher challenge, one that has eluded US health policy for more than a half century. However, as I describe later, Medicare Advantage could be deployed to invite most privately insured Americans into good, truly affordable coverage without disrupting existing sources of employer funding. To understand how, it is important to recognize that Medicare is no longer simply a public program but a hybrid that includes a robust private segment, Medicare Advantage (MA) health plans. MA plans now cover 36% of beneficiaries, continue to grow rapidly, ¹⁴ and offer many of the advantages of social insurance with considerably more flexibility. They could be adapted to enlarge benefits and provide a peculiarly American response to relentlessly rising health care costs.     

The Commercial Determinants of Three Contemporary National Crises: How Corporate Practices Intersect With the COVID‐19 Pandemic,Economic Downturn,and Racial Inequity

Policy Points

•  The United States finds itself in the middle of an unprecedented combination of crises: a global pandemic, economic crisis, and unprecedented civic responses to structural racism.
•  While public sector responses to these crises have faced much justified criticism, the commercial determinants of these crises have not been sufficiently examined.
•  In this commentary we examine the nature of the contributions of such actors to the conditions that underpin these crises in the United States through their market and nonmarket activities.
•  On the basis of this analysis, we make recommendations on the role of governance and civil society in relation to such commercial actors in a post‐COVID‐19 world.

The united states finds itself amid three concurrent and interrelated crises. First, at the time of writing, the United States has reported more than 27 million confirmed COVID‐19 cases and more than 500,000 Americans have lost their lives. ¹ Second, in part as a consequence of the physical distancing measures enacted to slow the spread of the pandemic, the United States has faced record unemployment, a rise in the number of Americans unable to afford medical insurance, an end to federal support measures, and an uncertain economic outlook. According to the US Department of Labor, more than 50 million Americans have filed for unemployment benefits since the COVID‐19 pandemic started; more than 10 million Americans remain on state unemployment benefits. ² Third, the country is still contending with how to respond to mass civil protests in 2020 unlike any seen in half a century, triggered by the killing of George Floyd at the hands of police in Minneapolis. This civil unrest reflects centuries of structural racism and has brought unprecedented attention to this problem. ³ , ⁴ , ⁵ In each of these three concurrent crises, the pandemic, ongoing large‐scale unemployment, and civil protests, ⁶ the US federal response has been criticized as being delayed and poorly coordinated, involving downplaying the threat posed by the pandemic and building on longer‐term failures by previous administrations to make investments in public goods that may have facilitated a more robust and effective collective response.By contrast, it would appear that some of the largest entities in corporate America have responded more rapidly to each of the ongoing crises than the federal government has. A number of large companies have engaged in activities that responded to needs emerging from the pandemic, such as producing hand sanitizer, ⁷ setting up COVID‐19 testing sites, ⁸ and partnering on contact tracing. ⁹ Most notably, the pharmaceutical sector has contributed to an unexpectedly and unquestionably successful vaccine development process for SARS‐CoV‐2, with almost 200 million shots already distributed. ¹⁰ In response to the economic downturn, many companies have been adapting their business practices to supply essential services in a time of great disruption. For example, food and other essential businesses have largely kept supply chains for essential goods open, ¹¹ through extending working hours, hiring additional staff, and implementing new means of operating. Several large employers have responded to changing circumstance, aiming to keep as many employees working as possible, often through an embrace of remote working and implementing more permanent shifts into patterns of working. ¹² In response to the global protests around structural racism that erupted in 2020, a number of large companies, including Nike, Reebok, Twitter, and Citigroup, have publicly aligned themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement, ¹³ including committing more than a billion dollars in pledged donations. ¹⁴ In a moment of great national turmoil, when government seems not up to the task, private sector actors have appeared, by contrast, to be better positioned to address the three crises of the moment. This plays neatly into a private sector–centric narrative, and there is little question that much good has come from elements of the private sector during this time.It is certainly true that these visible private sector efforts have contributed to helping populations deal with the consequences of an unprecedented global pandemic. But, given the emerging evidence about the populations at risk for COVID‐19, and why that risk exists to begin with, it is legitimate to ask: in the case of COVID‐19, what was the contribution of the private sector in creating the conditions that made us vulnerable to the pandemic and its consequences to begin with? And, by extension, how can private sector actions align with a durable set of solutions to the crises that characterize this moment?We already know that large, consolidated corporate entities, particularly those that manufacture harmful products, can have profound effects on population health. ¹⁵ , ¹⁶ , ¹⁷ The most obvious way in which this manifests is through “market activity,” that is, the direct consequences of manufacturing and marketing particular products. For example, it is easy to recognize that marketing of cigarettes harms health. However, such actors also influence population health through a range of “nonmarket” activities that shape the political, social, and cultural environments that they operate in. ¹⁸ Examples of this activity include political donations, lobbying, corporate social responsibility initiatives, and legal activity. These activities, often seen as intrinsic to corporate practice, support and protect commercial interests, yet do not necessarily promote population health or structures of governance. Bearing this in mind, it is worth understanding how such activities, both market and nonmarket, have contributed to the vulnerability of the United States to the three crises we now face.     

Ethical and Legal Implications of Remote Monitoring of Medical Devices

Policy Points

• Millions of life‐sustaining implantable devices collect and relay massive amounts of digital health data, increasingly by using user‐downloaded smartphone applications to facilitate data relay to clinicians via manufacturer servers.
• Our analysis of health privacy laws indicates that most US patients may have little access to their own digital health data in the United States under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule, whereas the EU General Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act grant greater access to device‐collected data.
• Our normative analysis argues for consistently granting patients access to the raw data collected by their implantable devices.

ContextMillions of life‐sustaining implantable devices collect and relay massive amounts of digital health data, increasingly by using user‐downloaded smartphone applications to facilitate data relay to clinicians via manufacturer servers. Whether patients have either legal or normative claims to data collected by these devices, particularly in the raw, granular format beyond that summarized in their medical records, remains incompletely explored.MethodsUsing pacemakers and implantable cardioverter‐defibrillators (ICDs) as a clinical model, we outline the clinical ecosystem of data collection, relay, retrieval, and documentation. We consider the legal implications of US and European privacy regulations for patient access to either summary or raw device data. Lastly, we evaluate ethical arguments for or against providing patients access to data beyond the summaries presented in medical records.FindingsOur analysis of applicable health privacy laws indicates that US patients may have little access to their raw data collected and held by device manufacturers in the United States under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Privacy Rule, whereas the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) grants greater access to device‐collected data when the processing of personal data falls under the GDPR''s territorial scope. The California Consumer Privacy Act, the “little sister” of the GDPR, also grants greater rights to California residents. By contrast, our normative analysis argues for consistently granting patients access to the raw data collected by their implantable devices. Smartphone applications are increasingly involved in the collection, relay, retrieval, and documentation of these data. Therefore, we argue that smartphone user agreements are an emerging but potentially underutilized opportunity for clarifying both legal and ethical claims for device‐derived data.ConclusionsCurrent health privacy legislation incompletely supports patients’ normative claims for access to digital health data.     

Dark Nudges and Sludge in Big Alcohol: Behavioral Economics,Cognitive Biases,and Alcohol Industry Corporate Social Responsibility

Policy Points

• Nudges steer people toward certain options but also allow them to go their own way. “Dark nudges” aim to change consumer behavior against their best interests. “Sludge” uses cognitive biases to make behavior change more difficult.
• We have identified dark nudges and sludge in alcohol industry corporate social responsibility (CSR) materials. These undermine the information on alcohol harms that they disseminate, and may normalize or encourage alcohol consumption.
• Policymakers and practitioners should be aware of how dark nudges and sludge are used by the alcohol industry to promote misinformation about alcohol harms to the public.

Context“Nudges” and other behavioral economic approaches exploit common cognitive biases (systematic errors in thought processes) in order to influence behavior and decision‐making. Nudges that encourage the consumption of harmful products (for example, by exploiting gamblers’ cognitive biases) have been termed “dark nudges.” The term “sludge” has also been used to describe strategies that utilize cognitive biases to make behavior change harder. This study aimed to identify whether dark nudges and sludge are used by alcohol industry (AI)–funded corporate social responsibility (CSR) organizations, and, if so, to determine how they align with existing nudge conceptual frameworks. This information would aid their identification and mitigation by policymakers, researchers, and civil society.MethodsWe systematically searched websites and materials of AI CSR organizations (e.g., IARD, Drinkaware, Drinkwise, Éduc''alcool); examples were coded by independent raters and categorized for further analysis.FindingsDark nudges appear to be used in AI communications about “responsible drinking.” The approaches include social norming (telling consumers that “most people” are drinking) and priming drinkers by offering verbal and pictorial cues to drink, while simultaneously appearing to warn about alcohol harms. Sludge, such as the use of particular fonts, colors, and design layouts, appears to use cognitive biases to make health‐related information about the harms of alcohol difficult to access, and enhances exposure to misinformation. Nudge‐type mechanisms also underlie AI mixed messages, in particular alternative causation arguments, which propose nonalcohol causes of alcohol harms.ConclusionsAlcohol industry CSR bodies use dark nudges and sludge, which utilize consumers’ cognitive biases to promote mixed messages about alcohol harms and to undermine scientific evidence. Policymakers, practitioners, and the public need to be aware of how such techniques are used to nudge consumers toward industry misinformation. The revised typology presented in this article may help with the identification and further analysis of dark nudges and sludge.     

Is Obesity Policy in England Fit for Purpose? Analysis of Government Strategies and Policies, 1992–2020

Policy Points

• This analysis finds that government obesity policies in England have largely been proposed in a way that does not readily lead to implementation; that governments rarely commission evaluations of previous government strategies or learn from policy failures; that governments have tended to adopt less interventionist policy approaches; and that policies largely make high demands on individual agency, meaning they rely on individuals to make behavior changes rather than shaping external influences and are thus less likely to be effective or equitable.
• These findings may help explain why after 30 years of proposed government obesity policies, obesity prevalence and health inequities still have not been successfully reduced.
• If policymakers address the issues identified in this analysis, population obesity could be tackled more successfully, which has added urgency given the COVID‐19 pandemic.

ContextIn England, the majority of adults, and more than a quarter of children aged 2 to 15 years live with obesity or excess weight. From 1992 to 2020, even though the government published 14 obesity strategies in England, the prevalence of obesity has not been reduced. We aimed to determine whether such government strategies and policies have been fit for purpose regarding their strategic focus, nature, basis in theory and evidence, and implementation viability.MethodWe undertook a mixed‐methods study, involving a document review and analysis of government strategies either wholly or partially dedicated to tackling obesity in England. We developed a theory‐based analytical framework, using content analysis and applied thematic analysis (ATA) to code all policies. Our interpretation drew on quantitative findings and thematic analysis.FindingsWe identified and analyzed 14 government strategies published from 1992 to 2020 containing 689 wide‐ranging policies. Policies were largely proposed in a way that would be unlikely to lead to implementation; the majority were not interventionist and made high demands on individual agency, meaning that they relied on individuals to make behavior changes rather than shaping external influences, and are thus less likely to be effective or to reduce health inequalities.ConclusionsThe government obesity strategies’ failure to reduce the prevalence of obesity in England for almost 30 years may be due to weaknesses in the policies’ design, leading to a lack of effectiveness, but they may also be due to failures of implementation and evaluation. These failures appear to have led to insufficient or no policy learning and governments proposing similar or identical policies repeatedly over many years. Governments should learn from their earlier policy failures. They should prioritize policies that make minimal demands on individuals and have the potential for population‐wide reach so as to maximize their potential for equitable impacts. Policies should be proposed in ways that readily lead to implementation and evaluation.     

The Structure and Financing of Health Care Systems Affected How Providers Coped With COVID‐19

Policy Points

• We compared the structure of health care systems and the financial effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic on health care providers in the United States, England, Germany, and Israel: systems incorporating both public and private insurers and providers.
• The negative financial effects on health care providers have been more severe in the United States than elsewhere, owing to the prevalence of activity‐based payment systems, limited direct governmental control over available provider capacity, and the structure of governmental financial relief.
• In a pandemic, activity‐based payment reverses the conventional financial positions of payers and providers and may prevent providers from prioritizing public health because of the desire to avoid revenue loss caused by declines in patient visits.

Financial distress in the health care sector is a nonintuitive consequence of a pandemic. Yet, in the United States, the budgets of health care providers are under considerable strain as the COVID‐19 pandemic continues.Analysts anticipate that these continuing financial challenges will generate a wave of consolidation among hospitals and physician practices through 2021. ¹ Critical access hospitals, hospitals serving vulnerable populations, and independent primary care practices are particularly threatened. ² , ³ These dire financial outcomes arose through the interaction of the public health measures taken in response to the COVID‐19 epidemic, particularly the shutdown of elective procedures, along with the underlying structure of US health care financing and the US government''s emergency response.But COVID‐19 is a global epidemic. The twin effects of COVID‐19 treatment and reduced non‐COVID treatment have dramatically changed the number and case mix of patients treated in similar ways across high‐income countries. In all countries, the number of acutely ill patients with COVID rose while the number of patients with other conditions fell. The effects of these changes on health care providers’ finances have varied, however, depending on how health care systems are ordinarily structured and financed and to what extent government actions protected health care providers. By comparing the financial effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic in the United States and three other health care systems (England, Germany, and Israel) that incorporate both public and private insurers and providers, we can identify the governmental and policy factors that contributed to the severity and distribution of the effects of COVID‐19 on US providers.In all four countries, the impacts of COVID on the utilization of health care were similar. During infection surges, the number of COVID patients stressed hospitals, and as a result, nonurgent services for non‐COVID patients were postponed or forgone. The governments of all four countries directly supported health care providers with funding for increased COVID‐related expenditures (such as for personal protective equipment). The governments of all four countries also protected and compensated health care providers for their financial losses, but they did so in different ways, reflecting the structure of their health systems. In Israel, which uses relatively little activity‐based financing, the government saw less need for dedicated financial assistance. The governments of Germany and England shifted the form of payment away from activity‐based financing toward budgets to provide financial protection to health care providers, particularly in hospitals. Finally, in the United States, where activity‐based payment is prevalent and the health care–financing system is far too fragmented to permit a rapid switch in the method of payment, the government directly compensated providers for lost revenue.     

Population Health Science: Fulfilling the Mission of Public Health

Policy Points

• The historical mission of public health is to ensure the conditions in which people can be healthy, and yet the field of public health has been distracted from this mission by an excessive reliance on randomized‐control trials, a lack of formal theoretical models, and a fear of politics.
• The field of population health science has emerged to rigorously address all of these constraints. It deserves ongoing and formal institutional support.

The united states is failing in population health. life expectancy in the United States is falling for the first time since reliable mortality records have been available, and health equity has been on a downward trend for decades. ¹ Why is the United States, among the richest countries in the world, failing to protect the health of its residents? A dysfunctional medical system that pays for sickness rather than wellness is certainly part of the problem, but so is confusion about the role of public health in the United States.     

Rapid Transition to Telehealth and the Digital Divide: Implications for Primary Care Access and Equity in a Post‐COVID Era

Policy Points

• Telehealth has many potential advantages during an infectious disease outbreak such as the COVID‐19 pandemic, and the COVID‐19 pandemic has accelerated the shift to telehealth as a prominent care delivery mode.
• Not all health care providers and patients are equally ready to take part in the telehealth revolution, which raises concerns for health equity during and after the COVID‐19 pandemic.
• Without proactive efforts to address both patient‐ and provider‐related digital barriers associated with socioeconomic status, the wide‐scale implementation of telehealth amid COVID‐19 may reinforce disparities in health access in already marginalized and underserved communities.
• To ensure greater telehealth equity, policy changes should address barriers faced overwhelmingly by marginalized patient populations and those who serve them.

ContextThe COVID‐19 pandemic has catalyzed fundamental shifts across the US health care delivery system, including a rapid transition to telehealth. Telehealth has many potential advantages, including maintaining critical access to care while keeping both patients and providers safe from unnecessary exposure to the coronavirus. However, not all health care providers and patients are equally ready to take part in this digital revolution, which raises concerns for health equity during and after the COVID‐19 pandemic.MethodsThe study analyzed data about small primary care practices’ telehealth use and barriers to telehealth use collected from rapid‐response surveys administered by the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene''s Bureau of Equitable Health Systems and New York University from mid‐April through mid‐June 2020 as part of the city''s efforts to understand how primary care practices were responding to the COVID‐19 pandemic following New York State''s stay‐at‐home order on March 22. We focused on small primary care practices because they represent 40% of primary care providers and are disproportionately located in low‐income, minority or immigrant areas that were more severely impacted by COVID‐19. To examine whether telehealth use and barriers differed based on the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities served by these practices, we used the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) to stratify respondents as being in high‐SVI or low‐SVI areas. We then characterized respondents’ telehealth use and barriers to adoption by using means and proportions with 95% confidence intervals. In addition to a primary analysis using pooled data across the five waves of the survey, we performed sensitivity analyses using data from respondents who only took one survey, first wave only, and the last two waves only.FindingsWhile all providers rapidly shifted to telehealth, there were differences based on community characteristics in both the primary mode of telehealth used and the types of barriers experienced by providers. Providers in high‐SVI areas were almost twice as likely as providers in low‐SVI areas to use telephones as their primary telehealth modality (41.7% vs 23.8%; P <.001). The opposite was true for video, which was used as the primary telehealth modality by 18.7% of providers in high‐SVI areas and 33.7% of providers in low‐SVI areas (P <0.001). Providers in high‐SVI areas also faced more patient‐related barriers and fewer provider‐related barriers than those in low‐SVI areas.ConclusionsBetween April and June 2020, telehealth became a prominent mode of primary care delivery in New York City. However, the transition to telehealth did not unfold in the same manner across communities. To ensure greater telehealth equity, policy changes should address barriers faced overwhelmingly by marginalized patient populations and those who serve them.     

Educational Inequalities in Hospital Use Among Older Adults in England, 2004-2015

Policy Points

• US policymakers considering proposals to expand public health care (such as “Medicare for all”) as a means of reducing inequalities in health care access and use could learn from the experiences of nations where well‐funded universal health care systems are already in place.
• In England, which has a publicly funded universal health care system, the use of core inpatient services by adults 65 years and older is equal across groups defined by education level, after controlling for health status. However, variation among these groups in the use of outpatient and emergency department care developed between 2010 and 2015, a period of relative financial austerity.
• Based on England''s experience, introducing universal health care in the United States seems likely to reduce, but not entirely eliminate, inequalities in health care use across different population groups.

ContextExpanding access to health care is once again high on the US political agenda, as is concern about those who are being “left behind.” But is universal health care that is largely free at the point of use sufficient to eliminate inequalities in health care use? To explore this question, we studied variation in the use of hospital care among education‐level‐defined groups of older adults in England, before and after controlling for differences in health status. In England, the National Health Service (NHS) provides health care free to all, but the growth rate for NHS funding has slowed markedly since 2010 during a widespread austerity program, potentially increasing inequalities in access and use.MethodsNovel linkage of data from six waves (2004‐2015) of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) with participants’ hospital records (Hospital Episode Statistics [HES]) produced longitudinal data for 7,713 older adults (65 years and older) and 25,864 observations. We divided the sample into three groups by education level: low (no formal qualifications), mid (completed compulsory education), and high (at least some higher education). Four outcomes were examined: annual outpatient appointments, elective inpatient admissions, emergency inpatient admissions, and emergency department (ED) visits. We estimated regressions for the periods 2004‐2005 to 2008‐2009 and 2010‐2011 to 2014‐2015 to examine whether potential education‐related inequalities in hospital use increased after the growth rate for NHS funding slowed in 2010.FindingsFor the study period, our sample of ELSA respondents in the low‐education group made 2.44 annual outpatient visits. In comparison, after controlling for health status, we found that participants in the high‐education group made an additional 0.29 outpatient visits annually (95% confidence interval [CI], 0.11‐0.47). Additional outpatient health care use in the high‐education group was driven by follow‐up and routine appointments. This inequality widened after 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, individuals in the high‐education group made 0.48 (95% CI, 0.21‐0.74) more annual outpatient visits than those in the low‐education (16.9% [7.5% to 26.2%] of annual average 2.82 visits). In contrast, after 2010, the high‐education group made 0.04 (95% CI, −0.075 to 0.001) fewer annual ED visits than the low‐education group, which had a mean of 0.30 annual ED visits. No significant differences by education level were found for elective or emergency inpatient admissions in either period.ConclusionsAfter controlling for demographics and health status, there was no evidence of inequality in elective and emergency inpatient admissions among the education groups in our sample. However, a period of financial budget tightening for the NHS after 2010 was associated with the emergence of education gradients in other forms of hospital care, with respondents in the high‐education group using more outpatient care and less ED care than peers in the low‐education group. These estimates point to rising inequalities in the use of hospital care that, if not reversed, could exacerbate existing health inequalities in England. Although the US and UK settings differ in many ways, our results also suggest that a universal health care system would likely reduce inequality in US health care use.     

Weathering in Detroit: Place,Race, Ethnicity,and Poverty as Conceptually Fluctuating Social Constructs Shaping Variation in Allostatic Load

Policy Points

• Despite 30 years of attention to eliminating population health inequity, it remains entrenched, calling for new approaches.
• Targeted universalism, wellness‐based local development, and Jedi Public Health approaches that are community informed, evidence based, and focused on improving everyday settings and diverse lived experiences are important policy directions.
• State and federal revenue transfers are necessary to mitigate the harms of austerity and assure greater equity in fiscal and population health in places like Detroit, Michigan.

ContextUS population health inequity remains entrenched, despite mandates to eliminate it. To promote a public health approach of consequence in this domain, stakeholders call for moving from risk‐factor epidemiology toward consideration of dynamic local variations in the physiological impacts of structured lived experience.MethodsUsing a community‐based, participatory research approach, we collected and analyzed a unique data set of 239 black, white, and Mexican adults from a stratified, multistage probability sample of three Detroit, Michigan, neighborhoods. We drew venous blood, collected saliva, took anthropometric measurements, and assayed specimens to measure allostatic load (AL), an indicator of stress‐mediated biological dysregulation, linking participants’ AL scores and survey responses. In a series of nested Poisson models, we regressed AL on socioeconomic, psychosocial, neighborhood, and behavioral stressors to test the hypothesis that race/ethnicity and poverty‐to‐income ratio (PIR) are conceptually fluctuating variables whose impacts on AL are sensitive to structured lived experience.FindingsWhite and Mexican Detroit participants with PIR < 1 have higher AL than counterparts nationally; black participants in Detroit and nationwide had comparable AL. Within Detroit, disparities by PIR were higher in whites than blacks, with no significant difference by PIR in Mexicans. The size of estimated effects of having PIR < 1 for whites is 58 percentage points greater than that of Mexicans and twice that of blacks.ConclusionsStructurally rooted unobserved heterogeneity bias threatens the validity of independent main effects interpretations of associations between race/ethnicity, socioeconomic characteristics, or place and health. One‐size‐fits‐all analytic or policy models developed from the perspective of the dominant social group insufficiently address the experiences of diverse populations in specific settings and historical moments; nor do they recognize culturally mediated protective resources residents may have developed against material and psychosocial hardship.     

Our Postpandemic World: What Will It Take to Build a Better Future for People and Planet?

Policy Points

• Despite the pandemic''s ongoing devastating impacts, it also offers the opportunity and lessons for building a better, fairer, and sustainable world.
• Transformational change will require new ways of working, challenging powerful individuals and industries who worsened the crisis, will act to exploit it for personal gain, and will work to ensure that the future aligns with their interests.
• A flourishing world needs strong and equitable structures and systems, including strengthened democratic, research, and educational institutions, supported by ideas and discourses that are free of opaque and conflicted influence and that challenge the status quo and inequitable distribution of power.

     

Linking Data on Constituent Health with Elected Officials’ Opinions: Associations Between Urban Health Disparities and Mayoral Officials’ Beliefs About Health Disparities in Their Cities

Policy Points

• Mayoral officials’ opinions about the existence and fairness of health disparities in their city are positively associated with the magnitude of income‐based life expectancy disparity in their city.
• Associations between mayoral officials’ opinions about health disparities in their city and the magnitude of life expectancy disparity in their city are not moderated by the social or fiscal ideology of mayoral officials or the ideology of their constituents.
• Highly visible and publicized information about mortality disparities, such as that related to COVID‐19 disparities, has potential to elevate elected officials’ perceptions of the severity of health disparities and influence their opinions about the issue.

ContextA substantive body of research has explored what factors influence elected officials’ opinions about health issues. However, no studies have assessed the potential influence of the health of an elected official''s constituents. We assessed whether the magnitude of income‐based life expectancy disparity within a city was associated with the opinions of that city''s mayoral official (i.e., mayor or deputy mayor) about health disparities in their city.MethodsThe independent variable was the magnitude of income‐based life expectancy disparity in US cities. The magnitude was determined by linking 2010‐2015 estimates of life expectancy and median household income for 8,434 census tracts in 224 cities. The dependent variables were mayoral officials’ opinions from a 2016 survey about the existence and fairness of health disparities in their city (n = 224, response rate 30.3%). Multivariable logistic regression was used to adjust for characteristics of mayoral officials (e.g., ideology) and city characteristics.FindingsIn cities in the highest income‐based life expectancy disparity quartile, 50.0% of mayoral officials “strongly agreed” that health disparities existed and 52.7% believed health disparities were “very unfair.” In comparison, among mayoral officials in cities in the lowest disparity quartile 33.9% “strongly agreed” that health disparities existed and 22.2% believed the disparities were “very unfair.” A 1‐year‐larger income‐based life expectancy disparity in a city was associated with 25% higher odds that the city''s mayoral official would “strongly agree” that health disparities existed (odds ratio [OR] = 1.25; P = .04) and twice the odds that the city''s mayoral official would believe that such disparities were “very unfair” (OR = 2.24; P <.001).ConclusionsMayoral officials’ opinions about health disparities in their jurisdictions are generally aligned with, and potentially influenced by, information about the magnitude of income‐based life expectancy disparities among their constituents.     

COVID‐19: The Time for Collaboration Between Long‐Term Services and Supports,Health Care Systems,and Public Health Is Now

Policy Points

• To address systemic problems amplified by COVID‐19, we need to restructure US long‐term services and supports (LTSS) as they relate to both the health care systems and public health systems. We present both near‐term and long‐term policy solutions.
• Seven near‐term policy recommendations include requiring the uniform public reporting of COVID‐19 cases in all LTSS settings; identifying and supporting unpaid caregivers; bolstering protections for the direct care workforce; increasing coordination between public health departments and LTSS agencies and providers; enhancing collaboration and communication across health, LTSS, and public health systems; further reducing barriers to telehealth in LTSS; and providing incentives to care for vulnerable populations.
• Long‐term reform should focus on comprehensive workforce development, comprehensive LTSS financing reform, and the creation of an age‐friendly public health system.

ContextThe heavy toll of COVID‐19 brings the failings of the long‐term services and supports (LTSS) system in the United States into sharp focus. Although these are not new problems, the pandemic has exacerbated and amplified their impact to a point that they are impossible to ignore. The primary blame for the high rates of COVID‐19 infections and deaths has been assigned to formal LTSS care settings, specifically nursing homes. Yet other systemic problems have been unearthed during this pandemic: the failure to coordinate the US public health system at the federal level and the effects of long‐term disinvestment and neglect of state‐ and local‐level public health programs. Together these failures have contributed to an inability to coordinate with the LTSS system and to act early to protect residents and staff in the LTSS care settings that are hotspots for infection, spread, and serious negative health outcomes.MethodsWe analyze several impacts of the COVID‐19 pandemic on the US LTSS system and policy arrangements. The economic toll on state budgets has been multifaceted, and the pandemic has had a direct impact on Medicaid, the primary funder of LTSS, which in turn has further exacerbated the states’ fiscal problems. Both the inequalities across race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status as well as the increased burden on unpaid caregivers are clear. So too is the need to better integrate LTSS with the health, social care, and public health systems.FindingsWe propose seven near‐term actions that US policymakers could take: implementing a uniform public reporting of COVID‐19 cases in LTSS settings; identifying and supporting unpaid caregivers; bolstering support for the direct care workforce; increasing coordination between public health departments and LTSS agencies and providers; enhancing collaboration and communication across health, LTSS, and public health systems; further reducing the barriers to telehealth in LTSS; and providing incentives to care for our most vulnerable populations. Our analysis also demonstrates that our nation requires comprehensive reform to build the LTSS system we need through comprehensive workforce development, universal coverage through comprehensive financing reform, and the creation of an age‐friendly public health system.ConclusionsCOVID‐19 has exposed the many deficits of the US LTSS system and made clear the interdependence of LTSS with public health. Policymakers have an opportunity to address these failings through a substantive reform of the LTSS system and increased collaboration with public health agencies and leaders. The opportunity for reform is now.     

The Evolution of Supply and Demand in Markets for Generic Drugs

Policy Points

• Much concern about generic drug markets has emerged in recent policy debates.
• Important changes in regulations, the structure of purchasing, and the length of the drug supply chain have affected generic drug markets.
• Effective price competition remains the rule in generic markets for large‐selling drugs. Smaller markets and those for injectable products often have less price competition and are more susceptible to supply disruptions.

ContextThe image of generic drugs as a commodity sold in competitive markets is an oversimplification, as evidenced by increasing accounts of price spikes, sustained high price‐cost margins, and market disruptions. The mismatch between the canonical economic model of generic drug markets and reality motivated our empirical project.MethodsTo explore recent changes in those factors impacting the supply and demand for generic drugs, we studied, from a variety of sources, the data on price, competition, supply disruptions and recalls, changes to the supply chain, and buy‐side concentration. We examined quarterly data through 2018 for a cohort of 77 molecules that lost patent protection during the so‐called patent cliff between 2010 and 2013.FindingsOn the supply side, we found that for large‐market oral solids, generic entry and price declines were consistent with past studies showing a significant number of market entrants and substantial reductions in the average price of a molecule. In smaller markets for oral solids and injectable products, we observed fewer entrants, higher rates of exit, smaller price reductions, and, in some cases, considerable price instability. The number of reported shortages increased across all generic market types over time, with the rate of shortage increases especially pronounced in markets for injectable products. The number of product recalls also rose over our study period. Although we did not estimate causal effects, we did find several changes in the market environment for generic drugs that may contribute to these phenomena. The demand side for generics has become more concentrated. Supply chains rely more on producers outside the United States (particularly from China and India). Contracting practices have undergone changes that may inhibit competition in product supply. FDA regulatory scruitiny has increased.ConclusionsCompetition in generic drug markets varies widely by market size and product form. Recent changes in demand‐side market structure imply more downward pressure on prices stemming from buy‐side concentration. The FDA''s greater regulatory oversight puts upward pressure on costs, and the lengthening of the supply chain increases production uncertainty for producers. Demand and supply‐side changes point to further market instabilities across all generic markets due to producers’ changing economic position.     

US State Polarization,Policymaking Power,and Population Health

Policy Points

• Explanations for the troubling trend in US life expectancy since the 1980s should be grounded in the dynamic changes in policies and political landscapes. Efforts to reverse this trend and put US life expectancy on par with other high‐income countries must address those factors.
• Of prime importance are the shifts in the balance of policymaking power in the United States, the polarization of state policy contexts, and the forces behind those changes.

The troubling trend in us life expectancy and the widening disparities in life expectancy across the United States have deep roots. This article posits that both trends are grounded in the dynamic changes in the policy and political landscapes since the 1980s. It first briefly describes the trends and the importance of excavating their structural roots. It then builds the case that changes in state policies and politics, as well as the forces behind those changes, are key explanations for both trends.     

International Collaboration to Ensure Equitable Access to Vaccines for COVID‐19: The ACT‐Accelerator and the COVAX Facility

Policy Points

• Equitable access to a COVID‐19 vaccine in all countries remains a key policy objective, but experience of previous pandemics suggests access will be limited in developing countries, despite the rapid development of three successful vaccine candidates.
• The COVAX Facility seeks to address this important issue, but the prevalence of vaccine nationalism threatens to limit the ability of the facility to meet both its funding targets and its ambitious goals for vaccine procurement.
• A failure to adequately address the underlying lack of infrastructure in developing countries threatens to further limit the success of the COVAX Facility.

ContextSignificant effort has been directed toward developing a COVID‐19 vaccine, which is viewed as the route out of the pandemic. Much of this effort has coalesced around COVAX, the multilateral initiative aimed at accelerating the development of COVID‐19 vaccines, and ensuring they are equitably available in low‐ and middle‐income countries (LMICs). This paper represents the first significant analysis of COVAX, and the extent to which it can be said to have successfully met these aims.MethodsThis paper draws on the publicly available policy documents made available by the COVAX initiatives, as well as position papers and public statements from governments around the world with respect to COVID‐19 vaccines and equitable access. We analyze the academic literature regarding access to vaccines during the H1N1 pandemic. Finally, we consider the WHO Global Allocation System, and its principles, which are intended to guide COVAX vaccine deployment.FindingsWe argue that the funding mechanism deployed by the COVAX Pillar appears to be effective at fostering at‐risk investments in research and development and the production of doses in advance of confirmation of clinical efficacy, but caution that this represents a win‐win situation for vaccine manufacturers, providing them with opportunity to benefit regardless of whether their vaccine candidate ever goes on to gain regulatory approval. We also argue that the success of the COVAX Facility with respect to equitable access to vaccine is likely to be limited, primarily as a result of the prevalence of vaccine nationalism, whereby countries adopt policies which heavily prioritize their own public health needs at the expense of others.ConclusionsCurrent efforts through COVAX have greatly accelerated the development of vaccines against COVID‐19, but these benefits are unlikely to flow to LMICs, largely due to the threat of vaccine nationalism.

A vaccine is viewed as the key to bringing about the end of the COVID‐19 pandemic. The sooner a vaccine is available, the sooner the world can begin to escape the acute phase of the pandemic, suppressing mortality and morbidity caused by infection and restoring a degree of normality to social life and the global economy. Not only is global equitable access to a COVID‐19 vaccine an important public health tool, but it is also necessary to ensure that all countries can discharge their human rights obligations. ¹ In an attempt to accelerate the availability of vaccines and other tools to combat COVID‐19, the World Health Organization (WHO) established the Access to COVID‐19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, a global initiative designed to harbor international cooperation and knowledge regarding the pandemic. Specifically, the ACT‐Accelerator is focused on accelerating development in four areas, or pillars: diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines (called COVAX), and health systems strengthening.Although efforts to develop a vaccine are starting to prove successful, with the development of successful candidates from Pfizer, Moderna, and AstraZenica/University of Oxford all receiving emergency regulatory approval in late 2020, key questions remain about which countries will have access to these vaccines, when they will get access, and in what quantities. During the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, procurement of pandemic vaccines was dominated by developed countries, which used advance purchase agreements to reserve doses ahead of production. This severely limited the number of doses available in developing countries. ² In addition to accelerating research and development (R&D) through the ACT‐Accelerator, and in an attempt to ensure more equitable access to vaccines for COVID‐19, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI); Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; and the WHO formed the COVAX Facility in early 2020. The COVAX Facility is designed to address the issues encountered by developing countries during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic by using significant advance market commitments to secure access to vaccines on their behalf. It also encourages multilateral cooperation to increase access to vaccines in all participating countries.This paper argues that the funding mechanism deployed by the COVAX pillar appears to be effective at fostering at‐risk investments in R&D and the production of doses in advance of confirmation of clinical efficacy. Indeed, the development of two vaccine candidates funded by the ACT‐Accelerator is testament to this fact. However, this comes with a caution that the mechanism heavily favors pharmaceutical companies, for which up‐front investment from the COVAX pillar represents a win‐win situation and an opportunity to benefit regardless of whether their vaccine candidate ever goes on to gain regulatory approval. The paper then discusses the COVAX Facility, arguing that, like any multilateral purchasing system, securing a sufficient degree of interest and participation is essential to its success. It argues that the COVAX Facility has so far failed to do this, primarily as a result of the prevalence of vaccine nationalism, whereby countries adopt policies that heavily prioritize their own public health needs at the expense of others, and that its success is therefore likely to be limited. The paper concludes by arguing that the Global Allocation System, designed by the WHO, fails to address the issues experienced by the Vaccine Deployment Initiative during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, specifically the delays in deploying vaccine in developing countries owing to a lack of preparedness and vaccine utilization infrastructure. It argues that, if these issues are not addressed, the COVAX Facility will fail to secure equitable access to vaccines in developing countries, despite the rapid development of successful vaccine candidates, because the allocation framework will be unable to operate as intended.